



Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

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16 August 1990

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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Chad

* Deby Discusses Differences With Habre, War

90AF0368A Cotonou LA GAZETTE DU GOLFE
(Edition Internationale) in French 16 Jun 90 pp 8-10

[Interview with Idriss Deby, Chadian guerrilla leader, by Ismael Y. Soumanou; date and place not given]

[Text] [Soumanou] You are the military leader who is opposing Hissein Habre, with your guerrilla fighters, in the Sudanese Darfour. Are you really a colonel?

[Deby] I am a trained officer. I enrolled in the Officers' Training School in 1975 and emerged a sublieutenant in 1977. I then received a military scholarship to train as a pilot in France. As a result, I spent four years in Lille, in the northern part of France, where I obtained my professional pilot's license.

I returned to Ndjamena in 1979. At that time, there were numerous domestic problems. The civil war between Hissein Habre, who was then prime minister, and the president, General Felix Malloum, was at its height. Thus Ndjamena was on a war footing when I arrived. Chad was torn by civil war. I had chosen my path, and I served with the FAN [Northern Armed Forces], which were commanded at that time by Hissein Habre. I remained with the FAN until the war in 1980 in Ndjamena. As the military commander of the FAN, it was I who returned to Ndjamena first. I took Ndjamena on 7 June 1982 and sent a summons to Hissein Habre, who was in the Ouadai region. He then arrived to assume power. After that date, I was commissioned to organize the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT). I served as commander in chief from 1983 to 1985, when I decided to withdraw to pursue my military studies. I was given the green light by Hissein Habre, and I was accepted at the Interbranch War College in Paris. I began my studies there in September 1985, and I continued until December 1986. Subsequently I was made a colonel by Hissein Habre himself.

[Soumanou] What are the various posts you held in the Habre government prior to your departure?

[Deby] A month after the outbreak of the war in Ndjamena in 1980, Hissein called on me to head the operations there. I was therefore the operational commander in the city of Ndjamena until our withdrawal on 3 December 1980. At that time, he asked me to organize the retreat. I directed the orderly withdrawal of all of the FAN units, which had been sent to Ndjamena, and I reached Rancole on 28 January 1981 with all my men. I then established myself in the Rancole area, the first under FAN control from which I could repel the successive attacks mounted by the forces that formed a coalition in that era. There came a time when our logistics were in total disarray, and I withdrew with our units to the Sudanese frontier, and Hissein came to join us there. In 1981, a great congress was held in Ouadi Bark,

bringing together all of the sympathizers, cadres, and politicians who came out of the FAN in that era, and it was decided that I should be second in command of the FAN.

[Soumanou] Thus you were second only to Hissein Habre?

[Deby] Well, there was a chief of the General Staff, and I was his second in command.

[Soumanou] Who was the chief of the General Staff then?

[Deby] It was the present minister of agriculture, Gouara Lassou. Thus it was my task, in fact, to take the operation in hand, because Gouara Lassou was busy with the organizational plan and political matters. It was I who directed the operation from the frontier to Ndjamena. Gouara Lassou was made a minister when we returned to Ndjamena in 1982, and I was appointed commander in chief of the FAN, while at the same time serving as a member of the CC/FANT [Chadian National Armed Forces Command Council], the political body.

[Soumanou] Were you the only commander of the Chadian army at that time?

[Deby] Yes. I was the only commander. However, I had two assistants. With the establishment of the UNIR [National Union for Independence and Revolution], while remaining in command of the FANT, I was also appointed commissioner of the armies of the UNIR. Thus I held the two positions simultaneously. In 1985, I decided to leave these posts and to devote myself to my military studies. Three months after my return, I was appointed defense adviser to President Hissein Habre, while of course retaining my duties as commissioner for the armies on the level of the single party in power, the UNIR. After the congress of the UNIR in 1988, while continuing as Hissein's defense adviser, I was appointed security commissioner of the UNIR. Until my departure from Ndjamena, I held these two posts.

[Soumanou] How did the dispute between yourself and Hissein develop?

[Deby] I believe that it is no accident when a military commander in chief asks leave to pursue his studies. It means that there is some problem. There were rather profound differences concerning Hissein's manner of leading the country. I must tell you that in 1981, during the congress in Ouadi Bark, which brought together all of the political and military cadres, a political document was drafted by the sovereign congress. The spirit of the Ouadi congress was betrayed, beginning with our entry into Ndjamena in 1982. We have experienced many disappointments. Not only was the spirit of this congress betrayed by Hissein, but there was also the matter of undertaking national reconciliation, a major concern of the government. And what did we see? First of all, the betrayal was political. That is to say, Hissein did not intend to adhere to the political program established at the Ouadi Bark congress or to contribute to national life at all. Second, after our return, the government was formed and all of the institutions of the state were

established, and we could see that, unfortunately, Chad had not entered into a state of law. Where unity was concerned, something dear to the people of Chad, he made it seem he was making peace with the opposition. But in reality, his strategy was to act in such a way as to rally the others individually, leaving the vast mass behind in foreign countries. You cannot be unaware today that a rather substantial portion of the population of Chad is suffering in all of the countries adjacent to Chad and elsewhere. Those who make up this mass, who want to return to this country to make their contribution, also need to live in their own country in peace. And if this mass is not returning to the country today, it is because there is something wrong. There is something incomplete preventing them from returning to their homes. Thus one of our sorrows has to do with this matter. A second reason for sadness, and not a minor one, is the method of managing a national army that has passed the test in the field. The Chadian National Armed Forces were established in 1983, and this is an army that has been tested in the field. From 1983 until 1989, when I left the country, the army was in fact a poor cousin. The pay, which was not, moreover, received every month, was a lump sum of 15,000 francs. Sometimes it was necessary to wait six or seven months.

[Soumanou] Including the officers?

[Deby] The soldiers, the commissioned officers, and the noncommissioned officers.

[Soumanou] The same pay?

[Deby] It is a lump sum. And alongside this army that was tested in the field, Hissein created a parallel army, currently called the Presidential Security Force (SP). The strength of this army had increased to 9,000 men by 1989. After the war with Libya in 1987, all of the heavy weaponry the FANT had was withdrawn and reassigned to the SP, which is composed of young recruits brought in by Hissein from his native region. They are relatives of his. He recruited them for his force. They include shepherds who have had only very slight training in other educational centers. When you see a member of the SP and an FANT soldier marching side by side, you will see that the latter's deportment is smart, while the other man moves like a regular army soldier. I never ceased to tell Hissein that we were in the process of deviating from the spirit of Ouadi Bark. And I think that he found us a great irritant, in his effort to achieve his own goals. He wanted very simply to get rid of us. Obviously, Hissein talked about a coup d'etat. I think that we had many opportunities, if we had indeed wanted to bring off a coup d'etat. In 1982, I was the first to return to Ndjamena. I could have prevented him from coming. I remained commander in chief of the FANT from 1982 until 1985. I had opportunities to promote a coup d'etat. But I never wanted to do that, never, absolutely never. There is no question of a coup d'etat. In fact, Hissein prepared a scenario for the purpose of eliminating us,

pure and simple. Fortunately, we were warned in time, and to prevent further bloodshed in Ndjamena, we withdrew on 1 April 1989.

[Soumanou] What was your relationship with Hassan Djamouss, on the one hand, and with Hissein Habre, on the other?

[Deby] The former is a military leader, a battle companion, like many others, moreover. One could say that I am closer to Gouara, just as one could say that I am closer to Maman Nouri and others. In fact, I have no special relationship with him like that people have reported.

[Soumanou] Some people have said that you had meetings with him that led to problems. What about that?

[Deby] No, not at all. Hassan Djamouss, while he was commander in chief of the FANT and I was the defense adviser to Hissein—it is very true that our respective duties in that era led us to see each other and to discuss the situation often. That is certainly true. Thus these could not have been meetings for plotting, or motivated by evil intentions. That is not true.

[Soumanou] Hassan Djamouss replaced you, then, as commander in chief of the army?

[Deby] In fact he did, following my departure in 1985.

[Soumanou] What about the official story to the effect that you attempted a coup d'etat? What really happened?

[Deby] I said a moment ago that if it had been necessary to effect a coup d'etat, we would have done it. That was never our ambition. In 1982, when I returned to Ndjamena, Hissein was in Abeche. At that time, I could have prevented him from returning to Ndjamena and assuming government power.

[Soumanou] How long after you returned to Ndjamena did Hissein come back?

[Deby] He returned to Ndjamena four days later. I sent him a radio message. "We have taken control of Ndjamena. The situation is under control. You can come." That was the wording of the message we sent. And so Hissein returned to Ndjamena four days after our victory. In other words, he arrived on 12 June, coming from Manssakori, where he had spent two days. After that time, I was the military commander. If I had had these intentions, these ambitions, I would have attempted a coup d'etat immediately. Why would I leave the army and go elsewhere to attempt a coup d'etat, when while in control of things, it could have been done? For my part, I believe that this was a scenario he invented and announced to the domestic and international public. We absolutely never attempted any coup d'etat against Hissein.

[Soumanou] How did you manage to leave?

[Deby] It was on Saturday, 1 April, and I was in my office when a comrade came to see me. He saluted, and I could see that he was very upset. I realized then something was wrong.

For security reasons, I cannot give you the name of this comrade, who is one of the men close to Hissein today. What he said to me then was this. "I am afraid that what is happening today will cost you a great deal." I tried to find out what he meant, and he informed me that SP units had been alerted. "I do not know why, but we fear the worst. You are likely to be Hissein's target, in the same way the Hadjara were targets."

I was surprised. Another comrade, an officer, went to see Djamouss to tell him that a plan was being drafted to kidnap us late that night. He informed him that the targets of the plan were Ibrahim Etno, who was at that time minister of interior; Hassan Djamouss; and Deby. Then comrade Djamouss telephoned me. He told me that he had just learned that something was being plotted against us. I took my vehicle and drove to Hissein's area to see if in fact there were units that had been placed on alert. I saw a battalion on alert status.

[Soumanou] In what part of Ndjamenana?

[Deby] In the enclosure that is commonly called the Presidency. And thus we were prepared. As we have said, there was no need for further bloodshed here. To remain and to surrender to Hissein would have also meant dying in his prisons. For a soldier, it is better to die with dignity, weapon in hand, than to surrender to someone only to be coldly eliminated. It was thus that we chose to leave voluntarily.

[Soumanou] How did you get together again with Hassan Djamouss?

[Deby] We had arranged a rendezvous by telephone. We went to a certain neighborhood in the northern part of Ndjamenana at midnight to complete our plans. He came accompanied by several individuals, as did I, and we proceeded together.

[Soumanou] How many of you were there?

[Deby] We were a large group. At the beginning, leaving Ndjamenana, there were some 50 of us. But in the course of our withdrawal, there were supporters at each of the garrisons we passed who came along with us. It became a whole army.

[Soumanou] Was Ibrahim Etno with you when you left Ndjamenana?

[Deby] Etno was in Ndjamenana. He was preparing to join us when Hissein's security personnel arrested him at his home. Thus he did not physically have time to leave.

[Soumanou] What happened then?

[Deby] According to reports in our possession, he was coldly eliminated by Hissein himself.

[Soumanou] How did you manage to get out of the country?

[Deby] We reached the Sudanese frontier after fighting seven battles.

[Soumanou] How far is the Sudanese frontier from Ndjamenana?

[Deby] About 1,200 kilometers.

[Soumanou] How did these seven battles develop?

[Deby] The soldiers who pursued us were from the presidential contingent currently called the SP. At 4:00 PM on 2 April, the first clash occurred at Bil Kilm, 205 kilometers east of Ndjamenana. There were two companies there pursuing us, and two others in front of us. Approximately 800 men. Another battle occurred at 6:00 PM. We took control of the town, which allowed us to resupply ourselves with fuel, ammunition, and food-stuffs, and then we continued.

[Soumanou] Was Hassan Djamouss still with you?

[Deby] Yes, he was. At 3:00 the following afternoon, our pursuers overtook us in the Mongo region, and the battle began at noon. At 2:00 PM, we were able to repulse the attack. Thus we were able to recover vehicles, ammunition, weapons, and fuel from the enemy, and we continued along our route. When we arrived at a subprefecture called Abouteya in the Amitina region about 5:00 PM, we found that SP commandos had arrived by plane and were waiting for us at the edge of the town. We forced the gate. We entered the town and we saw that there was a force that was still pursuing us. We had our radio, and thus we were following all developments. We decided it would be wise to leave. We left Abouteya, moving in the direction of Mangalme, during the night. At 9:00 the next morning, we reached the subprefecture. There were battles at 9:00 AM and 5:00 PM. There again, we succeeded in pushing the enemy back, and we proceeded toward the frontier. There was no battle at all on the fourth. On the fifth of the month, we reached a locality called Adjar Hadit, 200 kilometers from the frontier. There we encountered three columns, which had pursued us. The first had come from Abeche, the second from Ndjamenana, and the third from Iriba. These three columns converged on us in Adjar Hadit. The clashes occurred between 1:00 and 5:00 PM. We were able to gain control of the terrain, repulsing our adversaries. In the morning, we continued along our route. On 6 April, there was no battle, and on the seventh, when we reached the frontier, we encountered other pursuers, who had come from Tine, at Sebeya. There were battles on the seventh. We again repulsed the attack. Throughout all this time, Hassan Djamouss remained with us. Then on the night of 7 April, we crossed the Sudanese frontier, where we had fuel problems. In fact, we had some wounded, but no medicines. There was nothing we could do but stay there and wait. We sent people left and right in search of medicines and fuel. We remained in the same spot until the 12th.

[Soumanou] And how did you survive?

[Deby] It is not a desert area there. There is a civilian population living there, and the people gave us food.

[Soumanou] Had you already succeeded in reaching Sudanese territory?

[Deby] Yes.

[Soumanou] Had you made contact with the Sudanese authorities?

[Deby] We attempted to make contact with the Sudanese authorities in Darfour to ask for asylum and protection. Obviously, we had sent someone toward Darfour to find the authorities. On 12 April, a large column with armored vehicles, estimated at more than 3,000 men, came into Sudanese territory, some 20 kilometers from the frontier, to attack us. It was there that Comrade Hassan Djamouss was wounded and taken prisoner.

[Soumanou] In fact, how exactly was he wounded?

[Deby] The pressure was such that in fact the war had stopped at Kili Tetan. We were located in different positions. It was a fact that once radiophonic contact had been broken, one could not know what was happening at another position. Thus when we got together again in the evening, we learned that Hassan Djamouss had been wounded during the attack and had been taken prisoner. He suffered a foot wound, and was taken alive to Ndjamen, where Hissein struck him down coldly, by his own hand.

[Soumanou] Do you have proof that it was Hissein himself who did this?

[Deby] Quite recently, after this action took place, many people have come to join us. These are people who have come from Ndjamen—military people, cadres. It has not been reported officially, but according to what is being said in Ndjamen, it was Hissein himself who struck him down in cold blood.

[Soumanou] When you were commander in chief, had Hissein struck down anyone like that?

[Deby] In any case, there is a security system that Hissein installed about which none of us knows anything. It is what he calls now the Documentation and Security Office (DDS). It is headed by his nephew. The expeditious methods used by this security department have been noted by everyone. Kidnappings, unjustified detentions, and the physical liquidation of men and women were daily occurrences. It does not surprise us that in some instances, Hissein himself was present at torture sessions, occasions when certain political officials were dispatched. I would cite the case of Salem Gaba. It was Hissein himself who was there. I would cite the case of Ahmed, a former colleague of Hissein's and a member of the CC/FAN [Northern Armed Forces Command Council], who was also detained and liquidated by Hissein. I know whereof I speak.

[Soumanou] Have any of your people ever told you that President Habre himself tortured individuals, was present during torture, or physically liquidated anyone?

[Deby] Hissein's expeditious police system is known throughout the world. And, moreover, that is what has left everyone speechless today. The people cannot say what is really happening in the field. Let us take a simple example.

One goes to a friend's home in search of him. There is no way you can know if he is dead or alive, because first of all you are prevented from visiting him, from meeting with him, from greeting him, even if he is your son or brother. You can never know if he is dead or alive. Thousands of citizens of Chad are in this situation today. They have been arrested and their families do not know if they are dead or alive. But what is certain is that Hissein himself personally attends torture sessions. That is a reality.

[Soumanou] A number of soldiers were killed or wounded during these battles. It is reported that you yourself were wounded. What is the exact truth about this?

[Deby] Not at all. From the time of our departure in April 1989 to the present, we have been through many clashes and harsh battles with Hissein's units. But I was never wounded.

[Soumanou] Where are your men at the present time?

[Deby] After our retreat, we reached the Darfour region. We asked the Sudanese Government for protection and refugee status. The Sudanese Government, which was headed at the time by Prime Minister Sadek El Mahdi, agreed. There we established ourselves in a place in Sudanese territory chosen for us by the authorities in Darfour. And in exchange, the government demanded that we surrender our weapons. We agreed, because we were refugees and we had to submit to the laws and regulations of the country. But we had asked for a guarantee of our safety, because Hissein would be capable of going to where we were and attacking us. A week after this meeting with the Sudanese authorities, Hissein penetrated 150 kilometers into the territory and attacked us at a well called Ossen. There again, within sight and sound of everyone, Hissein himself announced over the radio that he had advanced 200 kilometers into the country. We saw then that if we surrendered our weapons, the Sudanese Government would not be capable of protecting us.

We said that it would be futile to surrender our weapons under these conditions. At that exact moment, a number of individuals in the FANT came to join us. Many other partners did so as well, and every day new arrivals swelled our ranks. We organized ourselves as an army in order to defend ourselves better. And we simultaneously attempted to make contact with the heads of the opposition in Chad. We organized in the Darfour region, and we also demanded that they come and contribute to our efforts. Many did come. Personnel from the CDR [Revolutionary Democratic Council], the 1st Army, and the FAT [Chadian Armed Forces] came to join us. Thus again our ranks were swelled. And in September 1989, Hissein, in violation of all the international regulations, plunged into the Sudan in depth and attacked us at

Bamisse. The war lasted one month. After the battles in Bamisse, Hissein suffered serious losses, very serious, and he withdrew. Today, we are organized as an army, in adequate numbers, and we are determined to continue the struggle. Our forces do not include military personnel only. There are also civilians who have come to seek refuge alongside us. Their number exceeds 15,000. To these numbers are added the families of the military personnel who have come to join us, making a whole population, which supports us and is with us in everything we do. Our numbers are estimated today at more than 40,000 men.

[Soumanou] In view of the fact that Hissein Habre's government has material and financial resources available, what sources do you have? Do you think you can hold on?

[Deby] We have demonstrated in the field that we can do anything. We will in fact be able to hold on to the end. During the last battles on 25 April, in Bahai, Tine, Herba, and Guerida, there was a force made up of Presidential Security personnel in excess of 4,000 men at the frontier. This force had the most efficient equipment—heavy equipment such as T-55 tanks, the BNPs of the 90s, and other weapons as well, but we repulsed them. And we were able to recover equipment from them. Thus it is this equipment we recover in the field that allows us to fight the enemy. And the contribution made by the civilian population coming from our country, as well as outside it, is very substantial. There are Chadian civilian settlements that support us, and we share the daily bread they give us with them. In this connection, we have no problems.

[Soumanou] What are your relations with the Sudanese Government?

[Deby] You know, Sudan and Chad are neighboring countries, which have a common frontier more than 8,000 kilometers long. And the population along the border areas is made up of people who share more or less the same civilization and traditions. We can even say that they are brotherly populations. The relations between the people of Chad and the people of Sudan are historic relations. When Hissein left in 1981, he sought refuge in Sudan. And at the time, General Gafar El Numeri, who was the president of Sudan, allocated a portion of the country so that Hissein and we could organize, using it as our base, with a view to returning and seizing power. We also asked the government of Sudan to welcome and protect us, in this same spirit. And just as the government supported Hissein in 1981, it allowed us to remain in Sudan, as well.

[Soumanou] And what about your relations with Libya?

[Deby] More or less the same thing. Libya is a country adjacent to Chad, a country with which, due to recent history, we have had problems, it is true. But the Libyan people remain a brotherly people to the people of Chad. It must be realized that there is a very substantial population of Chadians living in Libya. Thus it is in our interest to make contact with these groups living in

Libya. And this is why I told you a moment ago that there are men from the 1st Army, the CDR, and the FAT who came to join us. It is from Libya that they came to swell our ranks. But there are no special relations between us and Libya, that is a fact.

[Soumanou] There are rumors to the effect that during the harsh battles you fought with the FANT, you went to resupply yourself with weapons and to sign agreements with Libya. Can you confirm this?

[Deby] I have said that I have never engaged in any written or verbal agreement—none.

[Soumanou] But you did go to Libya, just the same?

[Deby] I never went to Libya.

[Soumanou] Was it the Government of Sudan or the authorities in Darfour who welcomed you?

[Deby] There is a part of our population that sought refuge in Sudan, with the authorization of the government in Darfour. Members of our forces go to visit their families and return again. But we have no special relations. Hissein would have it believed that the Sudanese Government is helping us. This is not at all true. The weapons we use in the field are weapons recovered either from Hissein's men, weapons we have obtained from the people who rallied to support us, or weapons belonging to the members of the opposition in Chad who came to make their contribution to the struggle.

[Soumanou] What is your view on the differences between your country and Libya on the subject of the Aouzou strip?

[Deby] The problem of the Aouzou strip is a frontier issue, which began in fact in 1972. I must tell you that this is a recent affair. The individual who authorized the establishment of the Libyan Army in the Aouzou strip at that time was Hissein Habre himself, when he was president of the CC/FAN. Thus the problem today is thus not a new one. There has been a dispute between Libya and Chad, but we believe that the Aouzou strip is an integral part of Chad. We also think that this problem of the Aouzou strip cannot be resolved by the force of arms. What is needed is dialogue—sitting down at the table to discuss the matter within the framework of our regional and subregional organizations, in order to find a solution with the brotherly people of Libya. But nonetheless, the Aouzou strip well and truly belongs to Chad.

[Soumanou] You collaborated closely with President Hissein, and you say that it was he who authorized the Libyan Army to establish itself there. Why did he do that?

[Deby] As I said, he did that in 1972, because in that era, Hissein needed weapons to combat the Tombalbaye regime. And the Libyans did not come of their own accord. Thus it was in a way a trade. The Libyans would come and establish themselves in the Aouzou strip, but they would give him weapons to wage the battle against the Tombalbaye regime.

This is not ancient history, and all of the people of Chad are familiar with it. It is a reality.

[Soumanou] After you left Chad, did Hissein attempt to arrange talks with you, or vice versa?

[Deby] No! I never received a message from any emissary from Ndjamen, while we, on our side, never sent a representative there. But nonetheless, the Sudanese Government informed us in December that it would launch an effort to reconcile us. Since then, we have heard nothing. Thus there has not in fact been any contact.

[Soumanou] There has been no contact between Hissein and yourself to date, but if he were to indicate a desire to meet with you in a neutral country today for the purpose of discussion, would you accept?

[Deby] The problem does not lie between Hissein and Idriss. I think that the problem is one that pertains to all the citizens of Chad. I am not the only citizen of Chad in the opposition. You know, there are Chadians who live in all of the countries adjacent to Chad, and elsewhere in the world, who regard themselves as members of the opposition. I think that if there were to be a meeting, it would have to be a general meeting between Hissein and all of the opposition. But not Hissein-Idriss. Otherwise it would be like Sheik Ibn Omar, and the others who returned. Just the same as that. The opposition will always exist, and therefore the problem of Chad will not be settled yet. We would again be obliged to stay with Hissein and to take up arms to combat those people. And what purpose would that serve? What is of interest to the people of Chad, in fact, is finding a solution, a global solution, taking the entire opposition in Chad, wherever its members may be, into account. What we must have is a definitive settlement of the problem of Chad.

[Soumanou] If the holding of a national conference like that in Benin or Gabon were demanded now, would you be ready to return to Chad?

[Deby] You must ask the question of Hissein. I do not know if he is ready today to organize such a conference. I do not think so. But if there is any undertaking that would pave the way for the people of Chad to make a decision about their future, we could do nothing but accept.

[Soumanou] Do you have political ambitions, or more specifically, would you agree to serve as president if the opportunity should arise?

[Deby] You know, since 1982, I have always been a military leader. I have held very important posts within the FAN and Hissein's government. If I had such ambitions or pretensions, I would long since have attempted a coup d'etat, or I would have undertaken some action, which would have led me to say that I wanted power. I think that this is not my desire at all. Far from it. My personal ambition is to serve in such a way that peace will be established in this country, real peace, so that the people of Chad can return to their homeland and contemplate the problem of development, the problem of

their dignity, and the problem of freedom. I think that this is my only ambition. I have none other.

[Soumanou] We interviewed the first secretary and charge d'affaires at the Chadian Embassy in Benin. He believes that the problem is not between Chad and its citizens, but rather between Chad and Libya. Is the problem between Chad and Libya, or between Chad and the Sudan, or does it involve Chad alone?

[Deby] That is not what I think. The reality is to be found in the field. I challenge anyone to come and see us in the field. If there were a single Libyan in our ranks, I would agree that the problem is between Chad and Libya. And on the same basis, if there were a single Sudanese in our ranks, I would accept the fact that the problem is between Chad and Sudan. In fact, Hissein has always found a reason underlying this Libyan-Chadian threat, the Islamic Legion, and all the rest. I think that the reality is that if I am not a member of the Islamic Legion, my compatriots in the field are as much citizens of Chad as I am. We have no foreigners in our ranks. There are only citizens of Chad who are members of the opposition, who left the country because of the deteriorating political situation there, and who are combating the regime in power. Moreover, Hissein is always crying wolf when there is no wolf visible! Because when Hissein sees the shadow of Libya everywhere, this allows him to obtain military aid, because he is an individual who has no government program other than war. War domestically, war on the frontiers—war, war, constant war. Thus this allows him to have weapons to continue his war program, nothing more and nothing less.

[Soumanou] A few weeks ago, a convoy of Libyan trucks transporting people was stopped by Hissein's men. You were in the Sudan. What happened, in reality?

[Deby] I was in Chad, and I am not familiar with the facts.

[Soumanou] You were in the interior of Chad, then?

[Deby] Yes, in Chadian territory. At the time, I was with some other individuals in the interior portion of the territory of Chad, in a locality called Ehin Dani.

[Soumanou] Your men had occupied a part of Chadian territory, then?

[Deby] They did, in fact.

[Soumanou] About how many square kilometers in the interior of Chad?

[Deby] I cannot estimate it in square kilometers. These are wells, or, let us say, villages. Thus the interception of these trucks took place more than 400 kilometers from the border, on the commercial route linking Darfour with Libya, in Sudanese territory. This is a problem we deplore, because in fact this was an act of piracy, since these were civilian convoys. Hissein spoke of military convoys. At that time, we were not expecting military convoys coming from that direction. Thus these were civilian convoys that were piratically attacked by

Hissein. What we deplore even more is the fact that this genocide was perpetrated by Hissein, in violation of all the international regulations, upon civilians from Chad who have sought refuge in the Darfour region of Sudan. Hissein pushes into the country, takes hostage, and kills the civilians from Chad who have taken refuge there. And this is how he takes his prisoners.

[Soumanou] We have learned that the convoy of trucks was carrying soldiers who were to reinforce your men in the Darfour region. Is this true?

[Deby] The reality is different. Illumination will come as of the time when Sudan claims its civilian citizens coming from Libya, and when Libya also claims its civilian personnel. I said that we were not expecting military convoys coming to us from Libya. That is the truth. I think that this story is designed to camouflage this act of piracy. After all, Hissein has found it convenient to say that these were military convoys destined to join us.

[Soumanou] As of today, the battles between your men and Hissein's forces have temporarily ceased. Do you not think that the time has come to make peace now?

[Deby] It is sad to continue to plunge Chadian families into mourning every day. If we are led to wage war, it is not for the pleasure of doing so, but because each time, Hissein forces us to wage this war. All of the successive attacks that have occurred since our departure in 1989 were attacks directed against us by Hissein himself. We have never undertaken to attack the FANT. On the other hand, we further deplore this war, which is in progress, because it is Hissein who, each time, having war as his government program, has created situations that have plunged Chadian families into mourning. And I think that life for the people of Chad has been rich in events.

In 1979, Hissein was President Malloum's prime minister. It was he who was behind the war that was called North-South, Christian-Muslim, at the time. In 1980, it was again Hissein who was behind the war between the FAN and the other movements that formed a coalition.

Since 1982, we have had to wage war at home and abroad, successively. In 1983, you will recall, Hissein promoted the war on the frontier with neighboring Nigeria, at the same time as war was being waged in the North with Libya. At the same time, he promoted war with the local ethnic groups, the Kanembou and the Kreda, in Kanem Lac. In 1983, there was the war with the Arabs in the Center, and in 1983-1987, the war in the South and the Center-East. In 1989, there was again war with the Arabs.

Thus Hissein is to be found at the origin of all the evils from which the people of Chad are suffering. The only path of salvation for the people of Chad demands that Hissein abandon the political scene in Chad and leave the people of Chad to decide upon their fate in democratic pluralism. This is the message I want to put forth.

[Soumanou] Do you believe that he is willing to leave power today?

[Deby] How long will the people of Chad tolerate the appetites of a man who has no desires but war and blood?

[Soumanou] If he refuses to relinquish power and is ready to organize a national conference like that in Benin or Gabon, what will the alternative be?

[Deby] For us, there will have to be a change. And it is the people who will decide on the society they want to establish. Whether it be through a national conference like those held in Benin and elsewhere, or whether it be the departure of Hissein, the people themselves must find the means of expressing themselves as to their destiny. That is what our goal is.

[Soumanou] What are you doing to rally the opposition to form a capable force so that you can get your message better understood?

[Deby] In fact, this situation worries us a great deal. Since our departure in April 1989, we have put forth every possible effort aimed at all of the opposition political movements abroad, urging that we come together again on a new basis, that we succeed in organizing in such a way as to find a common formula for understanding, a new alternative. We have been in touch with all of the political factions. Contact is being maintained, and at this point, our desire is for the internal quarrels, the quarrels pertaining in fact to leadership and separate interests, to disappear to the benefit of the national interests. What our people are awaiting, I believe, is unity. It is necessary that the foundations for national unity be established now on the level of the opposition here. The unity so long desired by our people must be projected by the opposition beginning now. We have also deplored the fact that since our departure, we have engaged in concrete actions in the field, but we have never had anything other than moral support from these movement leaders, these leaders of political factions in the Chadian opposition. Obviously, some of our brothers in arms belonging to these movements have come to participate with us in what we are doing. There are people who have come from the 1st Army, others from the CDR and the FAT. But the fact remains that we deplore the silence of these leaders of political factions and groups who have not to date responded to our appeal.

[Soumanou] Do you think that the fact that they remain silent means that they also want to return, like the others who occupy ministerial posts in Chad today?

[Deby] This is a question that perhaps should be asked of them. They would know better than I how to respond. Nonetheless, what is certain is that there has been a split within the opposition. A split that began in the era of the GUNT [National Union Transition Government]. Thus it is not easy for us to succeed in getting ourselves together and finding a solution. This will not be done in one, two, or three days. But I think that thanks to the contact maintained on both sides, there will inevitably

come a day when we will get together to establish the foundations for real opposition unity. That is our desire and our concern, as well.

[Soumanou] What do you think of those individuals who have now returned to Chad and who occupy positions of responsibility in Hisssein's government?

[Deby] For my part, I think that these are individuals, leaders without followers, who went to join Hisssein and abandoned their troops. You have seen all of the citizens of Chad who are running more or less here and there in the neighboring countries and elsewhere. These are the men and women who have been abandoned by their leaders. They abandoned their troops, their sympathizers, and returned to Ndjamen. Here again, I think that the people of Chad should extract the lessons to be learned from all that has happened.

Zaire

First 100 Days of Transition Cabinet Viewed

AB1508185790 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French
1830 GMT 12 Aug 90

[Text] Tomorrow Zaire's transitional government will enter its 100th day amid strong criticism by the Zairian opposition and calls by the Zairian press for its resignation. In a recent interview to the Zairian national radio, Prime Minister Lunda Bululu expressed optimism about the changes that had been adopted. Lunda Bululu's optimism stems from the fact that the Zairian parliament last month amended some parts of the Constitution pertaining to the multiparty system.

The parliament adopted a law on financing political parties in Zaire. There will be three parties in Zaire at the primary elections scheduled for the beginning of next year. Furthermore, the opposition is criticizing the reduction of the number of parties which, according to it, impedes real democracy in the country.

It must however be admitted that the Zairian political scene has considerably changed in the 100 days following the open policy decreed by President Mobutu. The number of political parties increased from one to 63. All the opposition parties are calling for a national conference which, according to them, will help establish true democracy in Zaire.

While waiting for the elections, the parties are organizing press conferences and meetings to make themselves known because they still cannot use the national press or well-known media. Some of these parties, like the party of [name indistinct], one of the founding fathers of independent Zaire, along with Kamanda wa Kamanda, or the Independent Republican Party of former Foreign Minister Nguz A Karl-I-Bond, have national structures and supporters nationwide.

Lunda Bululu's optimism in the economic field, notably about balancing public finances and fighting inflation, is

strongly opposed by the national press which, for the past three months, has been highly critical. It contends that the government's failure is apparent in salaries and inflation control.

Registration of 60 Political Associations Noted

AB1508201290 Dakar PANA in French 1834 GMT
14 Aug 90

[Text] Dakar, 14 Aug (PANA)—Sixty political associations have been registered in Zaire since President Mobutu Sese Seko, on 24 April, announced the introduction of political pluralism to be limited to three parties. "As of today, 60 political associations have expressed their intention to form political parties," the minister counsellor at the Zairian Presidency, Mokolo wa Pombo, who has just visited the Senegalese capital, asserted.

In part of his interview with PANA devoted to internal policy, the Zairian statesman spoke exclusively of the current process in his country that will lead to a multiparty government by 1991. President Mobutu's adviser, who concluded a three-day visit to Senegal on 12 August, asserted that Zaire is "not living in a closed vase." He, however, affirmed that the national element has weighed more heavily than the international environment on the overture that the Zairian head of state initiated four months ago.

The popular consultation that President Mobutu undertook from January to March 1990 has "revealed the real aspirations of the Zairian people as far as their political evolution is concerned," Mr. Mokolo emphasized. That was the origin of the decision putting an end to the existence, the Zairian emissary stated. [sentence as received] Mr. Mokolo, who was the former minister of public works and territorial administration, has been charged with coordinating this campaign, gathering and compiling the memoranda submitted by various social, professional, or socioprofessional organizations.

Concerning implementing this process that will lead to establishing this three-party regime, the Zairian minister confirmed that early next year, "elementary elections, probably in the form of local or communal elections," will be organized.

According to the law, he added, the three groups winning the most seats after this consultation "will be constitutionally considered as the only political parties authorized to practice political activities." He specified in his interview with PANA that the parties that will be recognized like this will be the ones to participate in the presidential and legislative elections which will be held later the same year.

Questioned on the reaction of opponents living abroad, President Mobutu's emissary expressed his satisfaction with what he called "an important and real movement" for the return of political exiles. In fact, two spokesmen of the UDPS (Union for Democracy and Social Progress, which in the past acted as an internal opposition movement),

have returned to Kinshasa. They are the movement's Chairman Professor Lihau Ebua Libana le Molengo and a lecturer in sociology Dikonda wa Lumanisha.

Another opponent has abandoned the land of exile: General Nathanael Mbumba, whose followers invaded Kolwezi Region in 1977 and 1978 sparking the two "Shaba wars" in southeastern Zaire.

*** Resolution of Civil Servants' Grievances Urged**

90AF0507B Kinshasa ELIMA in French
20 Jul 90 pp 1, 8

[Editorial: "Solving the Civil Servants' Problems"]

[Text] Public administration has been paralyzed since early July by the civil servants' strike. The functionaries working in the public sector have only one demand: higher salaries. Current salaries are not high enough—to live on. They are nowhere near commensurate with the current cost of living.

In every way, the current pay scale consigns civil servants to poverty.

In fact, according to a World Bank report on global development made public on 16 July, a poor person is defined as anyone whose annual income is less than \$370.

That is why the civil servants are demanding higher wages. The government must find a solution that satisfies their needs. The Council of Ministers at its last meeting called on the civil servants to return to their jobs without delay, but the appeal fell on deaf ears. The civil servants remain intransigent.

What most irritates them are the government's unkept promises. The government had solemnly sworn that public sector employees would get a significant wage increase in July. Although the situation cries out urgently for resolution, the transition government has instead chosen to set up an ad hoc committee to deal with the salary issue, as if the civil servants had only just now come out with their demands. Everyone knows what the problem is. But no one dares to lift a finger to announce the first step toward overcoming the impasse. With a little political will, the civil servants' could be alleviated, at least to some extent.

Further, the establishment of a committee whose members include the secretaries general of several public agencies has astonished a number of observers, given the fact that nearly 10 years ago there was set up an "economic crisis committee" that was supposed to meet whenever a new problem arose.

The government seems to be minimizing the civil servants' strike movement. It does not seem to have realized yet that a 10-day strike represents a serious loss for the state.

At present, everything is paralyzed. It is high time for the state to resolve this thorny social problem. A word to the wise is sufficient!

*** 10 Victims of Student Massacre Identified**

90AF0507A Brussels LE SOIR in French 18 Jul 90 p 6

[Article by Veronique Kiesel: "Citizens Resume Probe"; first paragraph is LE SOIR introduction]

[Text] New information in the affair of the 11 May killings on the Lumumbashi campus: a list of 10 victims identified by a group of Zairian citizens...

The attack that took place on the campus of Lumumbashi University on the night of 11-12 May is still being talked about: after provoking a new and exceptionally serious crisis in Belgian-Zairian relations—since it has led, at least for the time being, to the suspension of Belgian cooperation in Zaire—within the next few weeks the affair is going to lead to the public identification of all the students who fell victim in the assault by the organized murderers. Since classes have not been held since May, the beginning of the new academic term in September should provide an opportunity to tally up the "unexcused absences"...

For a long time Zairian authorities maintained that only one person was killed in the "incidents" at Lumumbashi, before taking refuge behind one of the conclusions of their parliamentary investigating committee, namely that it "was not possible to determine the number of victims." However, almost immediately after the very violent night of 11 May, an ever-increasing number of eyewitnesses began to tell of dozens of fatalities, although the names of those killed by the security forces could not be established.

Yesterday we received the report of a private inquest undertaken by a group of Zairians in Lumumbashi with close links to the opposition. Their aim was to help the international commission of inquiry that was supposed to get to the bottom of the facts. As we know, the Zairian Government has steadfastly refused to allow the international commission to do its work, preferring to content itself with an investigation at the national level.

The report we received contains an initial list of 10 victims who appear to have been conclusively identified.

Among the victims of this organized repression were the student Elombe, a native of Kasai-Oriental and a second-year metallurgy student who reportedly died at South Lumumbashi Hospital; Ngoy Kamanda of Shaba, who was finishing his second year in law school; Numbi Wa Banza, from Manono in Shaba province, who was reportedly picked up in the bush on the outskirts of the campus; Abel Kajanga, a second-year student in political-administrative science, son of Luani Kajanga; Tshiomba Olonda, a native of Shaba from the Sambue mission who was completing his second year of studies for a graduate degree in political science; Mabisisi

Mavasi of Bandundu, in his last year of medical school; Mabila Phoba, who was working on his first degree in international relations; Ambuya Mfudi of Bandundu, a second-degree polytechnic student; and Zapate, also of Bandundu, a law student. Mamie Esambo Diase of Kasai-Oriental, a third-degree law graduate whose parents are from Kanango, reportedly received grievous wounds and is now crippled in both legs.

It is unfortunately very difficult to confirm this information, since telephone communications with Lumumbashi were impossible on Tuesday, and the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the recently repatriated former consul in Lumumbashi, refused to comment, in order not to increase tensions further while the withdrawal of Belgian aid teams is still in progress.

It would therefore be incautious to assert categorically that these 10 students were really murdered, and only a counter inquest carried out on the scene by an international organization could establish the truth. Nevertheless, the list as it stands has enough detail—academic status, towns of origin—to give it a certain credibility. Unless the Zairian Government for its part can bring forth evidence that all those young people are still very much alive...

* British Emergency Food Assistance Reported

90AF0483B Kinshasa ELIMA in French
19 Jul 90 pp 1, 9

[Unattributed article: "Zaire Receives Emergency Food Assistance From the British Government"]

[Text] The British minister of foreign development, Mrs. Lynda Chalker, has just announced her government's promise to supply an additional 7,500 metric tons of food as part of the International Emergency Food Reserve, thus bringing total British food assistance for the year 1990-91 to more than 57,500 metric tons, including nonemergency aid.

The overall supplementary emergency aid package amounts to 900,000 pounds sterling (or 900 million zaires) earmarked for Tanzania, Zaire, and Western Samoa. Zaire's share, 3,750 metric tons of corn, will help feed refugees displaced by the war in the Sudan.

* Director of OZAC Suspended for Fraud

90AF0483A Kinshasa ELIMA in French
18 Jul 90 pp 1, 8

[Article by Kisungu Kiambi: "OZAC: Why Was the President-Director General Suspended?"; first two paragraphs are ELIMA introduction]

[Text] The Zairian Control Office, managed like an ownerless property, is on the brink of bankruptcy.

Will the government's decision put an end to the social discontent prevailing at the firm?

While waiting for the findings of the investigating team which will be sent immediately to the Zairian Control Office (OZAC) for fiscal, administrative, and technical oversight, Mr. Bononge Endunda, the president-director general of this public-sector firm was suspended from his duties. The decision was made last Friday at the weekly meeting of the Council of Ministers chaired by the prime minister, Professor Lunda Bululu.

According to information in our possession, Mr. Endunda is charged with poor management of the agency's finances and staff as well as with signing dubious work contracts worth hundreds of millions of zaires, corrupting members of the administrative council and certain members of the management committee by granting them illegal bonuses, insubordination to the government and most specifically to his administrative authority, squandering huge sums of money on individuals who were not part of the firm, notably friends and family members of the president-director general, etc. [sentence as published]

On the issue of bad fiscal management, this was particularly characterized by illegal and irregular expenses and by short-term debts sought by Mr. Endunda that amount to more than one billion zaires, 760 million of which represent overdrafts granted OZAC by different local banks in order to cover ordinary operating expenses, particularly the payment of wages and more than 200 million zaires due various suppliers.

The situation is all the more catastrophic since the firm is no longer able to pay its bills when they fall due and thus goes further into debt to discharge its obligations.

Thus, since the beginning of 1990, total bank overdrafts have not stopped growing at the end of each month, thus worsening the OZAC's insolvency. The agency is caught in a vicious circle in which monthly receipts no longer cover monthly responsibilities, which only swell in favor of the banks.

As proof, we deem it important to review the history of these bank overdrafts, which is as follows, according to this firm's financial records:

- 282,757,612.71 zaires on 25 January 1990
- 357,343,615.38 zaires on 27 February 1990
- 519,416,766 zaires on 28 March 1990
- 622,810,404 zaires on 26 April 1990
- 603,952,248 zaires on 26 May 1990
- 756,036,300.99 zaires on 22 June 1990

Further evidence of President-Director General Endunda's bad management, which has been provided to us, concerns his role in arranging labor deals. In this area we have come across a particular case involving the recent importation of a computer for the OZAC with a declared value of US\$447,509. This transaction turns out to be tainted with several irregularities, one in particular being the absence of a call for bids on a transaction worth almost one-half million US dollars or more than 350 million zaires financed by short-term bank credit, a second being the absence of prior authorization by

administrative authority, and a third being making the deal without the management committee's knowledge.

Furthermore, an analysis of the available documents reveals that the invoice for \$447,509 sent by the company that had imported the computer is curiously different from the order as recorded on the import license, which was more than \$460,000, making for a difference of more than \$12,000.

Added to this piece of fraud is an even bigger irregularity uncovered at the top of the already mentioned import firm, which took the liberty of writing to the Bank of Zaire through the Department of Exchange Control to ask for permission to have this equipment checked only upon arrival, this being in flagrant violation of the laws on this subject. What in the government's eyes constitutes irrefutable proof of OZAC complicity in this reprehensible practice is this: overcharging with the aim of getting the hard currency out of the country fraudulently by means of deals with the suppliers.

Thus, owing to its president-director general's mistake, OZAC, which should be the firm rooting out this type of economic crime, becomes the firm that abets it.

"Under such conditions," many OZAC employees told us, "why be surprised to see this once prosperous firm engaging in underhanded dealings?"

This is all the more evident because the office's precarious financial situation has produced deep social discontent within the firm, in Kinshasa as well as the interior, and has even led to strikes in Boma and Ilebo.

So observers wonder if the government's courageous Friday evening decision will be able to check this dangerous unrest.

*** Creation of Opposition Common Front Questioned**

90AF0508A Kinshasa LE POTENTIEL in French
21 July 90 pp 1,3

[Article by Mutinga Mutuishayi: "Is It Possible for There To Be a Manifesto Shared By All Political Viewpoints?"]

[Text] The political renewal decreed 24 April was legalized by the Constitution of 5 July 1990. The purely theoretical change in the system of state administration deriving from this new fundamental law provides no encouraging prospects for the political future of our country.

In the face of public opinion pressure, as well as reservations and protests of the political parties being formed,

Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko has in fact remained intransigent concerning the principle of a tripartite multiparty system and the way of selecting parties to be approved.

The chief of state pays no particular attention to the general consensus that emerged within the "administrative staffs" concerning political viewpoints toward the "National Conference" and the formation of a "National Union Government."

Imperturbable and impassive to reactions of other political viewpoints, the president of the Republic keeps a team at the transition government's command posts that has been demonstrably unable to ensure social peace and safeguard the stability that has always characterized the public administration.

The chief of state's firm attitude revives further pessimism in a great part of national opinion, which fears "reconfiscation" of power by the Popular Movement of the Revolution [MPR]. The organization of primary elections next January under the control of the territorial members of the former party-state aptly illustrates that Machiavellian intent.

The political parties being formed are unanimous in that regard. Holding early primary elections masks the deliberate intention of the chief of state to catch unawares, for the benefit of the MPR, the political groupings born of democratization. The immediate reaction of Ileo Songo Amba, leader of the (PDSC) [Christian Democrat and Social Party], and repeated by leaders of other political formations, who continue to react negatively to the presidential message of 30 June, presage wide abstention in the vote of January 1991, if dialogued joint action are not re-established within the scope of a national conference.

Moreover, the Chief of State's firmness would permit greater chances of success for Nguz A Karl-I-Bond, the president of the Independent Republicans, who actively seeks a reconciliation of the leaders of all political nuances for a coalition of tendencies capable of countering MPR designs and strongly influencing the democratization process. According to circles close to the former foreign affairs minister, this move should bring about the signature of a joint manifesto by all political groups. Such a document, which would demonstrate the political maturity of the Zairian people and of its leaders, will have the aim of revealing to the nation and to international public opinion the general consensus emerging about the national conference.

Although praiseworthy, the step by the Party of Independent Republicans threatens to dissipate its effectiveness in maneuvers and manipulations, considering the lack of [a strong] personality, and the cupidity of certain leaders of the parties being formed.

Kenya

Reportage of Anglican Bishop Muge's Death

Visit to Busia

EA1508133890 Nairobi DAILY NATION in English
15 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by NATION correspondent Moses Radoli in Busia]

[Excerpts] Bishop Muge made a dramatic entry into Busia town yesterday, defying Cabinet Minister Peter Okondo's banning orders. Bishop Muge arrived at 10:25 AM in a white Peugeot 405 car escorted by two white Isuzu troopers and a white Subaru saloon car.

His arrival stirred the Kenya-Uganda border town as his mini-convoy drove to the Star Hotel for tea with incredulous throngs of people chanting, "Welcome, welcome. Peace, peace."

They jammed the hotel's reception area as others jostled and struggled outside for vantage points shouting "Wapi bwana Okondo ajionee? (where is Mr. Okondo to see for himself?) Wapi ajionee, uongo wake ni bure? (Where is he to see that his lies are useless?) This is our man, Muge kiboko yao: (their—his detractors'—match)."

It took the hotel's management more than 45 minutes to clear a place in the hotel for the prelate and his retinue.

The Rev. Muge said: "Honourable members of the press, please join me for a cup of tea, before we can talk." He beckoned to waiters to serve journalists gathered around him.

Even KANU [Kenya African National Union] youth-wingers abandoned their duties on Panya (smugglers') routes in the Sofia and Marachi estates along the border and rushed to the hotel to shake hands with the prelate.

"Are you the people who are supposed to kill me?" The bishop asked the youthwingers.

"We are not here to kill you," they said. "In fact, we are very happy to see you and welcome you here."

Speaking to reporters at the hotel, the prelate said: "The bible teaches us: Love your enemy as you love yourself. I love Mr. Okondo and bear him no hatred or malice at all."

He said he was thankful that Mr. Okondo's weekend utterances had enabled him to meet a large crowd of Christians in Busia and for whom he would conduct an open-air prayer service at the St. Stephens Busia CPK [Church of the Province of Kenya] church. [passage omitted]

During the service, Bishop Muge said: "Mr. Okondo cannot have as large a following as this. We should pray for his loose tongue so that he is brought closer to God as he is the only one who can help him."

He said that the tongues of people like Mr. Okondo were controlled and led by demons and that such people could not help themselves when speaking and they should, therefore, be prayed for.

"The tongue is a small thing but it can cause a big fire and inflame the whole country," the prelate said, adding, "therefore, leaders in this country must learn by all means to bridle their tongues."

Replying to Mr. Okondo's charges that he and fellow Bishop Henry Okullu of the Maseno South Diocese were "licking the colonialists' boots when Kenyans were fighting for independence," Bishop Muge said: "I was just a small boy at that time doing my standard five and knew almost nothing about politics."

The prelate, in a sermon based on the acts of apostles entitled Church and Politics, said that Christians in Kenya should fight corruption.

"Most of the leaders in the country are corrupt," he charged. "Some have grabbed land and property illegally from poor wananchi [citizens] and Kenyans should pray for them to change their ways."

Said Bishop Muge: "Some leaders who are known to be corrupt in this country are obviously being over-protected by the authorities as they continue with their habits."

He said he would continue with his pastoral duties in the Katakwa archdeaconry, where he is the bishop in charge of breakaway group.

He said: "I left Eldoret at 8 AM to this place to prove to my flock and wananchi in the country that I am not a liar like some of the politicians." [passage omitted]

Further Details on Accident

EA1508132890 Nairobi DAILY NATION in English
15 Aug 90 p 1

[Excerpt] Anglican Bishop Alexander Kipsang arap Muge is dead.

He was killed in a road accident at around 4 pm yesterday shortly after making a triumphal visit to Busia town.

Eye-witnesses said the CPK prelate's four-month-old Peugeot 405 car collided head-on with a lorry at the Kipkarren river trading centre about 64 kilometres from Eldoret town on the Webuye-Eldoret road. His three passengers were in a critical condition at the eldoret hospital last night with deep head and limb wounds.

Father John Owino, among the first people to get to the scene, said he and several other people used iron bars to free the bishop's body from the wreckage. He said the body lay at the scene for more than two hours. Police later arrived and took it to Uasin Gishu Memorial Hospital mortuary.

"NATION" correspondents Willy Faris and Evans Kanini, who travelled to the scene from their Eldoret base, filed the following report:

"Hundreds of grief-stricken mourners were milling around the spot. A middle-aged woman overcome by grief collapsed, while somebody else brought a blanket and covered the bishop's body with it.

"The lorry involved in the collision lay on its roof on the roadside with its front wheel axle ripped off. The mangled wreckage of the bishop's car rested on the other side of the road.

"The lorry, belonging to Western Carriers of Luanda in Western Province, was said to have been carrying milk.

"Traffic on the road was backed up for hours."

Two of Bishop Muge's passengers were identified as secretaries Rodah Chebor and Clare Kerubo.

Last night, the commissioner of police, Mr. Philip Kilonzo, said he had sent the western provincial police boss, Mr. J.O. Ochido, to the scene. "I am awaiting his report," Mr. Kilonzo said.

Mr. Ochido, who is based at Kakamega, left for the scene, accompanied by the CID [expansion unknown] provincial head, Mr. Jebel Muchunku, at 5 P.M. Reached for comment last night, Mr. Ochido said: "I have nothing to say about it at this moment. We have to make thorough investigations."

Bishop Muge, of the Eldoret diocese of the Church of the province of Kenya [CID], had taken a circuitous route from Busia en route to his Eldoret base. He had travelled through Kisumu from Busia, where he had held an open-air service after defying weekend orders by the Minister Peter Okondo to keep off the district.

The bishop had been worried about his own safety after Mr. Okondo, who holds the labor portfolio, warned last Saturday [11 Aug] that the prelate and his Maseno south counterpart, Dr. Henry Okullu, "will see fire and might not leave alive" if they set foot in Busia district.

Bishop Muge's immediate reaction to the Okondo threat was an announcement to the effect that he would visit Busia at 10.30 am yesterday "waiting to die."

He had also told Mr. Okondo: "Let him know that my innocent blood will haunt him forever and he will not be at peace, for God does not approve of murder."

Mr. Okondo had issued his threats at a KANU [Kenya African National Union] rally at the Busia stadium. The rally had been convened to mark the 30th anniversary of the founding of the ruling KNAU.

Bishop Muge had said that he was "terribly perturbed by the irresponsible utterances of Mr. Okondo." The prelate had said that the only "crimes" he may have committed were his presentation of the views of the Eldoret diocese to the KANU electoral review committee and an appeal

to the president for a commission made up of lawyers and churchmen to investigate cabinet ministers and civil servants. He had said he stood by that statement and declared that nothing would make him shift from it.

The head of the Anglican Church, Archbishop Manasses Kuria, expressed shock and sadness at the bishop's death but called on Kenyans to remain calm and not to speculate about the accident. Speaking on the 9 PM Kenya Television Network (KTN) news bulletin, Archbishop Kuria said he could not understand why such a thing could happen "at this time."

"When things are as they are in Kenya today, I would like to call on all Christians to be calm and not to speculate on anything, just take it as it is said. It was an accident which was tragic indeed," he said. He added: "But... we need to pray very hard so that things like these do not happen." [passage omitted]

Moi Sends Condolences

EA1608074390 Nairobi KNA in English 1215 GMT
15 Aug 90

[Text] Nairobi, 15th August—The following is a message of condolence from his excellency the president, Honourable D.T. arap Moi, C.G.H., M.P., on the death of Bishop Alexander Kipsang Muge.

"It is with disbelief and deep shock that I have learnt of the untimely and tragic death of the Bishop Alexander Kipsang Muge of Eldoret C.P.K. [Church of the Province of Kenya] Diocese. The late Bishop Muge died in a horrific road accident near Kipkarren river market on 14th August 1990. Death is a thief. It has stolen a young and courageous Kenyan from us. At 44, he was in the prime of his life. He exerted all his energies in the service to the people of God and the country he loved.

In defence of the nation's sovereignty, the late Bishop Muge fought bravely and gallantly in the anti-shifita [anti-bandit] campaigns. He distinguished himself and earned the north-eastern campaign medal for bravery. As a church leader, the late Bishop Muge earned the distinction of being a forthright soldier in the army of the Lord.

Bishop Muge is no more but his contributions to the moral and material development of Kenyans, particularly those in his diocese, lives on. The Kim'roror water project shines brightest amongst the development projects he initiated. No better legacy could he have left to his birth place than fresh and clean water.

The last major sermon which the late Bishop Muge delivered may be said to be his recent contribution to the work of KANU [Kenya African National Union] review committee. It is fatal that this dynamic Kenyan will not participate with his fellow countrymen in the implementation of the committee's recommendations. It is sad that the carnage on our roads has denied him that chance. I once again appeal to all road users to exercise maximum care and control.

We have lost a resourceful man as a nation. The Christian community will always remember him for his devotion to duty. I sincerely sympathise with his widow and children in the painful loss of a dear husband and father. I pray to God to give them courage to bear the loss."

Uganda

NRA Reportedly Commits New 'Atrocities'

AB1508171490 London BBC World Service in English
1830 GMT 10 Aug 90

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] There are new claims of atrocities by the Ugandan National Resistance Army, NRA, in the north of the country. It follows a recent agreement in Kampala between Otemba Allimadi of the rebel Uganda People's Democratic Movement, UPDM, and President Museveni. At the time, a former ally of Allimadi, Wilson Awini, condemned the agreement and he is now interim leader of the United National Democratic Movement, and he claims that the Army has been getting out of order since the agreement. Robin White asked Wilson Awini whereabouts, according to him, the atrocities were happening.

[Begin recording] [Awini] In four districts in northern Uganda, namely Lira District, Kapwach District, Kitgum District, and Gulu district.

[White] And what kind of things are you claiming they have been doing?

[Awini] First of all, we get so much depressed if a government force goes out straight into a church when people are praying.

[White] That happened you claim?

[Awini] And that happened. And they killed over 27 people. The rest ran in different directions for their lives. I can name two of them. One is Mr. Owl, the son of Ochila, and another one is, of course, Mr. Okello Ochede. And these people, they were witnesses to what happened on that day, on the 27th of July 1990.

[White] What else are you claiming has happened?

[Awini] And also in Lamori, in Gulu district, the entire division, people are on the run. Some of them have run to Alero, their houses burned, crops destroyed, and not only that, children are being abducted to go and join the National Resistance Army by force and this maybe is happening due to the peace accord which was signed and nobody has bothered to go to it.

[White] But I cannot understand why the Ugandan Army should be committing atrocities now after they have signed that peace agreement. Why?

[Awini] I think they are doing this in the light that there are no journalists who go to northern Uganda independently and anything done there, nobody can make the world know. And they are doing it also because they know that without intimidating the public, nobody is going to respond to the oppressed government.

[White] Perhaps they are not doing it, perhaps you are just making it up, some people might say.

[Awini] They are doing it, and there is a lot of evidence. I myself was there. I have been to some of these places, and I have just arrived this morning from where I went and I am telling you the real facts. People know about it. It was even reported on Radio Uganda one day that there are people who came from Gulu District and Lira to attack innocent people and this was just a dodging statement by the government; they knew exactly what happened.

[White] Some people might say you are just making it up because there is nothing happening, people are surrendering, people are coming. The war is over. You need some invention.

[Awini] We had a surprise attack by the National Resistance Army; this one was the 17th Battalion. It took one hour to fight the battle, and in the end we even managed to arrest the commanding officer by the name David Turieba alive. He is a witness who can testify to this, what I am telling you.

[White] So you are saying the war is still going on?

[Awini] A lot of war is going on, and we have kept David Turieba, major, for future reference so that anybody who is in doubt, we shall produce him in front of the journalists.

[White] Have any people in the north surrendered, handed in their arms, because of this peace agreement?

[Awini] People have not surrendered. What is happening in northern Uganda is that there is the unit called the Local Defense Unit organized by the government. They are basically known as militias. Some of them have been requested to go and hand over their weapons to the government under the pretext that they have come from the bush, and therefore they are appealing and accepting that the peace agreement signed in Addis Ababa is the right one to go for.

[White] And that's a pretense?

[Awini] That's a pretense.

[White] And the war goes on?

[Awini] And the war goes on. [end recording]

Vlok Details Police Casualties in Violence

*MB1608063490 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0500 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Text] The minister of law and order, Mr. Adriaan Vlok, says 42 policemen have been killed and 403 wounded in unrest-related incidents since January.

He said there had been at least 1,223 attacks on policemen and police patrols, 522 attacks on the houses of policemen and their families, and more than 1,800 police vehicles were destroyed or damaged.

Mr. Vlok announced these figures at the opening of the Transvaal congress of the Southern Cross Fund in Pretoria.

Mr. Vlok said claims by certain individuals and organizations that the police were to blame for all violence in South Africa were devoid of truth, and nothing but propagandistic lies aimed at vilifying the police.

Further on Orange Free State CP Congress

'Not To Submit' To ANC Rule

*MB1608071390 Johannesburg SAPA in English
2240 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[By Lorraine Braid]

[Text] Bloemfontein Aug 15 SAPA—The [Orange] Free State Conservative Party [CP] Congress has given an unequivocal undertaking not to submit to ANC [African National Congress] or Communist rule.

It was serious business all the way as speaker after speaker reiterated CP policy of the whites never giving in to black rule. Threats of white mobilisation and resistance were frequently heard. Delegates gave the impression that the party was preparing for a holy war.

This was underscored by leader Dr. Andries Treurnicht's opening speech in which he copiously quoted biblical examples of resistance to ungodly authorities. In a brief closing statement to delegates he quoted from the Old Testament: "Don't be afraid as I am with you. Don't be anxious and look behind you as I am your God."

Dr. Treurnicht said it was not a crime to think of resistance when one's rights or freedom were meddled with and armed resistance would be acceptable in extreme cases.

Dr. Ferdie Hartzenberg, deputy leader of the CP, was the most militant speaker and received a standing ovation after his speech. He said the freedom of whites was a God-given right and was not negotiable. The fatherland was a gift from God and Nelson Mandela would not be asked if whites could live in the fatherland.

"I want to tell Mandela that if he wants to fight, we will beat him up. If you want to rule us, you are looking for trouble. We will lay everything on the altar to prevent ANC rule over us."

Many delegates spoke about the unrest and violence throughout the country and placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the government and the black trade unions.

The black unions were responsible for crippling the country's economy through strikes, stay-aways, sit-ins and made a mockery of productivity. Warnings were specifically directed at farmers and the mining industry about the devastating effect continued action by the black unions would have on the country.

Mr. Eddie Jordaan, CP MP [member of parliament] for Welkom, said black labour, specially in the Free State goldfields, demanded the highest rates of pay for the lowest productivity. Strikes about each and every thing were the order of the day on the goldfields.

"The wet (papbroek) government has allowed national mineworkers union President Cyril Ramaphosa to become the most powerful man in South Africa."

Mr. Frank le Roux, CP MP for Brakpan, said the government was naive in its belief that once blacks obtained political rights, labour unrest would disappear. SATU [South African Trade Union] would, in the United Kingdom with its sophisticated labour legislation, never have been able to gain credibility for its "living wage" demand.

Discussion on black protest marches saw many demands for an outright government ban on these demonstrations. Warnings were issued that if any white lost his life or sustained any damage to property as a result of these marches through "white areas," the blame would rest squarely on the shoulders of the government.

Mr. Koos van der Merwe, CP MP for Owerlaal, said the National Party controlled council of Vereeniging had granted permission for 5,000 blacks to stage a protest march this coming Saturday [18 Aug]. "I've heard stories coming from Vanderbijlpark that some of the blacks have been told to bring matches and others would bring petrol."

Delegates reiterated their stand against open hospitals and a mixed-up health services. It was contended that the country's health services had never been in a worse state and that key personnel were resigning. There were constant attacks on the press, accompanied by accusations that the press "hated Afrikaners" and was guilty of disseminating naive propaganda.

There were also several scathing references about the Broederbond [Afrikaner Brotherhood] which were not accompanied by any elaborating justifications for the attacks.

The hallmark of the Congress was the euphoria of delegates who believed they were only a short step away from taking over the government. All they needed was an election. It was contended that CP victory in the forthcoming Randburg parliamentary by-election would be "the final nail in the coffin to force a general election."

Appeal To Stop Black Protests

*MB1508182690 Johannesburg Television Service
in English 1545 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] The Conservative Party [CP] has appealed to State President F.W. de Klerk to prohibit protest marches in white areas by people of color. At the [Orange] Free State congress of the party in Bloemfontein, the party's defense spokesman, Mr. Koos van der Merwe, said he had asked the police to do everything in their power to have a proposed protest march in Welkom on Saturday canceled. He had made this request at a meeting with the minister of law and order, Mr. Adriaan Vlok, and the commissioner of police, General Johan van der Merwe.

In his opening address last night, the party leader, Dr. Andries Treurnicht, said the party would exercise its right to resist with greater force if the government allowed black domination to take place:

[Begin Treurnicht video recording in Afrikaans] We warn the government: Steer clear from negotiations on the surrender of white political power. Steer clear from negotiations with the ANC [African National Congress] regarding the takeover of power by the ANC—power which they will have over whites. [end recording]

Mandela—Government Responsible for Cape Violence

*MB1508170090 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in Afrikaans 1400 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] The ANC's [African National Congress] deputy president, Mr. Nelson Mandela, says the recent acts of violence in the areas north of Port Elizabeth were caused by organizations [as heard] which have been forced upon the residents.

Speaking at the opening of the ANC's regional office in North End, Mr. Mandela said the government would eventually have to bear the responsibility for the acts of violence, arson, and looting of businesses.

Jordan Says Cease-Fire May Be Reconsidered

*MB1508154790 Umtata Capital Radio in English
1505 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] ANC [African National Congress] official, Pallo Jordan, says the peace process might be jeopardized by the violence. Janet White reports:

[White] Jordan says that the police are definitely helping Inkatha supporters in their attacks on ANC supporters in the Vaal townships. He says unless the government can bring the police into line the ANC may have to rethink their announcement of a cease-fire in the armed struggle.

The ANC has strongly denied that the conflict has tribal roots. COSATU [Congress of South African Trade

Unions] Vice President, Chris Dlamini, says the tribalized nature of the fighting has been promoted by Inkatha in an attempt to extend the Natal conflict to the rest of the country.

International, Diplomatic, Trade Ties Expanding

*MB1508171590 Johannesburg International Service
in English 1150 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Station commentary: "Strengthening International Ties"]

[Text] Commentators have noted that South Africa is going through a process of rapidly expanding its international, diplomatic, and trade ties.

It began more than a year ago with visits by President Botha and later President de Klerk to various countries in southern Africa. Since then there have been numerous contacts in the region. Trade has expanded. New trade and diplomatic offices have been opened and technical and commercial cooperation agreements have been signed between governments.

The new ties with Madagascar with the visit to the island this week by President de Klerk are the latest development on this front. More recently, there have been a strengthening of relations with Europe and several countries have relaxed sanctions. And no less significant, there have been breakthroughs in developing new links with Eastern Europe.

In terms of an agreement with Hungary, that country has now dropped all trade and financial sanctions against South Africa and trade, industry and tourism minister, Mr. Kent Durr, has just returned from a visit to the Soviet Union where he held talks with officials on possible future trade and investment. These events reflect the far reaching changes that are underway in South Africa and elsewhere. Other governments have come to realize that South Africa is on an irreversible course to a new constitutional dispensation with full political rights for all in a democratic system. The desire to normalize relations is an acknowledgement of that fact.

As far as Eastern Europe is concerned the diplomatic initiatives also reflect the people's rejection of socialist ideology and their desire to achieve economic development through contact with all countries. South Africa is able to offer them a mutually rewarding economic relationship but the most important developments for South Africa and its neighbors are the changes that are underway in Southern Africa itself. Here too, governments have come to realize that two issues are crucial to their countries progress. The first is to reject ideology and allow greater economic freedom. The second is that no country, least of all small countries like those of southern Africa, can achieve economic development on its own. The governments and people of southern Africa need to work together for a better future for all. The new diplomatic initiatives are meant to further that goal.

Presence of Umkhonto We Sizwe Unit 'Dangerous'

*MB1508172290 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in Afrikaans 1400 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] According to the police, an extremely dangerous situation has been created by the presence of an Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation] unit in the northern and far northern Transvaal.

This was revealed in a sworn statement by a member of the Security Police, Captain Alfred Zeelie, which was submitted to the Pretoria Supreme Court as an argument against the release of two suspected terrorists. The Supreme Court had received an urgent application for the release of Mr. (Izak Leshego) and Mr. (Johannes Makitla), who are being held under terms of the Security Act.

The police allege that the two men are withholding important information regarding the activities of the unit, known as the (Nchabaleng) Cell. According to the statement, the police have over the past two months uncovered several large arms caches belonging to the unit. The unit was acting under instructions from Mr. Chris Hani, head of staff of the ANC's [African National Congress] military wing, and was instructed to prepare to enter an armed struggle at short notice.

PAC General Secretary on 'Transfer of Power'

*MB1608075090 Johannesburg SAPA in English
2151 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] Grahamstown Aug 15 SAPA—The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) accepted a negotiated settlement, but only if it led to a "complete transfer of power," PAC General Secretary Benny Alexander said in Grahamstown on Wednesday [15 Aug].

Addressing a gathering at Rhodes University, Mr. Alexander added the only mechanism to transfer power was a "democratic constituent assembly," which was broadly contested by political parties and not by individuals.

Mr. Alexander said there was broad consensus by the ANC [African National Congress], PAC and AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization] on a democratic settlement based upon the idea of a constituent assembly.

"We must not waste our energy by distorting past history and the history to come. We should rather pool our resources now so that one day our people will be able to decide for themselves in a democratic election. While we reject President F. W. de Klerk's current reforms, we are willing to meet anyone to discuss why we are not talking to the government," said Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Alexander said Mr. de Klerk's model allowed for a two-tier parliamentary system with a "house of majority rule" and a "house of races," the latter having veto rights for the protection of whites.

"No self-respecting liberation movement or political party would take part in elections they could not win," he added. The PAC regarded race classification as

"mythical nonsense" and stood for the creation of a single nation, comprising "one race, the human race."

He said the PAC recognised two categories of Africans, indigenous Africans, whose history did not lie outside the continent, and those Africans, whose history could be traced elsewhere but whose allegiance was totally to "the African people and to the development of Africa."

East Rand Unrest Death Toll Increases to 143

*MB1608053390 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0500 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Text] A police spokesman says the black residential areas on the East Rand where fighting broke out between Xhosa and Zulu factions on Monday [13 Aug] were quiet again by late last night. There were no incidents.

The police and the Defense Force were maintaining a strong presence in the areas and plan to remain there today. The spokesman said the police had succeeded largely in keeping the feuding factions apart and in confining them to their hostels.

The official death toll was 143, and more than 100 people were receiving hospital treatment. The violence occurred at Vosloosrus, Thokoza, and Katlehong.

Claims of Mandela Walkout Threat at Talks

*MB1508122190 Cape Town SOUTH in English
9-15 Aug 90 p 2*

[By Mono Badela]

[Text] Johannesburg—There was drama behind closed doors during the Pretoria talks this week when ANC [African National Congress] Deputy President Nelson Mandela threatened a walk-out.

While there were smiles and a firm handshake at the joint press conference on Tuesday [7 Aug] morning, the talks almost collapsed about two hours earlier when a dispute arose over the release of prisoners.

According to the ANC's Penuel Maduna, a member of the Joint Working Group, the dispute centred on the government's refusal to be specific on a date for the release of political prisoners.

The ANC was reportedly also concerned at the government's refusal to carry out some of the agreements in the Pretoria Minute.

Maduna said at about 11 pm [2100 GMT], Mandela informed de Klerk that if he did not provide a date for the releases, the ANC could not suspend the armed struggle.

He threatened to withdraw from the talks if the government refused to budge.

Maduna said the talks were adjourned and de Klerk and his colleagues returned 90 minutes later and committed themselves to releasing the prisoners from September 1.

Inkatha Has 'Substantial Overseas Support'*MB1508081690 Umtata Capital Radio in English
0700 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] The new-look Inkatha has substantial overseas support. That's according to Inkatha Institute Director Gavin Woods, who has recently returned from a European tour, where he says Inkatha was promised assistance. Carmel Rickard has the details:

[Rickard] Woods has just returned from a two-week visit to Europe selling Inkatha's new image as a political party open to all races. He told me he found some prominent politicians expressing concern about aspects of the recent ANC [African National Congress] tour of Europe, headed by Nelson Mandela. Woods said they were worried about the relationship between the ANC and the South African Communist Party, as well as Mandela's apparent approval of Libya's Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi and PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat. They also disapproved of Mandela's remarks about Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi, seeing him as arrogant and intolerant. Woods said there'd been invitations to Buthelezi to conduct an extensive European trip during which he'd be guaranteed the highest-level audience possible.

Boerestaat Party Leader on Reestablishing Republics*MB1508152390 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1408 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[By Pierre Claassen]

[Text] Stellenbosch AUG 15 SAPA—Boerestaat Party leader Mr. Robert van Tonder said on Wednesday [16 Aug] he hoped his party would not eventually be forced into resorting to terrorism in order to re-establish the old Boer republics.

He was answering questions put to him by journalists after addressing a Stellebosse Aktuele Aangeleentheidskring (SAAK) conference on the role of the Afrikaner in building a new South Africa. After his address, a student asked him for his master plan to regain the republics.

"We are in the majority," he said. "The greatest concentration of Boers are up there (Orange Free State and Transvaal). We will succeed, don't you worry," he said.

All his party wanted to do was to re-establish the Boer states, which the British had taken away and in which Boers had citizenship and the vote. His party did not look at the problem in a racist manner, but rather in terms of nationalities.

In the state it envisaged, the Boers would be the largest national group, with the rest, of which the Zulus, were the second largest, expressing their political rights in bordering nations. After the discussions, Mr. van Tonder was approached by the media and asked what would happen if he was not able to bring about the re-establishment of the old republics.

"If Israel could struggle for 2000 years, why can't we?" Asked if his party would resort to terrorism, his response was: "I hope they do not force us into it."

Leftist Group Condemns ANC-NP 'Alliance'*MB1508144890 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1329 GMT 15 AUG 90*

[By Charl de Villiers]

[Text] Cape Town Aug 15 SAPA—An organisation to the left of the African National Congress [ANC] claims the ANC and the National Party [NP] are attempting to rally and consolidate the political middle ground at the material expense of the black working class majority.

Accusing the ANC/SA Communist Party [SACP] alliance of negotiating compromises "which bind no-one but themselves," the Workers Organisation for Socialist Action [WOSA] on Wednesday [15 Aug] joined the Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC] in rejecting pre-negotiation talks between the ANC and NP government.

Instead, it urged the convening of a consultative conference between all sections of the "liberatory movement" and an eventual constituent assembly. The conference would discuss "the dangers of the way ahead" and "forge a principled alliance which promotes the interest of the majority—the working class—to continue the struggle for fundamental rights and social change."

WOSA Chairman Dr. Neville Alexander said such a gathering, to be held before negotiations in order to obtain "maximum consensus", would be the only way to prevent a "Lebanon-type" situation developing in the country.

Reading a statement at a press conference, WOSA General Secretary Ms. Jean Pease said the ANC/SACP alliance was currently the most popular anti-apartheid force, but did "not comprise the whole liberatory movement." Neither did it speak or negotiate on behalf of all the oppressed—"their compromises bind no-one but themselves."

According to WOSA, only a constituent assembly called when the "ruling class has been brought to its knees" and based on free and fair elections with universal franchise and proportional representation "has the right to determine a constitution for a free SA/Azania."

Directing its criticism at the formal talks between the ANC and NP, the WOSA statement said:

"We see a process in which the ANC appears to be seduced into attempting to harness the revolutionary energies of black workers and youth, so that the black and white middle class can assist the ruling class to usher in a 'new' South Africa. The liberatory movement stands at a dangerous cross-roads. The black workers are being deluded into believing that a 'new' South Africa will bring peace and better existence, if only, the NP and the ANC will compromise and negotiate."

People were being asked to "trust their leaders," who would take decisions on their behalf. "Democratic traditions, fruits of a long and bloody struggle, are now of no consequence."

One implication of the Pretoria Minute was that sections of the liberation movement were being co-opted as the NP "opens up so-called reforms for the black middle classes."

Access to various previously denied privileges was being offered in exchange for the ANC assisting in maintaining law and order, "that is, dampening down working class anger, militancy and revolutionary mass action."

The ANC, WOSA charged, went even further by suspending its armed struggle in exchange "not for equality and justice, or even the removal of all the draconian apartheid and security laws" but for removing "(so-called) obstacles to negotiations."

ANC Deputy President Mr. Nelson Mandela had admitted on television on Sunday night that "for all intents and purposes, an alliance already exists" between the ANC and NP. The NP had clear short-term goals and a clear bottom-line for a settlement, said WOSA.

The ruling party wanted to end international isolation, achieve full integration into the world capitalist economy and wanted "to disarm the liberation movement and deepen divisions."

The NP's long-term goal was a "new SA" based on a multi-racial alliance of black and white middle classes under the "command of the white capitalist class and imperialism. The working class, however, will barely benefit as the rulers will not allow any fundamental change in the property relations which could change conditions in the ghettos, squatter settlements and homelands."

There was a simplistic belief that negotiations had to succeed in bringing about peace and prosperity when the process could, in fact, be torpedoed by a rightwing uprising against reforms and the implementation of a military government. Said Dr. Alexander: "We must not assume because negotiations seem to be the moral way that a (militarist) takeover will not happen. Look at, for example, Chile and Argentina."

15 Aug Press Review on Current Problems, Issues MB1508115590

[Editorial Report]

THE CITIZEN

Democrats Unable To Attract Afrikaners—The Democratic Party (DP) made a "mistake" to think that "leaders like Dr. van Zyl Slabbert and Mr. Wynand Malan could bring in Afrikaners in what was essentially a party of liberal English-speakers," points out the page 6 editorial in Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English on 14 August. Both Slabbert and Malan "let the party down by

quitting," and "dreams of the DP attracting a Fourth Force of Afrikaner academics and Yuppies have faded." The DP should return to the "old principles and old role of the PFP [Progressive Federal Party]," a "voice of conscience and a party of unchallenged principle."

THE STAR

Vietnam 'Specter' Hangs over Bush in Iraqi 'Crisis'—"The spectre of another Vietnam hangs over President Bush as he handles his biggest crisis," remarks Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 15 August in a page 16 editorial. "Although he had few options, it took courage to commit U.S. forces to the Gulf to arrest President Saddam Husayn's naked power grab. The trouble is, if he gets into a shooting war with heavy casualties and loses domestic support, how will he extricate himself? The U.S. has massive military strength, but Iraq has a million battle-hardened troops who believe they are fighting a holy war, and already Muslims in other countries are beginning to rally round Husayn." "If U.S. forces take a step into Iraqi territory there is no saying where it will end."

THE DAILY MAIL

Democratic Party's All-White Role 'Shortsighted'—"The debate within the Democratic Party may be messy and in danger of being reduced to petty sniping, but the fact that it is happening is healthy," observes the page 8 editorial in Johannesburg THE DAILY MAIL in English on 15 August. "The fanfare of the launch of the DP last year masked a hidden problem: being an all-white party in the era of non-racial democracy was shortsighted." If the DP is to have a role in the future it will have to do "some serious recruiting in the wider community." Its economic policy may need to "reflect wider social needs."

Nationalizing Gold Mines 'Unwise'—Editor Allister Sparks writes on the same page there is no question the economic imbalances in the country need to be redressed. "Just as the government and the ANC [African National Congress] are getting down to constructive negotiations on the political front, this is what the business sector should be discussing with those selfsame black leaders on the economic front. If they were to do that, and succeed in building mutual trust the way President F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela are doing, one result might be a realisation on the black side of how unwise it would be for a new majority government to nationalise the gold mines." "Taking over the mines would be hugely expensive. The market valuation of South African gold shares is about R [Rand] 55-billion. To pay compensation significantly below that would be to kiss goodbye to all future foreign investment (20 percent of gold shares are held by foreign investors) and trigger a flight of domestic capital, with disastrous results." But "if nationalising the mines is out, then other ways must be found to compensate for the past and bring blacks into the economy as well as into the political system."

BUSINESS DAY

RSA May Help Neighbors With Aid—Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 15 August in a page 8 editorial

states: "Our African neighbours and near-neighbours have been in a double bind. They desperately needed South African advice, expertise and development aid, and they were largely denied this by self-imposed ostracism of the regional pariah." Now President de Klerk's visit to Madagascar was "symbolic of more than lessened political tensions between South Africa and black-ruled states." It was also "evidence of their need to develop or restore their mines, industries and tourism, and a public acknowledgment that aid may now be openly sought and given." Therefore, Africa "must look to its own neighbours." The "caveat is that, while South Africa may now help as it frees itself of apartheid, it will be able to do so only for as long as it is also free of socialism."

SOWETAN

Improve Black Lifestyles To End Violence—Referring to the violence in the black townships all over the country Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 15 August in its page 6 editorial states: "There needs to be a developmental process that will deal with the total reconstruction to create decent living conditions for blacks. The areas that have seen the most violence are the most under-privileged, the most poverty-stricken." SOWETAN believes the "political solutions will mean nothing to the man in the street until his lifestyle drastically improves."

CAPE TIMES

Port Elizabeth Rioting Slows 'Liberation'—Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English on 13 August in a page 4 editorial says the Port Elizabeth violence "is to be condemned without reservation as intolerable in a civilised society. No injustice or deprivation, however grievous, can justify the criminal anarchy." "The rioting does not serve the cause of liberation. In fact it is retarding the movement towards democracy and wiping out the dramatic improvement in perceptions of this country abroad."

DIE BURGER

RSA Begins Picking Reform 'Fruits'—"South Africa has already started picking the first fruits of its reform initiatives since President F.W. de Klerk's 2 February speech," notes Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans on 13 August in a page 8 editorial. "Heading the list of positive results is the wall of isolation that is beginning to crumble. It is, among other things, illustrated by President de Klerk's successful trip earlier this year to various European countries where South African heads of state were very unwelcome until 2 February." Referring to De Klerk's proposed visit to Madagascar DIE BURGER says "the ideal of a southern African economic community where South Africa can play a positive role, is becoming politically practical."

BEELD

Praise for ANC's Repudiation of Winnie Mandela Statement—"Mrs. Winnie Mandela cannot stop herself from

throwing matches onto the grass," remarks a page 8 editorial in Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans on 13 August. "Violence is not ended, she declares, and echoes Chris Hani and Joe Slovo. One would nevertheless think that Mrs. Mandela would be more cautious in view of possible prosecution over the Stompie issue. There is much convincing work to be done, also on the side of the whites. The ANC has the particular task of changing the laws and lack of morality it encouraged over the years, to peace and order. It is to the ANC's credit that it did not hesitate to repudiate Mrs. Mandela over her recent statement on violence."

Visit to Madagascar 'Dividend' of De Klerk Initiatives—"President de Klerk's official visit to Madagascar on 14 August is another dividend of the government's positive internal initiatives these past six months," says a page 12 editorial in Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans on 14 August. "Just as most of the so-called Frontline states are finding out about Minister Pik Botha's plan for economic cooperation and development in southern Africa, so Madagascar realizes the South African Government is sincere when it presents itself as a good and reliable neighbor in Africa."

* ANC Branch Elects Leader

90AF0465A Johannesburg THE STAR in English
16 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] Former Umkhonto we Sizwe member Laloo "Isu" Chiba, who was jailed for 18 years, was unanimously elected chairperson of the new ANC [African National Congress] Lenz branch in Lenasia yesterday. The Lenz branch is the ANC's first to be officially launched in the PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging] region since the movement was unbanned in February.

* Capitalism Viewed as Post-Apartheid Model

90AF0491B Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 13-16 Jul 90 p 9

[Speech by John Gaunt]

[Text] Some people, in a rather endearing harking back to the dreams of the 1950s or even the 1850s, do not want to forget communism. A good many of these seem to have found a home in opposition groupings in South Africa.

Despite all the evidence to the contrary they still pursue the myth of the efficiency of the socialist state. In their lexicon, elitism is a dirty word and quality is all. But in an imperfect world the issue is not whether or not we want an elitist society. We are going to get one, whether we like it or not, because every society is elitist to some degree.

We can make South Africa once again a good place to do business. If it isn't, foreign capital will not come here and domestic capital will either go away or lie fallow in unproductive, short-term projects. Capital follows perceived profit and businessmen would be very stupid to entrust their shareholders' funds to a new enterprise

where uncertainty is high, the reward dubious and the business climate uncongenial.

Given the likely marginalisation of Africa as a result of the opening of markets in Eastern Europe to Western capital and the competition for funds that will ensue, it is an issue of the utmost urgency that we are clear in our minds as to the kind of business environment that we want to create. Business people must make sure that their case does not go by default.

But we know that important as it is, putting the right economic structures in place will not be enough, given our special circumstances. Reluctantly or not, business is going to have to take part in a redistributive process that aims to bring the benefits of the market system of sterility and stagnation in our economic life.

If it does not, the suspicious and cynical attitude taken towards the business community by the poor people will justifiably be reinforced. Business has to become part of the developmental process and this implies a strong social role, much greater than most businessmen would want it to be.

It is obvious that business is going to have to meet a large part of the bill for decades of neglect and misdirection of resources. It is of no consequence to argue that many of these activities should be undertaken by the government. And it is not an impossible task, if we summon the will to face it, for the private sector to begin the process of reparation.

We should consider carefully the likely demands on business of the emergent society of post-apartheid South Africa. Harking back to the requirements of a successful economy, it should be noted that a programme of mass education as a common factor to all. This is lacking in South Africa and because educational programmes are time-constrained, it will be some time before significant progress is apparent. It has been suggested that of South Africa's total manpower of about 10.8-million, 30 percent has no education, 36 percent has primary school and 31 percent secondary. Three percent have a degree or diploma. Ninety percent of graduates are white and 45 percent of blacks are illiterate.

The skills South Africa needs to sustain high levels of economic growth are unlikely to be available in the near term. We are probably 40 percent short of engineers, scientists and people skilled in advanced information systems, engineering management and some professions. We have produced 45 black professional engineers since 1970; South Africa has three black architects. Its ratio of managers to workers is one of the world's lowest (1:42 compared with between 1:3 and 1:10 in developed economies).

The impact of this situation on business will be twofold: first, in its effect on the level of quality of management and second, on the diversion of resources to direct programmes of educational advancement for the workforce at every level. As to the first, it is clear that South Africa will not be able to sustain First World methods of administration and

management without a First World management cadre and some deterioration in standards is inevitable in the medium term. This implies a cost to the organisation. As to the second, management will find itself funding internal and external programmes ranging from pre-primary to senior management education. South African institutions spend less on education and training than their British counterparts, can no longer be sustained.

As a corollary of this, fast-track advancement schemes for black staff and pressure through trade unions and other, less formal group for promotion of black staff on grounds of previous disadvantage, are likely to become a permanent feature of business life.

Secondly, in the broader quest for social stability, companies are going to have to fund programmes which ease the process of urbanisation. In this context one refers to housing, health, energy, land acquisition and infrastructure development. It is not in management's interests if its employees are ill-housed with no security of tenure, if their health care is neglected, if their transport facilities are inadequate, if their family life is disrupted. Failure by business organisations to address such issues will perpetuate the perception of business as exploitative, ruthless and uncaring.

It follows that social investment expenditures, already under pressure as competition for funds intensifies, will remain in the medium term a major consideration for senior management. Obviously the aim of the corporation should be to withdraw from this area as soon as circumstances permit and to allow market forces free play. But this is not likely to happen for some years.

Finally, business should take much more time to sell itself to the people. Those who for so long have been denied political channels through which to air their views are likely to attack whatever targets come to hand and corporate South Africa is a sitting duck. That does not mean that the criticism is fair or accurate. Some is, but a great deal is not. The modern business enterprise, especially the multinational corporation, is a remarkable example of efficient, purposeful social organisation. Since its first function is the creation of wealth, it is both an agent of social change and a mirror of the environment in which it operates. But it is not government and although many people believe otherwise, its influence on public policy is limited.

Lacking the options open to the multinationals, which can depart when the cost of their presence exceeded the perceived benefits, South African businessmen have generally done fairly well. Contrary to the image of the cynical profiteer they have, perhaps, been unduly trusting of politicians and one hopes they do not continue to accept without question the bona fides of the latest batch.

But unless businessmen are prepared to recognise their broader responsibilities their organisations will not survive and perhaps do not deserve to. It is counter-productive to try to allocate blame for our present

situation. What is important now is that the private sector should carry the main burden of national development in the most cost-effective way. The value added through the market process in terms of jobs, of resources and skills accumulation, in the search for markets and the common interest between workers, shareholders, management and consumers far exceeds that available through any other means.

Businessmen do not have to be apologetic about this. They simply have to carry on their task of wealth creation while being responsive to the legitimate concerns of the broader society.

*** Main Arguments in Nationalization Debate Examined**
90AF0491A Johannesburg *THE WEEKLY MAIL*
in English 13-16 Jul 90 p 9

[Article by Lawrence Schlemmer: "Nationalisation: Winners Can Be Losers"]

[Text] In all the serious arguments about economic policy in the media, the anti-nationalisation school has won most rounds. It is noteworthy, for example, that Alec Erwin, who is perhaps most prominent among professional economists in the Mass Democratic Movement, cautiously stops short of arguing for nationalisation.

The arguments put forward for nationalisation suggest that this policy—in the sense of the state purloining the assets of companies to achieve social ends—is either vacuous and unconsidered rhetoric, or else is based on considerations and goals which do not require nationalisation for their achievement.

Since even the most idealistic of governments would not wish to run hopelessly inefficient industries, with the factors of production distorted, the effects of nationalisation on wealth redistribution are likely to be less than what constituencies would have come to expect. It is probably true to say that relatively more social benefits can be achieved through state intervention and taxation than through assuming ownership.

In terms of fairly basic logic it is very difficult to make a convincing case for nationalisation. If the arguments are insufficient then surely the fact that virtually all countries which have nationalised operations and are now seeking to introduce or reintroduce market factors (from French banks to Chinese agriculture) must have some demonstration effect on a future government.

In the face of the arguments and the international evidence, therefore, it is difficult to see the proclaimed African National Congress [ANC] policy of nationalisation surviving, in terms of economic logic or as a basis for redistribution. This, however, does not mean that the ideological/analytical war between public and private control will be won through logical persuasion and debate.

The motive to nationalise or control the economy has large political components which are immune to economic logic.

Against a background of universal condemnation of apartheid, and the equally universally condemned economic inequality between races, the ANC feels itself justified in calling for future economic policies which are in terms of political symbolism, diametrically at odds with the present dispensation.

In its long period of exile, the ANC survived the political drought sustained by revolutionary theory, which is shared with other liberation movements, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). This theory becomes a total mode of thought in which all problems are traced back to some central evil, the capitalist mode of production.

The ANC has never been alone in this theoretical obsession. Of all the agencies responsible for its persistence as a mobilising dictum, the liberation movements like the ANC are least blameworthy.

The high priests of the cult of centralist dictatorship parading in the name of democracy, with total control not only of the state but of the economy as well, have been the communist dictators themselves, as well as a tradition of political idealism, with its political perfectionism, a secular pietism, at Western bourgeois universities.

Furthermore, for politicians who anticipate assuming power in difficult situations, in which impoverished and discontented mass support may be liable to schisms and fragmentation, the more total the control by the state, the more levers are at hand to use as sanctions. South Africa, a difficult country to keep under control by any standards, is probably seen as a little easier to control if the power elite controls not only the Union Buildings but 44 Main Street as well.

It is not all surprising, therefore, that ANC spokespeople seem reluctant to jettison the ideal of nationalisation. Its political advantages far outweigh its economic contradictions.

There are factors likely to arise, however, which might make the arguments in favour of nationalisation impossible to sustain. For example, the current Western disapproval of this policy might intensify, to a point at which effective international support for the ANC might become conditional on the acceptance of continued private ownership of large companies.

If the countries which are still dominated by public ownership, most prominently the Soviet Union and China, become increasingly disreputable because of continuing state suppression of dissidence in the future, then the moral public image of socialism may be further weakened. It is also conceivable that a sustained information campaign by South African businessmen will contribute to a weakening of the political urge to nationalise leading companies.

This, however, is where the point about winning the argument and losing the war comes in. Nationalisation can easily be jettisoned without sacrificing the capacity to damage the prospects for growth in the economy. Here one is talking about "socialisation" as opposed to "nationalisation" of production.

Joe Slovo, whom one must assume to be very influential in the ANC on the basis not only of his intellect but his membership of the national executive committee, is quite clear on what should happen. He argues that "the destruction of the political and economic power of capital are merely first steps..." He is fully aware of the alienation of both managers and workers which bureaucratic state control implies. He quotes President Gorbachev in calling for "real socialisation" and the real turning of working people into the "masters of all socialised production."

Writing in the same issue of the SA LABOUR BULLETIN (ibid:45-50), editor Karl von Holdt acknowledges the need for caution and compromises in future policy but pleads for what he terms "a radical mixed economy," in which the state's "plan dominates the market and private enterprise..." He distinguishes this mixed economy from social democracy, in which state regulation is subordinate to capitalism.

Not only these quotes but a great deal of informal public debate suggests that a mixed economy is seen as the compromise between nationalisation and market-related capitalism. The phrase "mixed economy" can be heard among the most elevated captains of industry. Certainly, in using the phrase they do not mean to endorse the proposed radical model, but one is not sure what most of them do actually mean.

The radical mixed economy is clearly highly state interventionist and could entail a veto of management decisions by organised labour on the shopfloor. One prediction can be made quite confidently.

Most boards of companies would probably prefer to be nationalised, with compensation obviously, than to struggle under the kind of muddling in management decisions which the socialisation of production would imply. If anything is likely to be a formula for capital flight, a collapse of business confidence and falling growth, it is the kind of mixed economy that some interests in the MDM have in mind.

Economist Ronnie Bethlehem probably comes closer to the mixed economy concept that most businessmen have in mind. He argues that, "it is the duality of capitalism and socialism that South Africa will have to incorporate in its mixed market system."

These words no doubt sound terrifying to investors, but Bethlehem specifies that the market system must be dominant and that both capitalist and socialist institutions should be subject to the disciplines of the market.

It would seem to be essential that convincing models of the market-based duality be found to give content to the well-intentioned but dangerously vacuous endorsement of the "mixed economy" which some capitalists offer.

Bethlehem suggests that a "restructuring of ownership" takes place to give blacks a substantial stake in entrepreneurship. In the article quoted, however, he does not indicate how such structuring should take place.

If it is to be significantly at the cost of existing shareholders or taxpayers, then it will, like most other mixed economy models, simply inhibit the growth that South Africa requires. I am also not convinced that the extension of entrepreneurship to individuals will have the symbolic appeal to outweigh the powerful, if economically irresponsible symbolism of ANC economic policy.

It might be far more appealing, and effective, for the state to expand its current privatisation strategy to empower black communities (and possibly trade unions) in the field of social services.

Loan funds, of the order of or even larger than the recently created R2-billion "social upliftment" fund, might enable identifiable collectives, such as civic associations, trade unions and even voluntary organisations to become established as co-operative owners of a variety of service companies, peri-urban or urban housing estates, shopping centres, economically viable production operations and perhaps even urban service companies in the field of refuse removal, electricity and water reticulation, etc.

A condition for a loan to establish an economic collective would have to be that a suitable management team be engaged to undertake the technical tasks and co-ordination that most community collectives are generally not able to cope with. Appropriate government subsidisation would also be included in the case of certain operations.

This would be a way of giving a community board real access to material resources without intervening in and undermining the growth potential of the existing private economy. It would also give communities a sense of ownership, and the collective aspect creates the correct political symbolism.

I am not suggesting privatisation to community collectives as the only strategy. It is merely an example. Without workable models of community empowerment, however, the fall-back position from nationalisation—a "mixed economy"—is likely to become a popular passion in thinking about the "new society."

The imprecision of the concept, and the consequences which are masked by good intentions, hold very grave dangers to the future prosperity of all South Africans.

*** Extreme Conservatism of White Youth Surveyed**
 90AF0491C Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
 in English 13-16 Jul 90 p 8

[Article by Shaun Johnson; first paragraph THE WEEKLY MAIL comment]

[Text] This generation of young whites will help shape the future of South Africa. But it seems they are more conservative than their parents. They are racist, military minded and unhappy about change.

Any attempt to give a single answer to the question "What do white South Africans think?" is an obviously foolish exercise.

One might as well have stood on the Johannesburg-Pretoria highway one Saturday last month, exactly halfway between the Voortrekker Monument and the Johannesburg suburb of Yeoville, and flagged down the first white-driver car to pass by.

That commuter's view would have been no more or less a valid barometer of white opinion than the right-wing volksvergadering taking place to the north, or the African National Congress white membership drive simultaneously under way in the south.

But the specious nature of the exercise does not discourage pundits from trying to take the national white temperature—for the simple reason that what whites are thinking has an enormous bearing on the future of the negotiation process, and of South Africa itself.

Which is why, given the welter of analysis, voodoo sociology and plain guesswork on offer, the publication of the South African Institute of International Affairs' [SAIIA] latest survey of white opinion is so welcome. Within frankly conceded parameters—the respondent base comprises 2,000 "representative" white households, and the survey was conducted in January—"What do we think? A survey of white opinion" provides the most reliable gauge of political trends among whites today.

It also throws up a startling prospect: according to the research young South African whites—in the 16 to 24-year-old age group—are significantly more conservative than their elders on a range of key issues. If this trends holds, it could have a profound impact on the aftermath of the negotiating process—for these are the very people who will inherit the "new South Africa" which the process spawns.

Edited and interpreted by SAIIA research director Andre du Pisani, the study shows those in the young category to take a more unbending and right-wing line on these among other issues:

- Funding for the South African Defence Force [SADF]. Eighty-one percent of respondents said the SADF should get more money.
- The "threat" posed by the Soviet Union in Southern Africa. Only three percent agreed that the USSR was

- "abandoning its active involvement" in the subcontinent.
- South Africa's supply of food to its neighbours. Eighty-four percent believed South Africa "should not export food to black states which support or harbour terrorists/guerrillas."
- Economic sanctions. Thirty-seven percent of 16-24-year olds (as opposed to 25 percent of 25 to 34 year-olds) agreed that "the South African economy is strong enough to prevent economic sanctions hurting our country."
- Equal political rights as a means of ending sanctions. Less than half of those in the youngest category agreed that "the only way in which South Africa can in the long run avoid tougher economic sanctions is by granting equal political rights to blacks," while 65 percent of their immediate elders concurred with this view.
- The "loyalty" of blacks to South Africa in the event of war being declared against the country. Fewer 16 to 24 year-olds "trusted black motives" than any of their elders.
- Black representation in parliament. Only 42 percent in this age group believed that "blacks should serve with whites, coloureds and Indians in the same parliament," as against 65 percent of 25 to 49 year-olds.
- Direct negotiations with the ANC [African National Congress]. Only 45 percent of 16 to 24 year-olds supported this, while an average of well over 50 percent of their elders thought it is a good idea.
- The SADF's ability to contain the armed struggle. A bare 20 percent agreed with the statement that "South Africa cannot win the military struggle against the ANC in the long run." The incidence of positive reaction from 25 to 49 year-olds was at least 10 percent higher.
- The acceptability of the South African Broadcasting Corporation [SABC] as currently constituted. Well over half—55 percent—of the youngest age group surveyed agreed that "SABC-TV adequately informs the public on domestic and international political developments." Older groups were much more critical, with only 35 percent of 35 to 49 year-olds agreeing with the statement.

Within the defined group, Afrikaans-speaking youngsters are markedly more conservative than their English counterparts, and factors such as low income and geographic location play a part in feeding conservative attitudes. Nevertheless, the over-all trend toward conservatism among those who might be expected to be more open-minded than their elders, is clear.

Du Pisani concludes—not necessarily with specific reference to the 16 to 24 year-old group—that anxiety and defiance is extremely high among whites, and that although opinion has shifted toward a "law and order" perspective, there is some improvement in people's potential acceptance of social integration at various levels. But the latter remains lowest among the youngest.

"The spectre of communism and onslaught still looms large," says Du Pisani, speaking particularly among Afrikaners.

"The manner in which the government and its state-controlled media articulate the 'communist threat' is widely accepted," he says.

"What the research shows is that the majority of young white South Africans are very, very poorly informed on regional, African and international questions. These people watch NETWORK as their informative programme, but don't read widely beyond that.

"Secondly I believe that very often their political attitudes are shaped remarkably early, and under artificial conditions in that they don't get wide exposure. They also don't interact with black South African youth—they don't know how politicised they are, or what the separate reality of apartheid is."

For these reasons, "I am not that surprised at the conservatism," Du Pisani said.

He added that the experience of militarisation among many respondents—"young men have tasted the military mind"—had served to harden many attitudes. "It is a significant enough experience to influence their perceptions."

Du Pisani agreed that his findings were "obviously extremely disturbing that this is the generation that will partly shape the future of the country—it's frightening that members of this age group should hold such conservative views across a variety of questions.

"This indicates an even bigger problem for South Africa: the processes of political socialisation haven't kept up with the pace of political change. They're lagging behind.

"Very often people simply react, don't internalise and consider issues for themselves. I think white political parties, the media and even big business have failed to prepare people in vital areas for the future."

Du Pisani said that "on the ground" this resulted in "insularity and parochiality being powerfully enforced." International isolation had played a part in this process, he said, but to blame the international community was "an easy way out" of an essentially local problem.

Du Pisani said he expected a trend towards changing views in the aftermath of State President F.W. de Klerk's February speech to parliament, but that "it is likely to go both ways. People will move more to the left on 'reform' issues, and to the right on 'security' issues. I suspect we will find a curious paradox."

If there was cause for optimism regarding the attitudes of young whites, he said, it was in the opening up of the information flow. "There will be an impact—for the first time they have direct information to such issues as opposition to the ANC. More importantly, while profound international transitions have not yet influenced many whites—like perestroika and the fall of governments in Eastern Europe—their impact will be felt."

* High Rate of Graduate Emigration 'Alarming'

90AF0490E Johannesburg THE STAR
in English 20 Jul 90 p 9

[Article by Michael Chester: "Economists Alarmed at Scale of SA's 'Brain Drain'"]

[Text] New disclosures about the enormous scale of the brain drain by the silent exodus of thousands of university graduates mean even worse nightmares for economists looking at the inevitable impact of huge shortages of skilled manpower.

The future scenario had been worsened by research by the Centre for Policy Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand showing that as many as 4,500 varsity students pack their bags and quit South Africa every year—as soon as they have graduated.

The leakage equals the loss of 25 percent of all graduates flowing out of the universities, regarded as a main source of potential brain power to plug growing gaps in the ranks of top-level manpower.

Estimates of the size of the exodus have caused gloom among labour experts about the chances of solutions from a reversal of migration flows in and out of South Africa.

True, an improved political climate means that arrivals of new immigrants once more outnumber all the official departures. But the net gains still fall far short of target and still make little difference to skilled labour shortages.

It needs a reminder that total immigration last year, at 11,270, though a marked improvement compared with under 7,000 in 1986, still contrasts with inflows running at more than 50,000 a year in the mid-1970s.

While official statistics show total emigration as down below 5,000 last year, against almost 14,000 in 1986, the crucial element missing in the count was the true size of the exodus of graduates.

Most of the losses went unrecorded because of the number of graduates who slipped out in the guise of tourists travelling on return air tickets—often determined to dodge military service.

It leaves estimates on the massive shortage of skilled manpower looming as large as ever.

Executives

According to the National Manpower Commission, without a radical turnaround in trends, South Africa will be short of no fewer than 228,000 workers with university degrees or equivalent diplomas by the year 2000.

At least 120,000 new senior executives will be needed and the shortage of professionals—engineers and technologists to doctors and accountants—will be almost half a million.

The ratio of managers to non-managers already stands as weak as one to 42, compared with one to 16 in the United States, one to 14 in Australia and one in 12 in Japan. By the end of the 1990s, says the Institute of Futures Research, it may stand as bad as one to 76.

Several experts are beginning to wonder about the merits of relying on recruitment of expatriates to plug all the shortages anyway—unless they come to stay.

At PE Corporate Services, Jon Cole, marketing director, sees little chance of finding solutions if expatriates arrive on short-term contracts rather than slot into permanent jobs, willing and able to contribute in training programmes.

"There are lots of exceptions, of course, but all too often," he says, "many recruits spend the first six months here learning the ropes and the next six looking for another job."

Nor does he view the recruitment of large numbers of East Europeans, which has become a talking point in recent months, as necessarily a sound answer. He fears that East Germany, as an example, may have slipped behind in high-tech know how.

The best and only root, he believes, is a concentrated effort to retain existing South African or settler skills—with much more emphasis on the education and grooming of local skills.

That turns the debate to the sheer realities of South African demographics and the crucial need to bring more and more black talent into the management arena.

But where are the new black managers?

There is growing suspicion among the experts that many companies have paid the whole concept of black advancement little more than lip service—aside from bits of window dressing to parade their liberal thinking with a few black appointments.

Says management consultant Anthony Manning: "Apartheid's walls are crumbling: black empowerment is the new buzz phrase."

"Yet despite the liberal views of some business leaders, discrimination is alive and well in many organisations. Black advancement is sluggish."

There are problems galore—worst of all the legacy of all Bantu education system that left huge chunks of the black population either uneducated or under-educated, plus a political system leaving traumatic cultural and social scars.

According to Mr Manning, the problems are compounded by pockets of white resistance to black advancement.

He still comes across negative attitudes at high level even in the most progressive companies. "But they are most lethal at middle management level, where they're not so

easy to detect," he says, "and they're especially troublesome among white supervisors."

"However, more and more companies are trying a range of strategies to transform their racial structures."

"Above all, it must be remembered there is no magic wand to wave. There are no quick fixes when it comes to creating managers and leaders."

Exceptional

"The average age of chief executives in the Top 100 companies in South Africa is 53. Assuming most of them spent four years studying, and they've been in their current jobs for four years, it means it took them 27 years to get to the top."

"An exceptional few made it in 15 to 20 years. So how on earth can we expect suddenly to catapult a generation of blacks up there?"

"Research shows successful managers learn from a complex mix of education, on-the-job training experience, role models and relationships. Some knowhow is relatively easy to acquire."

"But the most vital skill of all—judgment—is not something that can be taught in a hurry. 'Baptism by fire' is a must."

"Real progress will require that companies take greater risks. The only way to treat the potential of blacks is to hire them carefully, train them thoroughly, and then provide the information, resources and support they need."

Mr Manning likes to quote Rob Childs, resources director at SA [South African] Breweries, who draws parallels between running a black manpower programme and his experience as a veteran of many Duzi canoe marathons:

"You can't scan the whole river before you put your boat into it. You've got to get in and start paddling."

"Too many people have spent their time looking for the rapids and trying to decide how to grade them."

"We have said to ourselves: We know there's rough water ahead, but we're going for it. We know we're going to break some paddles and we're going to fall out of the canoe now and then perhaps."

"But we're moving."

* Political Transformation of Inkatha Viewed

90AF0490B Johannesburg THE STAR
in English 17 Jul 90 p 18

[Article by Kaizer Nyatumba: "Whites Inkatha's Only Hope"]

[Text] When it was first formed in 1975 with the tacit approval of the ANC [African National Congress],

Inkatha, a predominantly Zulu organisation, was meant to be concerned largely with culture.

In the first few years of its existence it had a fairly close relationship with the ANC. The latter refrained from publicly criticising Inkatha, but the honeymoon did not last long.

The fall-out occurred after a meeting in London in November 1979 between the ANC and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

In a show of strength Chief Buthelezi, who had always been under great pressure from the Black Consciousness groups and the Soweto Civic Association under the chairmanship of Dr Nthato Motlana, flew to London with his entire Cabinet to get the ANC to speak out in his support and "get the Black Consciousness people off my back".

On his return home, Chief Buthelezi presented his meeting with the ANC as a breakthrough, saying the two organisations were on the verge of working closer together. However, ANC president Oliver Tambo later denied the meeting had taken place.

This marked the beginning of a bitter war of words between the two organisations. Chief Buthelezi frequently launched scathing attacks on the exiled organisation, which could not legally respond.

His popularity began to drop, however, after the violent clash between students and Inkatha at the University of Zululand in 1983, in which at least three students lost their lives. The United Democratic Front (UDF), which offered the greatest challenge to Inkatha inside the country, was formed in the same year.

From then onwards, Inkatha has been increasingly isolated by anti-apartheid organisation in this country, and was recently labelled "the people's enemy" by the radical South African Youth Congress (Sayco), a very influential ANC component.

Despite all this, Inkatha has remained determined to play an important role in any future political settlement, and Chief Buthelezi has let it be known that he considers himself a potential participant in negotiations.

Given Inkatha's pariah status in black politics, the organisation had no choice but to throw its membership open to all races and become a political party. Under the circumstances it was the best Chief Buthelezi could do for both the organisation and his own political ambition.

A Zulu-based Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement, as the organisation was known, could not pose any serious threat to the ANC-UDF-Cosatu [African National Congress-United Democratic Front-Congress of South African Trade Unions] SACP [South African Communist Party] alliance, and the possibility of it playing an important role in future was negligible.

New Name

Last week I asked Chief Buthelezi if Inkatha's name would change to give it a new image and if the party's headquarters would be moved from Ulundi, capital of the KwaZulu homeland. The name, he said, might be changed later, and a decision was still going to be made about the party's new head office.

What will the transformation do for Inkatha, and what are the implications for South African politics?

To start with, the organisation's membership of 1.7 million—a figure given to me by Chief Buthelezi's office on Friday—is very much in doubt.

Included in this figure are KwaZulu civil servants who have no choice but to be card-carrying members of Inkatha if they are to be employed by the homeland, and students registered at all KwaZulu-controlled schools.

On the positive side, verligte whites in President de Klerk's National Party and conservative liberals in the Democratic Party, who were members of Dr Denis Worrall's Independent Party, may conceivably support it.

Unlike any other black liberation movement, Inkatha is acceptable to many whites and stands for most of the things they believe in, ranging from a multi-party democracy, the free enterprise system, a rejection of a winner-takes-all one person, one vote system, and rejection of an interim government during negotiations.

Like the Government, it is also opposed to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa and foreign intervention in domestic issues. On many issues Inkatha's position is closer to that of the NP [National Party] than it is to that of anti-apartheid organisations, and white should find themselves comfortable within it.

While many whites will feel at home in Inkatha, it does not appear that Inkatha is about to be flooded by applications from whites wishing to join the party in the near future. Some will probably play a wait-and-see game, while others will be repelled by the way in which Chief Buthelezi has hitherto run the organisation.

However, with probably the best publicity department among political organisations in the country, Inkatha might just be able to play down the negative aspects of Chief Buthelezi's leadership, and project the KwaZulu leader as a never-say-die fighter who has been the only voice of non-violence and reason when others turned to militant demonstrations and the rhetoric of armed struggle.

Inkatha has engaged a world-renowned marketing expert, David Kingsley, to help re-orientate the party from "grand style politics" to developing policies that will win votes.

However, Inkatha is not likely to make major inroads into the coloured and Indian communities which do not

at present support the tricameral parliamentary system. These people are largely behind the ANC, with a sprinkling supporting the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

Unless Inkatha makes major changes in leadership style and substance, it is not likely to get wide support in the black community outside the KwaZulu-Natal area. Its salvation as a viable party, then, rests squarely with the white community which would like to see South Africa ruled by "an acceptable" black leader subscribing to values of Western-style democracy.

Merger

While a merger between the NP and Inkatha might be unlikely in the near future, especially in the period leading up to negotiations, the two parties will probably find themselves drawn closer to each other than ever before.

Neither party alone can win a democratic one person, one vote general election, and here they might have either to form an alliance or merge.

That, too, is the route smaller ethnic parties such as those in the Houses of Delegates and of Representatives will have to take if they are to survive.

In conclusion it must be said, though, that Inkatha will continue to be a major player in South African politics and cannot simply be wished away, as some would like to do.

* Government Subsidies for Black Housing Cut

90AF0490D Johannesburg THE STAR
in English 24 Jul 90 p 19

[Article by Michael Chester: "Question Mark Over Future of Homes Subsidy"]

[Text] The shock waves are still spreading from the news that Government funds earmarked for black home-buyer subsidies in the current financial year have been exhausted.

A first round of cutbacks has already torpedoed the chances of thousands of black families pressing ahead with house purchases—and the list threatens to grow far longer.

The admission that the subsidy scheme is broke came from Minister of Planning and Provincial Affairs Hernus Kriel.

It came on the heels of a shock announcement of a new clampdown on subsidies for all applications from black families trying to buy a home for the first time, if their joint household incomes climb above a ceiling as low as R2,000 a month.

What has added to the controversy is the way the limit has been clamped specifically on black applicants, while the limit on the incomes of white first-time home buyers stays unaltered at R3,500.

Discrimination

It smacks of discrimination, according to the Urban Foundation.

But the admission that the State coffers are empty has put a question mark over the immediate future of the entire scheme.

The National Association of Home Builders [NAHB], concerned about the impact on potential low-income black home-buyers and on the whole building industry, is now alarmed over what happens next unless there is an urgent injection of fresh funds.

It has already sounded a warning that several thousand jobs may have to be axed by building companies in a matter of weeks unless a rescue package saves the subsidy scheme for low-income home-buyers with a chain of company liquidations looming on the horizon.

On NAHB estimates, the meagre R40 million budget set aside for black subsidies for 1990 was depleted by more than two-thirds from the outset of the year, simply by the cost of servicing the 20,000 subsidies already in operation.

The timing could not have been worse in view of the steep climb that was underway in demand from more and more potential black homeowners, and the rising expectations of black communities in the reform programme.

Urgent talks with the Minister have already been launched in search of solutions, even if they yield only a temporary rescue package while longer term answers are found to the chronic problems of black housing shortages.

If the Government needed any reminder about the key role of subsidies it has been provided by studies commissioned by the NAHB from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.

The studies probed into the effect of the first-time home-buyer subsidy scheme, and fluctuations in interest rates, on the whole burning issue of the affordability of home loans among low-income families.

The research results are now at the centre of discussions aimed at working out total new strategies to crack the housing crisis.

One finding has demonstrated the enormity of the problem: as many as 78 percent of all black households are struggling to survive on less than R800 a month.

The crucial importance of subsidies, especially in times of sky-high interest rates on home-bond repayments, is demonstrated in sets of tables.

Until now, the state subsidy scheme has footed the cost of one-third of home loan repayments over the first five years of ownership, as long as the house or flat costs no more than R45,000, excluding the cost of land.

That makes State assistance a make-or-break issue to thousands of families weighing their earnings against the price tag on the home they have set eyes on.

The role of the subsidies increased all the more when interest rates started climbing to the sort of 20/21 percent levels at which they stand today.

For example, the researchers found the subsidies to be especially critical for first-time white home buyers looking at loans of about R30,000.

With subsidies, and with interest rates perched at 20 percent, that cost level came within the reach of more than 80 percent of whites. Without subsidies, the proportion dropped to below 70 percent.

Even making allowance for subsidies, loans at the identical R30,000 level were within the reach of a mere 7,9 percent of black households. Without assistance, the proportion dropped to only 5,1 percent.

Dramatic

The loan repayments at 20 percent interest rates would stand at R504 a month. Assuming that repayments were pegged at 25 percent of income, the earnings of the household would need to be at least R2,014 a month.

The dramatic clout of interest rate patterns is also demonstrated. On a similar R30,000 loan, at the 12/13 percent rates of the mid-1980s, the basic monthly income required would shrink to about R1,300 a month.

With interest rates at 24 percent, the peak reached about three years ago, incomes would need to stand as high as R2,400 or more.

Not many black families could meet bond repayments even if they dropped their sights and took aim on new homes carrying loans of a more modest R20,000.

Even with subsidies, only 18 percent of black households earn enough to stand the chance of a mortgage loan. Without subsidies, it plunges to barely above 8 percent.

Coming down to earth to face the fact that 78 percent of all black households earn less than R800 a month, the problems multiply.

The studies show that at 20 percent interest rates, it would require a basic monthly income of R704 to entertain even the idea of a home loan as low as R10,000.

That in turn collides with the economic realities of the affordability of new homes when house builders need to ensure that projects look viable and make hard business sense.

These are the issues that the National Association of Home Builders want to tackle in discussions with the Government.

The association is also anxious to discuss the role to be played by the Urban Foundation with its new loan guarantee scheme that forecasts the release of about R3,5 billion in home loans from the financial institutions over the next three or four years.

NAHB executive director John Grotsius considers it equally urgent to see signals of action with the real mobilisation of the R3 billion that the Government has said it has set aside for mammoth social upliftment initiatives.

The association is already seeking talks with Jan Steyn, former chairman of the Urban Foundation, who was appointed head of the independent trust assigned to decide how best to spend R2 billion of the total.

Insiders are showing growing dismay over the delay in news about progress while the black housing dilemma becomes even more entangled.

*** Black Suicides, Family Murders Increasing**

90AF0490C Johannesburg THE STAR
in English 17 Jul 90 p 19

[Article by Dawn Barkhuizen: "Black Family Killings: A New and Increasing Trend in SA"]

[Text] In March this year a Port Elizabeth man flung his five children off a pier into the sea and systematically drowned three before drowning himself.

After the incident, shocked family members said: "In our society no one in his right mind kills himself and his family without any reason."

Not only was the murder bizarre, but it signified a new and tragic trend in South African black society—family murder and resultant suicides.

In 1989 one such incident was reported in THE STAR. In the seven months of 1990 seven occurred, three this month.

Significantly, black policemen were involved in three of the incidents.

Police said on Friday they had noted the trend and an investigation was in progress. Details would be released on completion of the probe.

While incidents of family murder and resultant suicides in white South African families, particularly Afrikaans families, are known to be the highest in the world, black society has been traditionally free of these killings.

Until recent months they were seldom heard of, Lloyd Vogelmann, director for the Project of the Study of Violence at the University of the Witwatersrand, said.

The only change in the pattern was in 1985/6 when two or three family murders occurred. Black policemen featured prominently.

"The trend has become alarmingly apparent in the last three to four months," Mr Vogelmann said.

"It is hard to say what triggered it.

"There are usually several reasons, with family problems being the main cause.

Violence

"It could be set against the broader political conflict.

"The more society is in crisis, the more stressed individuals are and the greater the potential for violence and extreme behavior.

"The way people resolve personal conflict changes from generation to generation. In South Africa today we have a broad culture of violence. There is a tendency to use violence to resolve any kind of conflict.

"Violence is seen as a quick and easy method and used on social and political levels. It is also reflected in the family."

An alarming trend is becoming apparent in South Africa. Black society has been free from family murder, but is not seeing a dramatic increase in these cases.

Blood Ties That Turned to Tragedy

1989:

- June 5, Kempton Park: A domestic servant feeds herself and her three-year-old daughter poison mixed with alcohol.

1990:

- February 22, Soweto: Police Constable Norman Nkonjana (30) shoots and kills his 13-year-old nephew and then himself. Puzzled relatives describe the dead man as a quiet person.
- March 17, Port Elizabeth: James Williams drowns three of his five children after flinging all five off a pier into the sea. He then drowns himself. Two survive. He had been unemployed and his wife was divorcing him.
- May 4, KwaZulu, Empangeni: Lecturer Nomusa Dholo is shot and killed by her husband. He then turns the gun on himself.
- June 27, Vosloorus: Student teacher Jabu Masango (32) and his wife, Dudu (31), hang themselves in a bathroom. They leave behind a 19-month-old daughter.
- July 7, Mangaung, Bloemfontein: Policeman shoots and kills his wife and their two children. The couple had been having marital problems.
- July 7, Soweto: Jackie Buzwa shoots his 25-year-old lover, Thabang Ellen Kalaka, and then himself.
- July 9, Soweto: A policeman shoots his lover before turning his 9 mm pistol on himself. Both die on the spot.

There has been a general increase in violent crime through the country.

Guns were also easily available.

"South Africa is permeated with firearms. Remember, if you want to kill several people at once you have to be quick," Mr Vogelmann said.

Men, usually the perpetrators of family murders, tended to use more violent methods than women.

Black policemen, who are involved in five of the 11 murders listed by THE STAR, were armed, prone to stress and possibly desensitized to violence, Mr Vogelmann said.

In addition, they tended to be isolated within their communities, without access to family and social support. They were also possibly anxious over their futures in a post-apartheid society.

SAP [South African Police] spokesman Brigadier Vic Heynes added that attacks on black policemen and intimidation compounded the pressure.

Middle-Class

Mr Vogelmann noted that most of the family killings occurred in urban areas, which lacked the established support systems found in rural areas or the traditional means of resolving conflict.

Suicide among any race tended to be a middle-class phenomenon; those who killed had had time to reflect.

"They usually have jobs. One finds that as wealth increases, financial pressure increases. Suicide in poverty-stricken societies is infrequent."

Common to most family murders were:

- An overwhelming sense of despair and depression.

"Such extreme violence is prompted by despair from which the person cannot see the future as being any different. They see no solution other than death.

"The depression is caused by a sense of loss.

"This can be over an affair, a job or finance, their place in society, a sense of insecurity.

"Anger over this loss lays the foundation for violence."

- Strong commitment to an individual or family.

"They believe that conditions are so bad and so persecutory that they can only take the family into a better world.

"In white families there is sometimes a religious orientation."

- Patriarchal authoritarian family structures.

"Often the man sees his wife and family as possessions and believes it is his right and responsibility to kill them."

Mr Vogelmann said the increase in killings and suicide by young people was a global trend.

"Younger people have a lower tolerance level and see things in more extreme terms. Consequently, they are more easily stressed."

In Western societies extreme violence was often perpetrated by males in the 16 to 25 age group, he said.

* Academic Analyzes Inkatha's Transformation

* 'Strategic Shift'

90AF0492A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 20-26 Jul 90 pp 6-7

[Article by Dr Ian Phillips: "Inkatha's New Look"]

[Text] Inkatha has apparently "transformed" itself from a self-styled "liberation movement" into an all-South African political party.

The change has clearly been considered for some time now as part of a strategic shift by Inkatha to adapt to changing conditions that have affected its overall position and activity within South African politics.

Briefly put, Inkatha has failed to have much positive impact on national politics. Its leader, Gatsha Buthelezi, has failed to emerge as anything more than a regional potentate with culled national aspirations.

What is important to note, though, is the simple fact that Inkatha and Buthelezi will not accept their reduced role easily, no matter what the cost. It is in the context then of institutional failure in uncertain times that its leadership has convinced its membership to change tactics, to modernise and present a new face to the world and to South Africans themselves.

What impact the change in Inkatha's self-image will have on South African politics, both in the present transitional phase, as well as in a post-apartheid South Africa, depends in part on the motivation of the move as well as the conditions in which it has taken place.

The adoption of the title, "political party," occurs at an important time in our political history. First of all, the notion of negotiation politics is high on the agenda for the first time, presenting a particular set of challenges and difficulties to all actors, both major and minor. It is this national context which impacts directly on Buthelezi's decision to go for the party label.

Inkatha needs to devise policies to swing back onto the freeway which they were forced off as a result of recent events.

A second factor, connected to the first, is the violence in Natal. Inkatha's domestic and international support and image, already under strain despite a few hiccoughs now

and then since 1979/80, have suffered from its exposure as a participant and even initiator, in many cases, in that violence.

The organisation therefore needs a radical facelift to turn its rout into something less of a disaster.

At a political level, Inkatha lost prominence as an individual actor, even within government thinking. This was evident in the regime's plans for their National Statutory Council, for example, that envisaged "homeland leaders" participating as equals alongside the major parties in the tricameral system, an arbitrary form of "urban black" representation and appointed "experts."

The thinking, quite simply, was to retain authority in such a council in the hands of Pretoria's creations such as the tricameral actors, the homeland representatives and the appointees. These would be ranged against the nine elected "urban black representatives," if these indeed happened to be more hostile than the others.

Although the plan had problems from the beginning, it is significant that new thoughts from within government circles about the structure of a constitutional forum emerged in the shadow of the collapse of the pro-Pretoria bantustan regimes in the early part of 1990.

Suddenly, and, with the ANC [African National Congress] quietly bringing the administrations of all except Bophuthatswana and kwaZulu into its fold, the numbers game became dangerous.

The state began to devise a new game-plan to ensure its control of the negotiation process, its agenda and the outcome. Hence, the new talk was about allowing all political parties "with proven followings" to participate in the discussions. This included all parties in the tricameral system, not only the majority parties in each house, as well as those outside the system.

Such plans would exclude the military governments of the ANC-supporting Transkei and Ciskei, for example, as well as the rather paltry parties that operate in the other bantustans. Thus, ANC predominance is diluted by the proliferation of parties that would thrust the middle-ground around the strongest contender in that area of the political spectrum, presumably the National Party (NP).

Such a plan, too, allows for the participation of Buthelezi in his own terms—not as the chief minister but as president of Inkatha, a point he has emphasised tirelessly over the years. Furthermore, it pushes Buthelezi and Inkatha back into South African politics as a third force.

The government's plan necessarily excludes the idea of a constituent assembly and an interim government. Furthermore, it retains the role of "player and referee." The unbanning of political organisations is tied to the idea of allowing their participation in the new game but preventing them, ideally, from establishing themselves as fully-operative, legitimate organisations in the full sense of the term.

How does Inkatha fit into this scheme? Buthelezi's speeches, Inkatha Central Committee resolutions and literature supporting their cause point overwhelmingly in one direction.

The turn of the tide against the organisation has forced it into a purely reactive role. It senses defeat in its own impotence and hence is forced to accommodate itself within the scenario mapped out by its closest ally, in this case, the NP.

Instead of producing a plan of action that will attempt to influence developments positively, and despite numerous protestations to the contrary, Inkatha has adopted a policy of follow-my-leader. It does so in the following ways.

First of all, it has already accepted the probability of a multi-party, leadership-structured negotiation forum, along with the NP, rejecting the constituent assembly idea in the process.

De Klerk's gratitude to Buthelezi in his February 2 speech was extended to one of positive encouragement by the official NP observer at the party launch and Natal NP MP [Member of Parliament], Reiner Schoeman.

All of this points to a rejection of Thabo Mbeki's sound argument that elections to a constituent assembly would solve the problem of the "numbers game," the question of the representation of the different parties/organisations in South Africa, once and for all.

Moreover, the Central Committee resolved recently to "ensure that Inkatha [becomes] a major player in the elections which will follow the politics of negotiation because there must be at least three contenders in the striving to establish a new democratic government."

Another element stressed in Inkatha documentation is the open membership focus of the political party. How serious the organisation is on this score remains to be seen.

After all, all through its existence, it has attempted to portray itself as a national organisation whereas the vast majority of its branches (defunct and operative) have been in rural Natal; its membership is overwhelmingly drawn in ethnic Zulu terms; and its policies, internationally and nationally, have been classified as chauvinistic, espousing a Zulu nationalism.

Indeed, as one commentator suggested recently, Inkatha needs to transform itself from the equivalent of a "Zulu Broederbond" to a formal, open organisation that does not rely on patronage or other political tricks to gain support.

The shift towards open membership also allows it to drift closer to the NP in the event of alliance-building or co-operation-seeking. It removes the emphasis on "black unity" that was Buthelezi's siren song, but, perhaps, also allows for the greater encouragement of white financial support.

Inkatha's support for the Indaba constitutional proposals is well-documented, as is their support for the economic preferences of the NP, albeit that these have more recently come to include direct references to the mixed economy idea. The latter does not signify any real shift in economic thinking, but rather seems to represent an encounter with reality.

Another element that needs consideration is the impact on Inkatha of the violence in Natal and state strategy.

The question needs to be asked: why the violence? It seems clear that the violence is beneficial to the regime and to Inkatha in very specific ways.

De Klerk needs to keep his options open. He does not want a strong, well-organised ANC operating in complete freedom in the country. He needs to create and support forces that may have a nuisance value or even a strategic role to play in the event of constituency politics playing a role in the negotiation process.

What this means, in effect, is that, although he cannot openly court an alliance with Buthelezi at this stage, he is able to tolerate the excesses of that organisation, precisely because they serve to disrupt the ANC's ability to organise in an important area of the country where there appears to be the only real chance, in the regime's view, of the ANC being challenged.

Thus, Buthelezi must survive. Furthermore, the violence allows him to retain the state of emergency card in Natal. De Klerk is moving slowly towards meeting the conditions set down by the ANC and the Conference for a Democratic Future for the creation of a climate for negotiations.

Thus, he gives the impression of movement forward in contrast apparently to the ANC, a theme that has been taken up with gusto by the press.

The ANC's position is quite clear: the state of emergency has never been applied in Natal in the context of controlling violence.

Indeed, it has been applied almost exclusively to members of the democratic resistance and hardly ever to those Inkatha forces responsible for obvious acts of violence.

In addition, the state does not need the powers of the emergency to curb violence if it wanted to in Natal, as the power to perform acts of violence under the aegis of this kwaZulu authority in the form of the kwaZulu police is contained in the statutes giving authority to bantustan structures.

That power can, likewise, be taken away. It does not take much imagination to appreciate what the state would have done if the thousands of people killed and injured during this period had been white.

*** Inkatha's Support Assessed**

90AF0492B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 20-26 Jul 90 p 7

[Text] All indications are that, ever since Buthelezi broke the accord with the ANC [African National Congress] in 1979/80, Inkatha has lost rather than gained support. It was from this time onwards that Inkatha began an aggressive and co-ordinated campaign to drum up support in its own right within Natal, before the formation of the UDF [United Democratic Front] and Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions], the organisations which Buthelezi blames for the violence in the region.

Absolutely conclusive evidence is difficult to collate, given the problems of differentiating between official membership statistics, the operation of what seems to be an informal "code of discipline" within the organisation, and the issues of voluntary and involuntary membership.

It is clear, though, that there are many within Inkatha who join for ideological and political reasons. Many people within the organisation do not approve of the public image of Inkatha as a violent organisation nor the actions of warlords and other close associates and members of the organisation.

Nevertheless, there is good reason for supporting the view that Inkatha's support is on the wane.

First of all, pressure has for some time been building up within the royal house, where Buthelezi, in particular, is singled out as someone who has assumed too much of the royal prerogative for himself, even suggesting that the position of Chief Minister, a sort of prime ministership, has no place in the dynastic policy of the Zulu people.

In the urban areas, Inkatha established Uwusa in an attempt to forestall the seepage away from it as a result of people's exposure to trade unions. But this proved to be disastrous.

Inkatha's association with the warlords, most of whom are publicly attributed as responsible for most of the violence in the informal settlement areas and beyond in the recent past, has turned the seepage from Inkatha into a flood.

But, ultimately, Inkatha has failed in the political arena. Whilst it has been particularly vociferous in its attacks on the UDF [United Democratic Front], Cosatu, Natal Indian Congress, white liberals and the ANC, it has only protested against aspects of apartheid policy.

The mobilisation of Inkatha supporters and members has predominantly been against the democratic forces rather than against Pretoria. Indeed, it is difficult to find examples of Inkatha demonstrations other than those against the established policies of the liberation movements, for example, on sanctions.

As a result, it seems that Inkatha has been most successful in building support amongst Natal's conservative white business and professional community. But even

that support has waned, as evidenced in the increasing frustration expressed, for example, by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Industries at Inkatha's reticence to abide by the terms of peace agreements in the area.

The departure of Oscar Dhlomo, for whatever reason, has already marred Inkatha's image. Dhlomo's importance, indeed, centrality, to the organisation was underlined last weekend when the conference failed to hold elections to choose a successor.

Somehow, Buthelezi appeared even more isolated than before. The extent to which he can be separated from Inkatha in the way that some try to separate Unita from Jonas Savimbi, assuming a greater legitimacy to the existence of the organisation than the individual leader, is difficult to ascertain. Perhaps the position of the leader of a political party is much stronger than that of a central committee of a national liberation movement.

The recent widespread national action to place the violence in Natal on the national political agenda and to place responsibility on the state itself further focussed attention on the relative weakness of those political organisations that publicly disavowed the action, including Inkatha itself. Indeed, compared to previous actions, Inkatha singularly failed in its attempts to offset the stayaway.

Ultimately though, the strength of Inkatha does not lie simply in numbers, but rather in the ability to mobilise sufficient people around its cause.

It has on its side a well-oiled publicity and propaganda department that operates effectively overseas and at home. It also has the administrative structures of kwa-Zulu, ably assisted by a police force that is certainly not shy to act.

It is important for the Pretoria government as well, as a destabiliser and a regional connection. The similarities between Inkatha policy and NP [National Party] forecasts place both in the same camp.

Accepting for the time being their position as minor actors, Inkatha and Buthelezi will attempt to make a comeback nationally via the negotiation process as envisaged by Pretoria, not by the majority of the people. Its success will depend on Pretoria's ability to control that process, not on any independent activity.

*** Need for Black Managers Termed 'Critical'**

*** Advancement Programs Viewed**

90AF0397A Johannesburg BLACK ENTERPRISE
in English Jul 90 pp 25-26, 39

[Text] Sam Alexander, Divisional Manager of Manpower Planning for Liberty Life, takes a critical look at the black advancement programmes of South African companies, identifies problem areas and offers solutions...

In a survey conducted by the South Africa Foundation early in 1989, black managers were asked two sets of questions:

a) What, in your opinion, are the major problems still confronting black management as an effective participant in South African business? The respondents answered as follows:

1.	Lack of training	22,8%
2.	Inadequate experience of the corporate world	12,3%
3.	Resistance from white middle management	21,1%
4.	Tokenism	33,3%
5.	Cultural problems	7,0%
6.	Miscellaneous	3,5%

b) What do you think companies should do in order to be more/most responsible?

1.	Accelerate promotion policies	17,5%
2.	Devolve more power to black management	28,1%
3.	Greater investment in community development	7,0%
4.	Pressure government for political change	22,8%
5.	Educate middle level managers	15,8%
6.	Develop new standards for performance and promotion	3,5%
7.	Miscellaneous	5,3%

There are, undeniably, many blacks who are not recruitable; not placeable; not yet promotable and who require much training. The demand for managers in South Africa will not be met by the meager number of blacks currently equipped and holding down management jobs. The education level of blacks and the social disadvantages experienced by them, among other things, all contribute to the exclusion of many blacks from management opportunities. Even blacks who operate at management level have to contend with inherent limitations inflicted by historical imbalances and injustice.

Despite this setback, I find it inconceivable to accept that of the 30 million blacks in South Africa, only 4,000 have been identified as managers. Are blacks so ill equipped for the business demands of South Africa? If there is a willingness to relate positively to the inclusion of blacks into leadership positions, resulting in a careful, relevant search, we will identify infinitely more blacks to meet South Africa's management needs than is currently assumed to be available.

At the turn of this century the demise of most businesses will be attributed to the suicidal tendencies that have been evident during the 90s. "FAILURE TO ACTIVELY IDENTIFY, APPOINT AND DEVELOP BLACKS FOR MANAGEMENT" will be appropriately inscribed on EX-COMPANY tombstones.

Companies are bound to reach breaking point because of the onerous burdens compatriot bosses will be placing upon the shoulders of their limited pool of white managers, expecting them to lead and manage more staff or workers than they are able to. I predict a time in the next four or five years when there will be a frantic stampede to embrace the best available blacks, internally and externally, to fill management jobs. Decrying nationalization by business leaders must create mixed feelings with black staff, when very contradictory actions within their companies scream out for consistency.

With all the business insights and entrepreneurial skills distinguishing some South African businessmen as world leaders, how have our companies developed this steering lock? In certain normal life situations it is expedient to employ white lies-and these could serve a useful purpose. However, one of the "white" lies employed in the corporate world has proven to be devastating. White management has, for factual reasons on the one hand and "white closed shop" mentality reasons on the other hand, informed the main stakeholders of business that blacks are not ready now for management positions, and will not be in the foreseeable future.

Recruitment

When vacancies arise in equal opportunity companies some managers maliciously comply with this policy. They submit staff requisitions, feigning support of this policy. They "see" several blacks, and finally out of "desperation" a white is selected after the job can no longer be left unmanned.

Recruitment departments do not recognize their role in preparing the company for a future South Africa. Outside recruitment agencies, who have bottom line referral considerations, know the entrenched attitudes of their clients and consequently appoint whites when "suitable" blacks could not be found.

Thus they save expensive interviewing costs by mainly accessing the white market, which is in demand.

Of course failing to build up a black client and awareness base in good time is shortsighted.

While the simple conclusion is "there are no suitable blacks for the vacancy", the real position is that recruitment managers are not enterprising enough or suitably qualified to identify appropriate black staff.

How can a person whose lips express a quest for real equality and survival, but whose heart does not endorse this aspiration, be placed at the vanguard of such a challenging exercise in a country facing such unprecedented change?

The challenge to companies is to place a futurist, relevant to the unfolding realities of South Africa, in this critically key position. This person should not be concerned about relationships or popularity. His ultimate accountability would be to the stakeholders who

entrusted this responsibility to a true human resources specialist. Place a person there who will give an equal opportunity to a Black, Afrikaner, French or German job applicant, whose verbal communication skills may be wanting, but whose technical and/or other critical skills meet the job specification.

Experience, to date, shows that the black job applicant has been singly prejudiced in this respect.

If companies were sincere in meeting the management shortages in South Africa, they would see the investment in recruitment expenses piling into insignificance when measured against the future losses on account of poor management. There are competent blacks, but interviewing and selection skills need to be finely tuned to this sector of the work market. Competent blacks may not appear on the surface of the work market, they have to be sought out and discovered.

In cases where the company does not have a stated policy of equal opportunity, the sheer current and future demography of the country should be sufficient to cause the recruitment manager to be proactive in this respect. After all, the job of the line manager is to be concerned with his line functions. Is the function of the recruitment manager not to attract the best "people" to the company? Where there is no company philosophy in this regard, he should take the initiative and recommend a policy that will ultimately result in a clarifying of the company's values, culture, philosophy and business strategy.

Placement

Placement of blacks do occur, but for the majority this turns out to be a seat in limbo. Most companies acknowledge that one of their areas of weakness are regular performance appraisal and related feedback and communication. This affects both white and black staff.

Yet it is amazing how, with subjective, undocumented and often uncommunicated appraisal, time and again whites are advanced over the heads of their black colleagues, despite the fact that they (whites) have been with the company for a shorter period of time. This is confirmed by the latest research, which shows whites are promoted three-and-a-half times, to every once in the case of a black.

If you seek an explanation for this action, the "note book" in the manager's forehead is quoted, giving you scientific, psychological, anthropological and sociological reasons why the white person's performance is superior.

Given the current education disparities, the manager could no doubt be correct, but the ratio of advancement is highly questionable.

Reasons for not advancing the blacks are: poor communication skills; low assertiveness; low cognitive skills and "that lack of spark" - a phrase which covers a multitude

of sins. Blacks are beginning to reject these claims when they measure themselves against their white counterparts, whose advancement is not affected by a comparative assessment of their own shortcomings.

In more verligte companies - this usually means that a commitment to black advancement will have been communicated from above and the needle has gotten stuck on the middle management ridge of the record - blacks are taken in and one of several things happen to them. They are PLACED in a training room; they are PLACED in charge of blacks; they are PLACED on a staff rotation listing. Their lack of assertiveness is questioned; their aggressiveness is not appreciated. Their absence arising from fear or conscience on stay-away days is not seen as exemplary until their white counterparts find reasons to join MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] marches during working hours. In short, everything they do, and stand for, gets observed under a magnifying glass.

They are pushed forward, praised, recognized and paraded when it suits the company. Their feelings are coincidental when they are overtly overlooked and bypassed. They are seen by their black colleagues as token staff; their managers see them as a threat for the motivation of their white colleagues - (ignore the future). Their safety in the township causes great concern to management, which results in withholding promotion in order to assure their safety and preserve their lives.

Managers believe it to be in the interests of the company and the black concerned to hold him back when he displays shortcomings. However, it has been proven in studies conducted in California USA that retarded children for example, if kept together, copy the mannerisms, habits and discussion patterns of the rest of their colleagues. When they are placed in a normal group, their progress is phenomenal and occurs over a very short space of time.

Given the basic qualities of the black - hence his being recruited in the first place - if his attitude is correct (this is also a nebulous and subjective point); if he displays a willingness to learn; if he has a good counselling record, he should be advanced and given the opportunity - and a conducive environment - to enable him to succeed.

This could seem like an over-simplification of a complex situation, but it has been proven more often than not, all other things being equal, that the job makes the man. Historically when a vacancy crops up, if an appropriate and ideal candidate is not identified, the person with the greatest number of attributes, knowledge and skills is selected. He is invariably white. When a black with a similar profile is identified, the morale of a group of white subordinates is placed before the needs of the country.

Amazingly, if a black is placed and succeeds, his success is used as a motivation for whites to support the black advancement programme.

Promotion

There is a trite saying "to succeed as a white you have to be good, but to succeed as a black you must be twice as good". More and more whites are beginning to understand why this is so in the South African context.

An idiomatic pool of water is placed across the career path of the black. If he can walk on water where whites would sink, the sinking white and the prodigious black are awarded silver medals.

If the reverse occurs, the white is awarded a gold medal and the black gets coaching on how to work towards a bronze medal.

This iniquitous practice is about to boomerang, and is entrenching hostile feelings among blacks who are consequently denied privileges like T & E, company cars, better salaries and perks - in short, economic empowerment. Successful blacks share the plight of their black colleagues and do not identify with management in this regard.

There is the view that white managers feel threatened by a visible increase in the number of blacks. Their survival is at stake, so it is believed. This is a folly. The survival of both black and white is at stake and while it is wise to expedite a re-distribution of opportunity, if this apprehension persists, we shall all end up with a re-distribution of poverty. Blacks do not wish to deny anyone a place in the sun, provided a select few do not hog the sunlight.

A question was recently raised by the chairman of a large conglomerate on the promotional and placement opportunities for blacks in his company. He was given a garbled response, whereupon he communicated his displeasure. He issued a directive for a task force to be formed and expected to see an improvement in this respect.

Six months later three black managers were promoted, three black managers were recruited and one senior black manager was promoted.

To date their performance matches that of their white peers. Question - where do they come from so suddenly and what is the source of their skills? Answer - if serious commitment is demonstrated at the top, management will pull out all stops and search for talent.

Training

That blacks need training is not in doubt. Where the training should take place is highly debatable. One would almost assume that the manager heaves a sigh of relief when the black trainee goes to the training room, like a mother who sends her hyperactive child to school.

I have met blacks from several large organizations who see themselves never out of training and never in the work situation. This situation continues for between one and three years.

The theory of body-building sounds good, but it can only be tested in a gymnasium. This is also a proven phenomenon of human advancement. A picture of a fire has never warned anyone.

Training must at all cost be avoided if it cannot be applied in the work environment within three months. If possible, on-the-job training is first prize.

Conclusion

South African companies face great challenges with future management. While the ideal is to recruit and develop blacks on the one hand it is also true that white middle managers experience apprehension on the other hand. This experience is based on job insecurity, fear of the unknown, inability to cope with black managers, etc.

The sports arena, mixed universities, non-racial creches, churches, mixed canteens, non-racial buses, loving, caring maids living on white doorsteps, etc, etc are but a few examples of mixing, of competent black leadership, of camaraderie, of commitment.

These can hardly be compared with the work experience, where people rub shoulders more often than in any other encounter per day. If successful role models of black leadership can be seen in non work-related activities, how much better would the results be if it were practiced in the workplace as well.

* Skilled Manpower Needed

90AF0397B Johannesburg BLACK ENTERPRISE
in English Jul 90 pp 28-29

[Article by Marion Whitehead]

[Text] The new South Africa cannot run on dreams and good intentions. It will need people with skills and practical, hands-on experience to make it work on a day-to-day basis: artisans and technicians, people to run the factories, to start their own businesses and create jobs and generate the wealth so that there is enough to go around.

But the figures on the number of skilled people and managers in this country show that unless we do something about it, the South Africa of the future is going to be badly under-staffed:

- Current projections are that by the year 2000 we will be short of 250,000 skilled people, of which the majority must come from the black population as they constitute the majority in the country.
- We need to put 1,300 black people with technical training on to the market each year, but are currently getting less than 10 percent.
- Despite years of black advancement programmes, the number of blacks in meaningful management positions remains at 2 percent to 4 percent (the more optimistic put this figure at 5 percent).
- The National Manpower commission has warned that just to accommodate the 350,000 school-leavers each year, we need to create jobs eight times faster than we created them in the 1980s.

One bright spot on the horizon is that measures to reverse the drop in the number of apprentices entering industry seem to be working. The Minister of Manpower recently revealed that last year the number of apprentices that had been indentured was 9,900 - a 25 percent increase on the previous year.

Informal Sector

Entrepreneurs in the informal sector are providing more and more jobs. The turnover of black street traders in the main urban centers is estimated to be nearly R10-billion a year, and they handle as much as 33 percent of the total spending power of the black urban community, according to Theo Rudman, Director of the Self Employment Institute.

While this is promising in terms of providing jobs, the corporate sector cannot ignore its responsibility to add to the pool of skills in this country.

Companies must recognize that they need to nurture their employees, because their success depends on them. Even entrepreneurs in small businesses know the difference that motivated workers make to the profit or failure of the venture. They are the ones who deal with the customers, and satisfied customers who enjoy good service come back time and time again to buy.

Training

What it all boils down to is an urgent need for training, commented Perfect Malimela, a prominent human resources consultant who runs his own business from Durban.

"We need training on all fronts and in all sectors. Companies will regret it if they do not do this".

He ascribed the failure of black advancement programmes to a lack of willingness on the part of companies to make it succeed: "It's not how much is being done, or how much is being spent, but how effective it is that counts," commented Malimela.

Innovation

Innovative thinking is needed to get appropriate training and education to the people who will build this country. The SA [South Africa] Institute of Management (SAIM), which is enrolling a growing number of black managers, believes that there is no shortage of people of the right kind of 'material' in this country.

"I am reminded constantly by my black colleagues in the SAIM that their families have always attached the highest priority to education and the quest for knowledge. They are prepared to make great sacrifices to meet the costs of education," said Morris Cowley, executive director of the SAIM.

"I am convinced that we have to face the reality of a need to make meaningful changes in the secondary and tertiary education systems, including the removal of significant monopolies of power enjoyed by the universities.

"Secondly, we must recognize and eliminate the overt and covert obstacles to black advancement which businesses have inherited.

The responsibility for creating examples of a new, tolerant, just business society with opportunities for all, lies with the leaders of the major powers in South African business. I believe they know that this is a powder-keg which can and must be defused," said Cowley.

Equal Opportunity Programmes

Under the guidance of Wells Ntuli, chairman of their development board, the SAIM has started running Self Development and Equal Opportunity programmes to equip aspirant executives with the skills to psychologically empower themselves to move up the corporate ladder.

Other organizations are working at school level, improving the quality of education for children and helping teachers to upgrade their own qualifications.

A great need is seen in the area of science and maths education to supply the engineers, artisans and technicians of the future. Organizations like Protec work with children who show a leaning in this direction, while the Foundation for Research Development is currently working on packages to support teachers of these subjects.

Maths and Science

We need to attract more children to take maths and science at school level and to help teachers to improve their teaching at this level.

Then There will be better qualified students admitted to the universities and technikons and to employment," explained Minky Seromo, who is working on a pilot project in Mamelodi to support teachers in these subjects.

Once these packages have been developed and tested, they will be made available to the rest of the country with the help of the private sector.

If our people do not have the necessary skills to build and run the country, there is a danger that all the great talk about the future simply remains rhetoric.

All South Africans have a part to play, whether it be in our communities or in the workplace - that meeting place of the diverse cultures and classes of people.

Even in conservative areas such as Bethal this is possible, as the AEI employees on a Participative Work Relations System have demonstrated. They have learned to deal with each other in an adult way, and relations between foremen and workers has improved.

If we can create harmony in the factories and businesses of this land, then it is possible to do it for the whole country, and build the new South Africa everyone is talking about.

* Individual Empowerment

90AF0397C Johannesburg *BLACK ENTERPRISE*
in English Jul 90 pp 29, 31

[Text] Despite their efforts to promote equal opportunities and advancement, companies are not delivering significant results, according to Anne Newman, an Organization Development Consultant who runs the SA [South Africa] Institute of Management's Equal Opportunity and Self Development programmes.

The number of black people occupying meaningful management positions is estimated to be from 2 - 5 percent of the total number of managers - hardly an impressive figure.

There seems to be two sides to the coin. One is that despite the good intentions of company directors and top management, many tactical and conceptual errors have been made in trying to implement meaningful advancement strategies. More alarmingly, attitudes within companies and society at large have tended to be negative or, at least, passively hostile toward the idea of black advancement.

Individual Empowerment

The other side of the coin concerns the question of individual empowerment. Despite the fact that in SA, white men hold the reins of power, there are enough black business "heroes" around to show that white hegemony is not enough to exclude those individuals from "disadvantaged" groups who are intent on success.

Newman said that people who have "made it" in the white-dominated corporate world are those who have learnt to enter confidently into the formal and informal communication channels of business. They are able to understand and manage the political machinations of the organization and exert personal power.

Research has indicated that in order to succeed, people who are from "disadvantaged" groups must develop their own sources of power in order to overcome organizational and psychological barriers.

Responsibility

Individuals have to take responsibility for developing strategies to achieve this, it is not something that just happens. In order to develop effective strategies, the individual needs to have a thorough understanding of his or her personal characteristics (strengths and weaknesses). For example:

- level of assertiveness;
- degree of communication skills;
- degree of introversion/extroversion;

- ability to access informal and formal communications systems;
- level of self-esteem;
- belief in self;
- ability to deal with barriers - both real and perceived;
- ability to make decisions;
- ability to take control of self and others;
- ability to develop and use power bases;
- ability to use mentors to enhance success;
- ability to handle the stress of dealing with multiple norm systems;
- acknowledgement and clarification of values and goals;
- ability to handle incongruence and conflict.

Organizations can do much to assist their employees along the way to self-empowerment. In this regard communication is vital to avoid one-sided paternalistic planning. Support systems, training and mentoring should be implemented by mutual commitment.

"Empowering of people economically, politically and socially is essential, but without psychological empowerment, people struggle to seize and capitalize on opportunities as they arise," said Newman.

Note: The next SA Institute of Management's Self Development Programme will be run from October 31-November 2, and the next Equal Opportunity Programme on October 30 this year. Both will be held in Johannesburg and organizations classed as 'developmental' will be sponsored to send delegates at no charge.

For further information, contact Cynthia Malan at (011) 339-2364.

* Labor Relations in Bethal

90AF0397D Johannesburg *BLACK ENTERPRISE*
in English Jul 90 p 33

[Text] In a rapidly developing society plagued by racial and cultural divisions, labor disputes and low productivity, South Africans would do well to note the progress of a fascinating experiment that is taking place in the conservative stronghold of Bethal, in the Eastern Transvaal.

Major changes since the implementation of the Participative Work Relations System (PWR) have been that workers on the factory floor are now actively involved in their jobs, taking responsibility for their work, identifying and solving problems that crop up.

Relations between foremen and workers have improved on the whole, with the result that productivity at the Bethal plant has improved significantly.

"Our Bethal factory had a history of problems," said Mr Benny Hlongwane, the IR Manager of AECI who coordinated the implementation of the PWR programme in the Bethal factory. "It is in a very conservative rural area. It had lost top executives and the market for explosives had shrunk. The plant also had a history of

strikes and some retrenchments. They had to do something quickly to overcome these difficulties."

Polarization

The major problems identified at the AECI's Explosives and Chemicals plant reflected the problems that existed in the community of Bethal at large - racial polarization, lack of communication, and authoritarian attitudes.

Training took place in 'natural work groups', that is the groups in which people worked at the factory. Over 50 percent of the workforce of the Bethal plant were exposed to the initial training scheme which was given in a series of four-day courses between January and September 1989.

They took part in a series of activities that were designed to teach important lessons about communication, leadership and problem solving.

Communication

In one exercise, group members were required to find out as much as they could about group members; backgrounds. Whilst seemingly a very simple or even frivolous task, it taught the participants much about each other and increased mutual understanding, as well as teaching them about their listening skills.

Another exercise involved using bowling and other team games to develop team spirit and to identify the "leaders", the "conciliators", "strategists" etc, in each group.

After each exercise, the group discussed their performance. Benny Hlongwane, Seadimo Setlogelo and Robyn Davidson acted as teachers and observers together with a team of PWR experts.

The lessons that emerged included the importance of communication, of checking that people understand, the importance of asking for participation and of asking for ideas. Course participants learned to apply communications skills to situations that crop up at the workplace. "Both communicators in an exchange must take responsibility for communication. People begin to understand why they get negative responses when they talk in a certain way to an employee."

They also learnt how to deal with other human beings in an adult way, instead of trying to force their will on others through sheer weight of authority, or by 'playing dumb' and refusing to get involved.

Leadership Games

Through leadership games, group members were able to observe what leadership skills each group member possessed and how the leadership of the group would change according to the task that had to be completed. The necessity for every group member to be involved in each task was continually stressed. Throughout the course emphasis was placed on the need for discussion and

feedback. The traditional autocratic systems of command at the factory were being replaced by a group-based, consensus seeking approach. No longer could individuals rely on their position to support their ideas. Everything was open for discussion.

Open Discussion

Discussions were extremely heated and emotional at times, as prejudices and deeply-held beliefs were exposed and challenged, but because they took place within the context of the course, the output could often be used constructively.

But not surprisingly there have been 'casualties'. Some workers were not able to adapt to the new approach and chose to leave the company or were rejected by the group.

The four-day training courses were only part of the beginning of this experiment, however. After completing the course, group members set to work identifying the problems they experienced in the workplace and then developing solutions to them, using problem-solving models.

Employees hold regular follow-up sessions every three to four weeks where problems and resolutions are documented. The sessions also serve as a means of checking if people are applying the skills they have learnt and of identifying areas where additional training is necessary.

"PWR works on people's minds," says Mr Theuns du Toit, factory manager at Bethal. "The seed has now been planted and the process will gather momentum. The return on investment is difficult to work out, but I believe we're getting our money back."

*** Skill Transfers**

90AF0397E Johannesburg *BLACK ENTERPRISE*
in English Jul 90 p 34

[Text] Mr Mandla Tisani runs a marriage bureau with a difference. His job is to match up entrepreneurs in the informal sector and community development organizations with big companies willing to share their financial muscle - and to give them the tools to make the marriage a success.

"If this country is to grow, managerial and supervisory skills must be transferred into the informal sector and into community groups to enable them to enhance their effectiveness and to help them succeed in the valuable work they are doing," said Tisani, head of the FSA-Contact Community Affairs division.

In his experience of working with community groups, he said he had seen some excellent ideas and projects supported by communities and companies. However, after two to three years, the projects often faltered because of lack of management and interactive skills and forward planning, embarrassing all concerned.

"We are not coming to the community to impose new ideas and say what they are doing is not right, but to look objectively at how we can make the project live longer to provide the service that it wants to," emphasized Tisani.

His division works on two levels:

- With community groups. A needs analysis is done to determine what skills are required to make the venture succeed. These needs are then addressed.
- With big business. Companies with corporate social responsibility programmes are matched up with community groups that are compatible with their objectives.

Benefits

"To our mind, everyone benefits. Community groups are in touch with the realities of getting to where they want to be. They are able to present their proposals to potential funders in a well defined, logical and goal oriented manner and ensure that the skills level of key personnel in the venture are addressed.

"Business benefits in that the success rate of ventures they fund is increased, they can be sure that the project that they are funding is well defined, viable and fits with their business profile and market image," commented Tisani.

For further information, call Mandla Tisani on (011) 726-5180.

Life Skills for a Brighter Future

Mast Study Skills course helps kids achieve better results.

The future of this country lies in the hands of its children—and they should not be forgotten when we talk of developing our people's skills.

Standard education does not supply children with life skills, or teach them how to study, motivate themselves or to plan their goals and manage their time—all essential ingredients in building successful careers.

Recognizing this, some companies are beginning to run programmes of this kind for their employees' children. One such example is Peninsular Beverage Company which recently put 30 of their employees' children in Std. 8, 9 & 10 through the Mast Study Skills course.

The children's results in the mid-year examinations were so much improved that Peninsular Beverage is making the

programme available to another 30 children of employees in the June holidays, this time from Std. 5, 6 & 7.

"My daughter is bright but lazy. Since doing this course she is so motivated, because now she is getting results. And she got top marks in her project," said Mr Corrie Julius, Human Resource Manager at Peninsular Beverage. "Another child improved by 27 percent in her science marks." He said that the company's motivation in running the course was simply to provide a community service and help build the pool of skills in South Africa. "If the children are successful, we will be too pleased."

* Career Management Planning

90AF0397F Johannesburg *BLACK ENTERPRISE*
in English Jul 90 p 36

[Text] Until recently, there has been a complete lack of career guidance and counselling for black people in South Africa, says Mandla Adonisi, of Wits University's Graduate School of Business Administration. But the untapped potential of our people can be unleashed by wise career management.

The career successes and the achievements of organizations pivot on the effective development of human resources within those organizations. By helping their employees to satisfy their need for growth and development, organizations benefit through increased productivity and a lower rate of absenteeism and employee turnover. A positive corporate image will also serve to attract high calibre applicants.

Mr Mandla Adonisi, a lecturer at the Wits Graduate School of Business Administration, believes career management should be an integral part of the strategic business plan of any organization - and individual. He runs career management workshops for aspirant executives. In one group, he said that all the participants had made career moves between their first workshop and the follow up session. "And the exciting thing about it was that their experiences have sensitized them to the career needs of the people that they are managing".

Adonisi is himself a product of a career management workshop which he attended. It led to a radical reviewing of his values and career goals. Now he is currently completing his second Master's degree on a part-time basis. Career management from the individual's point of view is one aspect of the broader process of self-development, says Adonisi. "Self development focuses on the development of the whole person rather than just the job related needs of an individual," he explained.

Angola

Government Calls on UNITA to Attend Talks

MB1508204090 Luanda Domestic Service
in Portuguese 1900 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Press Statement Issued by Information Ministry in Luanda on 15 August on Government-UNITA Peace Talks—read by announcer]

[Text] The Government of the People's Republic of Angola, translating the aspirations of peace and socio-economic development of all the Angolan people, has been mounting intensive, coherent, and unsurpassable efforts in the political and diplomatic fields to find just and lasting solutions for the internal conflict through serious negotiations.

However, despite their goodwill and initiative, the Angolan authorities have always found themselves confronted with an incongruous behavior and new demands from UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. This behavior is no more than a delaying tactic with undisclosed intentions. In practice, it aims at systematically hindering the solution of the problem and consequently prolonging the suffering of the Angolan people. Thanks to the spirit of good faith which is translated into the flexibility and political seriousness they always demonstrated, the Angolan authorities, in their many initiatives toward restoring peace, have held direct and exploratory talks with UNITA through the good offices of the Portuguese Government to reach an agreement that would lead to a cease-fire. In fact, even this mechanism has not seriously been used by UNITA. At the last meeting held in Oeiras, Portugal, last June, UNITA unilaterally decided to abandon the talks for consultations in Jamba at a time when the Angolan Government was already quite willing and ready to conclude a cease-fire agreement based on political principles that will fulfill the aspirations of the Angolan Government.

Although UNITA intensified its military actions on the battlefield, creating a less favorable atmosphere for political discussions—as was rightly pointed out by the Angolan head of state in Sao Tome and Principe—contacts between the government and UNITA will continue until an understanding is reached.

As a matter of fact, the Angolan Government's full readiness to hold a third meeting with UNITA was openly and sincerely expressed by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos to Portuguese Prime Minister Professor Anibal Cavaco Silva at a recent meeting held in Sao Tome and Principe. He left no one in doubt about the Angolan Government's readiness to negotiate to find a peaceful and honorable solution that will once and for all put an end to the war.

However, in a move that we are unable to explain, UNITA issued a statement from Washington indicating that the Angolan Government did not appear for the

meeting scheduled for 8 August. The truth was that the meeting had been set for 21 August, inasmuch as the Angolan authorities had proposed to the Portuguese Government a mechanism whereby prior consultations would be held with a view to ensuring the existence of indispensable conditions that would lead to concrete results. This would avoid false expectations as happened at a previous meeting because of UNITA's lack of preparation. Everyone had accepted this mechanism of prior consultations before a meeting set for 21 August, two days after UNITA asked the Portuguese Government that the meeting be postponed until the end of this month. This was clearly a delaying maneuver and disinformation campaign in order to try to persuade the U.S. Congress to approve decisions that would lead to prolonging the war.

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola has proposed the next meeting discuss of a cease-fire. The Angolan Government has defined views which it put forward in previous meetings. However, UNITA has been presenting arguments which do not conform with the existing regional and international atmosphere of detente and peace with a view to reaching an understanding in this field.

By the way, who does not want cease-fire? Why is UNITA systematically (?refusing) to contribute to the conclusion of a definitive cease-fire?

The intense efforts and the seriousness and flexibility demonstrated by the Angolan authorities during all this process is clear to everyone. Unfortunately, this commitment on the part of our government is not reciprocated by the UNITA side. This is because in view of its serious foreign commitments, it does not feel sufficiently independent to make decisions that would lead to a cease-fire.

As a matter of fact, the Angolan head of state had already pointed this out in Sao Tome when he told the press that there are prospects for peace, but we also know that there is still a lot of negative foreign interference in the peace process. He said we want to eliminate this negative foreign interference to speed up the peace process.

In this context, the Government of the People's Republic of Angola calls on UNITA to free itself once and for all from its foreign commitments and appear without further delays and subterfuge at the third meeting set to take place in Portugal toward the end of this month. This meeting was postponed at its request. Every day the suffering of the Angolan people increases.

MPLA Reportedly Prepares Large Offensive

MB1608094490 (Clandestine) KUP in English
to Southern and Central Africa 0928 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Communique issued by the FALA chief of general staff in Jamba on 12 August]

[Text] [No dateline as received] 1. Despite UNITA's [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]

efforts towards facilitating the negotiation process underway, the government of the People's Republic of Angola (PRA) has of late shown that it is not prepared to honestly negotiate the end to the armed conflict by opting for military offensives on UNITA areas.

2. The general chief of staff of the UNITA armed forces, FALA [Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] denounces through this communique the eminence of another large-scale military offensive along the southern border with Namibia on the following grounds:

a) The Namibian Government has provided movement facilities in its territory to the troops of the PRA government, including its logistical support following a secret agreement signed on May 23, 1990 between the defense ministers of the two countries;

b) The central logistics base was created June 28 in the town of Onjiva to support the offensive;

c) On July 22, the first grouping, reinforced with combat vehicles, started moving from Menongue to Xangongo via Lubango. (It is worth noting that this grouping has participated in the defeated offensive dubbed "the last assault");

d) On August 4, the forward command post for the southern front was established at Onjiva;

e) At this very movement, the 19th, 35th and 16th infantry brigades and the 80th artillery brigade, already inspected by MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] armed forces, FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] general chief of staff officers and by Soviet military advisors, are concentrated at Onjiva;

f) There are intense logistical movements from: —Menongue to Caiundo; Lubango to Onjiva; Namibia to Onjiva via Namacuande; Namibia to Melunga between the border marks 25 and 26;

g) As of August 8, there have been heavy air bombardments by MiG-23 jetfighter planes and SU-22 bombers on our positions along the southern border;

h) The following troop movement was registered between August 6 and 10:

—August 6, the Mongua mission was reinforced with a 130mm cannon group;

—August 7, arrival of T-62 tanks and BMP-1 armoured cars in Cahama;

—August 8, the first grouping started marching from Xangongo to Onjiva, reinforcing the Mongua mission;

—August 8, the Xangongo and Onjiva airstrips were inspected by FAPA/DAA [People's Air Force of Angola/Air Defense] officers.

3. In the light of this indication of eminent war, the FALA chief of staff warns the PRA Government and the international community that it will not be responsible for the unforeseen consequences of this military escalation. We will defend the liberated territory at whatever price and we will prove to the PRA leaders that military action is not the solution to the 15-year-long conflict.

Our country free or death. United we shall win.

Jamba, Bastion of the Angolan resistance, August 12, 1990
The Chief of Staff Arlindo Chenda Isaac Pena Ben Ben, general

Madagascar

Communique Issued From De Klerk, Botha Visit

EA1508215190 Antananarivo Domestic Service
in Malagasy 1830 GMT 14 Aug 90

[Excerpts] South African President Frederik de Klerk has made a working visit to Madagascar. As has already been reported by Radio Malagasy, a number of businessmen and technicians accompanied him. Shortly after his arrival in Madagascar, a meeting of technicians was held at the Malagasy Central Bank headquarters. This morning in Iavoloha-Ambohitraina state palace [15 km from Antananarivo] the two presidents held talks. At 0815 GMT the South African president reached Iavoloha. The Malagasy president and top officials from the various institutions welcomed him. The talks lasted for more than two hours and journalists were not allowed to cover them.

This afternoon, the agreement on air links between Madagascar and South Africa was signed. The two foreign ministers, Roelof Botha and Jean Bermananjara, signed the agreement. Shortly after that the presidents held a joint news conference. Over 60 journalists covered the news conference, including reporters from major international news agencies such as REUTER, AFP, and (?UPI), [words indistinct] from South African TV, radio, and printed media, and Malagasy journalists. The journalists' questions centered on relations between Madagascar and South Africa, cooperation resulting from these relations, and the new political wind now prevailing in South Africa and in Malagasy diplomacy.

Among Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka's answers was: We Malagasy carry out a policy based on geographical considerations, and such a policy must be adjusted to reality. The South African president noted that relations exist because change for better things, for establishing a new South Africa, is taking place. Relations exist so both peoples' interests are taken care of as well as Africans' interests in general.

Before the news conference, a joint communique issued by both governments was read. Mr. Roelof Botha, the South African foreign minister, read it in English. The joint communique reads as follows:

[Announcer, in English] At the invitation of the president of the Malagasy Republic, Mr. Didier Ratsiraka, South African President Frederik W. de Klerk came for a working visit to Antananarivo, Madagascar's capital, on Tuesday, 14 August 1990. The two sides' talks centered on the current state of affairs in South Africa and in Southern Africa and in the southwestern part of the Indian Ocean. They also held talks on issues of bilateral relations. The South African and Malagasy foreign ministers took part in the talks.

President Ratsiraka expressed satisfaction over the fact that the main obstacle which prevented the South African Government and the ANC [African National

Congress] from holding negotiations, from building a new South Africa, had been removed. Among the things at which President Ratsiraka expressed happiness and for which he praised President de Klerk and the ANC Deputy President Nelson Mandela was the fact that they had the opportunity to hold talks on a new constitution in South Africa.

Economic difficulties in Africa were then examined closely in light of the great changes happening throughout the world. The two presidents admitted that peace and order were an urgent requirement in the southern part of Africa in order to advance toward economic development. The two sides agreed that the time has come for a new era of cooperation between South Africa and Madagascar in order to [word indistinct] the future of the two respective peoples for the welfare of their children.

Referring to the above mentioned reality, though no diplomatic relations still exist, the two presidents admitted that the time has come to establish economic and commercial relations between South Africa and Madagascar. As a result, the two presidents decided that an economic and trade liaison center is to be created in each country to supervise, develop, and harmonize economic, trade, financial, technical, cultural, and tourism relations.

An agreement was reached between the two sides on air links and was signed by the two respective foreign ministers. The agreement will greatly facilitate air links between Madagascar and South Africa and neighboring countries in the tourism sector in particular. [passage omitted] [end of communique]

President de Klerk thanks the president of Madagascar and the whole Malagasy people for the [words indistinct] reserved for him and his South African delegation. Signed by the two foreign ministers in Antananarivo, 14 August 1990.

We have already said that the air links agreement between South Africa and Madagascar was signed, so today South African Airways announced that it will undertake regular weekly flights between Johannesburg and Antananarivo from 1 September 1990. [passage omitted]

Namibia

Ministry Denies Plan To Help in MPLA Attack

MB1508164590 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1531 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] Windhoek Aug 15 SAPA—Namibia's Ministry of Defence on Wednesday [15 Aug] rejected allegations that Namibia was preparing to assist Angolan MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government forces in an attack on UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] rebels in southern Angola.

In a statement issued in Windhoek, a spokesman for the ministry, Mr. Henk Rheeder, denied there was any secret agreement signed between the MPLA and Namibia's Ministry of Defence.

"There is no presence of MPLA troops, and the ministry strongly denies the presence of Angolan fighter aircraft on Namibian soil," the statement said. "The ministry once again repeats the fact that Namibian soil will not be used by the MPLA in attacks against UNITA," it said.

The statement came in response to allegations by UNITA that the MPLA was preparing a major offensive against UNITA in southern Angola with the help of Namibia. The UNITA statement issued in Lisbon claimed the MPLA had signed a secret agreement with Namibia in May and that Namibia was providing bases and logistical support for MPLA forces. UNITA said since August 6 Angolan troops had been massing in the area and raiding southern UNITA positions.

The two sides, who have been engaged in a bloody civil war since Angola's independence from Portugal in 1975, held exploratory peace talks in April and June, and a third round is expected shortly, reports said.

Military Equipment To Arrive From Angola

MB1508080390 Windhoek Domestic Service in English
0445 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Text] SWAPO's [South-West African People's Organization] second consignment of military equipment which has been donated to the government is to arrive from Angola this month.

Defense spokesman Paul Kanyemba said the consignment consisting of soft and hard military equipment was part of the (78,000 million rand) military donation.

Kanyemba said 600 former PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] members who are guarding the equipment would also return to Namibia. He said the Home Affairs Ministry had been requested to facilitate their entry into the country.

Kanyemba said Defense Minister Peter Mueshahange would consider sending a team to Angola to enlist them into the Namibian Defense Force and subsequently (?enter) the country as members of the Namibian army. The first consignment of war material arrived from Angola on 16 April.

14 Aug Press Review on Current Problems, Issues

MB1408114590

[Editorial Report]

THE NAMIBIAN

From Windhoek, THE NAMIBIAN in English on 10 August in its page 7 editorial refers to the bombing of THE NAMIBIAN premises and says: "THE NAMIBIAN and its staff believed that the days of

political harassment and attacks were over; however, in many ways we were naive to underestimate those forces who cannot even be placated by the reconciliatory stance of the SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] government. The incident proves to us, more than ever, that there are those in this country who will resort to whatever underhand means to try and destabilise the situation here."

TIMES OF NAMIBIA

Criticism of SWAPO 'Security' at NAMIBIAN Offices— "The SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] daily [THE NAMIBIAN] made allegations of alleged private armies with supposed arms caches, claimed to be consisting of former KOEVOETS [former Namibian police counterinsurgency units] and members of the Battalion 101 and supposedly supported in the said coup attempt by unnamed U.S. sources," declares a page 2 editorial in Windhoek TIMES OF NAMIBIA on 7 August in English. But then the offices of THE NAMIBIAN were bombed and it "confirmed the existence of a real and not alleged private army, by having 'the SWAPO security' sweeping for bombs which the police might have 'overlooked'." "The private army on which the SWAPO daily called for consolation in its hour of grief, this 'SWAPO security', is this by any chance a peaceful outfit, akin to the Salvation Army?"

Zambia

Kaunda Says 'Full Force' To Be Used in Campaign

*MB1508123890 Gaborone Domestic Service in English
1110 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia says he will unleash what he calls the full force of the ruling party in a campaign to maintain the country's one-party system.

At a news conference, Mr. Kaunda said that supporters of a multiparty democracy were doing things that worried him such as receiving funds from foreigners. The president originally scheduled a referendum on Zambia's political future for October, but it has now been put back to August next year.

Governor Sees 'Life and Death' in Referendum

*MB1508191290 Lusaka Domestic Service in English
1800 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] A district governor in the Copperbelt has advised Zambians to choose between life and death in the forthcoming referendum next year on whether or not to retain the one-party system. Chililabombwe Governor Comrade Paul Chansa also advised party leaders that the forthcoming referendum must not cause them to slacken in the recruitment of more members as this was the surest way of fighting against the reintroduction of multipartyism. Addressing party leaders at Kakosso ward today, Comrade Chansa said Zambians have been afforded the chance to choose between hell and paradise through next year's referendum and whether the country should revert to political pluralism.

Advocate of Multipartyism Denies Foreign Funding

*MB1508190790 Lusaka Domestic Service in English
1800 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Text] The national committee for the reintroduction of multiparty politics has denied that it is using funds from external sources to finance its campaign. Chairman of the committee Arthur Awino has said funds for the campaign are coming from donations by Zambians and there have been no offer of financial help by any outside organization or individual. Briefing the press in Lusaka, Mr. Awino said the multiparty advocates have formed a movement on multiparty which will only be [words indistinct] after the referendum to decide whether Zambia should retain the one-party system or opt for pluralism.

Benin

* Commission To Recover Stolen Money Reorganized

* Ahouansou Commission Dismissed

90AF0406A Cotonou L'OPINION in French
6 Jul 90 pp 4-5

[Article by Bernard Kayossi: "Rene Ahouansou a Disappointment"; first paragraph is L'OPINION introduction]

[Text] The National Property Auditing Commission, the now only-too-famous Ahouansou Commission, finally spilled its "secret." [The revelations] took place on Thursday 21 June, one month to the day after the big press conference of the prime minister, Mr. Nicephore Soglo, who introduced it.

If the commission has laid a goose egg, it is by and large because the conclusions communicated to the press fall short of the hope invested in it by all of the Beninese people. Everyone saw the commission as a last hope that would finally save the national economy by restoring a good part of the energy drained from it by the leeches of the People's Revolution Party of Benin (PRPB). Alas! This is a distant goal. Hold on to your seats. The Beninese state owes the Benin Commercial Bank (BCB) alone the a trifling 62 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs. That is the sum dissipated by the different state companies and institutions that the evil creative genius of the PRPB hatched, nurtured, and then extinguished everywhere, even in the remotest corners of the countryside (the state farm example). Add to that the hefty bribes demanded of investors, which the latter tranquilly bundled into the sums invested, and you have an inkling of the immensity of the money embezzled. It is money of which we stand in sore need today, and which the thieves must cough up.

Well, before our prolific press corps, which filled the spacious conference room of the Customs Directorate rapidly, tiny illicit "enrichment balances" were announced for people known to sleep on gold, if not diamonds!

But let us follow the account of Mr. Ahouansou, who was flanked on the occasion by Ministers Toussaint Tchitchi and Jean-Florentin Feliho, ministers of Information and Communications, and of the Interior, Public Security, and Territorial Administration, respectively. The members of the commission were all present.

The Audit Commission: A PRPB Institution

Commission President Ahouansou first explained the conditions under which "his" commission was born.

While a member of the National Revolutionary Assembly (ANR), he was obliged to condemn the illicit enrichment, very dangerous to the nation's economy, of certain PRPB members. Since he had to back up his statements, President Kerekou, then president of the central committee and

head of state, accepted the responsibility for creating an auditing commission. This commission, installed 27 December, 1989, and of which Mr. Ahouansou agreed, despite the peril, to accept the presidency, was given the task of auditing the property of individuals who had held positions of responsibility in the PRPB government since 1972 or still hold them today.

The first observation, then, is that the national property auditing commission is a "PRPB-ist" institution. As for those meant to form its backbone, Mr. Ahouansou called in vain on his professorial, economic, judicial, management, and labor union colleagues. He then asked the head of state to call on the military, which was done. And the commission was supplied, as its only working document, with the list of people having held official positions.

The commissioners then decided to begin their mission by auditing the property of members of the PRPB central committee, the government, cabinets, and state companies.

The people's collaboration was solicited, even in the form of denunciations, and the latter were not lacking.

From that time on, all sorts of obstacles cropped up everywhere: the lack of funds; the reluctance of those summoned to respond to the commission's invitation.

This lasted nearly a month, then the funds came through. With work barely under way, the National Conference of Active Forces was convened, again blocking action.

Democratic Renewal Worked at Hobbling Matters

Mr. Ahouansou stated that things went better before the National Conference than after.

Indeed, he stressed, the man who created the special commission, President Kerekou, sincerely desired a successful outcome in order to bring to light the truth.

But those who arrived after the conference, that is, members of the transition government, came with their conception and methods, and certainly with no further desire for the commission members. Mr. Ahouansou emphasized that he had been promised experts to beef up his commission several times, but that nothing had been done. On the contrary, there seemed to be a desire to paralyze him. The commissioners were even refused the necessary funds, which further paralyzed work. Some members of the commission doing auditing work in the north—in Borgou to be exact—with the enthusiastic support of the people had to return to Cotonou empty-handed, because the government was demanding their report immediately. This move disappointed both the president and members of the commission, which had nonetheless pursued its task as best it could.

...Yet the Commission Had Wasted No Time

The commission examined 18 of the 48 dossiers it had drawn up.

The method used to study the dossiers was simple. According to studies of the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis (INSAE), a family consumes 77 percent of its salary and saves the rest. Wanting to allow a wider margin, however, the commission settled on a savings rate of 50 percent. But for moral reasons and reasons of financial orthodoxy, it did not accept the principle of savings drawn from mission expenses—which make up the greater part of the estates declared to it. These disbursements, according to Mr. Ahouansou, should be spent entirely on the missions for which they were allocated, instead of being pocketed by individuals to fatten their estates.

Given these criteria, if the value of the estate exceeds the value of salary resources, it follows there has been illicit enrichment. The commission was unable to decide on the question of the "gifts" mentioned in most of the declarations, and which reflect the irresponsibility of the givers.

As stated earlier, the estate and enrichment figures are ridiculous.

For all of the 18 cases examined, the total figure for declared estates was 1 billion 200 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs, with illicit enrichment of less than 700 million CFA francs!! A drop in the ocean of all the real estate property of these individuals.

Here are the 18 cases presented to the press:

1. Mr. Martin Dohou Azonhiho, total salary: 35,968,960 francs, declared estate: 20,961,493. Taking into account the salary used to build up the estate—17,984,480, or 50 percent of the declared amount—there is an illicit enrichment balance of 2,977,013 CFA francs.

2. Mr. Joseph Degla: enrichment balance, negative.

3. Mr. Girigissou Gado: also a negative balance.

4. Mr. Imorou Roger Garba: shows an enrichment balance of 32,610,016 CFA francs.

5. Mr. Justin Gnidehou: shows an enrichment balance of 60,495,569 CFA francs, which he is disputing by sending a list of figures to the commission that forces a full reappraisal of his case.

6. Mr. Romain Vilon Guezo: an enrichment balance of nearly 30,000,000, although his estate has not been valued by experts.

7. Mr. Sanni Mama Gomina: an enrichment balance of 83,705,129 CFA francs.

8. Mr. Vincent Guezodje has substantial income, but the commission has not yet been able to undertake the necessary expert valuations.

9. Mr. Abdoulaye Malam Idi: 51,359,200 CFA francs to justify, for there are too many contradictions.

10. Mr. Ifede Simon Ogouma: because he has held diplomatic posts, his salary exceeds his gains, or, 85,975,899 compared to 13,769,474 CFA francs.

11. Mr. Soule Dankoro says that his estate is held jointly with his wife's and his form shows an enrichment balance of 155,011,159 CFA francs.

12. Mr. Barthelemy Ohouens: Told the commission that he was already rich before his return to Benin and that he had been the recipient of financial gifts from several African heads of state, including Mssrs. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Omar Bongo, and Paul Biya. Mr. Francois Tombalbaye of Chad reportedly even opened an account for him. He had 40,000,000 CFA francs in France before coming to Benin. His account shows an enrichment balance of 106,071,193 CFA francs, but there are several items that commission has not yet been able to master.

13. Mr. Ousmane Batoko: shows an enrichment balance of 23,421,742 CFA francs.

14. Mr. Didier Dassi: case on hold.

15. Mr. Leopold Ahoueya: an enrichment balance of 24,855,105 CFA francs.

16. Mr. Ali Houdou: the balance is said to be in his favor.

17. Mr. Codjo Francois Azodogbehou: said to have a salary surplus in his favor.

18. Mr. Thimothee Mevo: a hard to evaluate case because the principal, who was in the USSR, did not declare his entire personal estate.

Besides these 18 cases, the commission has a list of 42 individuals denounced by the people.

The sentiment expressed by Mr. Ahouansou after his commission was dissolved is that he and his collaborators are disillusioned, not embittered. They feel no bitterness because they fulfilled their mission properly with the means at their disposal. Rather, Mr. Ahouansou hoped the new commission would be able to delve into management practices to track down illicit enrichment.

When asked why the property of President Kerekou had not been audited, Mr. Ahouansou said that the commission had not had time. But as the question arose frequently, he finally explained that the president of the Republic had filled out his audit form, but that it was of no interest. First of all, President Kerekou's gains are reportedly insignificant compared to his salary: The many land holdings he owns are gifts. Even the president's house in Natitingou is said to have been built free of charge by a company.

The only advantage of this form, said Mr. Ahouansou, is that it raises the eternal problem of the gifts made to political officials during the exercise of their duties. In other words, has a politician the right to receive and keep

for personal use gifts given to him because of his official functions? In the United States, the answer to this question is a categorical "no."

* New Commission Appointed

90AF0406B Cotonou L'OPINION in French
6 Jul 90 p 5

[Article by Louis Raoul Zekpa: "Henri Amoussou-Kpakpa Testifies"; first paragraph is L'OPINION introduction]

[Text] The Rene Ahouansou Special Commission in charge of auditing the property of the People's Revolution Party of Benin (PRPB) and state officials has been dissolved and replaced by the National Commission. This new commission will audit the property of different individuals involved in politics, administration, or finance. Created by decree No. 90-114 of 21 June 1990, the commission is presided over by Mr. Henri Amoussou-Kpakpa. The ceremony officially installing it took place on 22 June 1990 in the conference room of the General Customs Directorate in Cotonou; the ceremony was presided over by the prime minister, Mr. Nicephore Soglo, who was flanked by several members of his government.

According to the explanations of the prime minister, the basic reason for this decision is that scrutiny of the information and results contained in the report of the Ahouansou commission, set up on 27 December 1989 by the head of state, indicate an urgent need to modify the bill that created the Special Commission. This is so with respect to both its makeup and powers. The decision is also meant to conform with a recommendation of the National Conference of Active Forces on upgrading morality in public life.

A New Mission

The first and most significant characteristic of the new commission is not only that its mission and powers have been redefined, but also that it has been placed under the direct authority of the head of government, who has already assured it of his constant availability and support. It must report to him at least once a month. In the interests of objectivity, efficiency, and speed, it may also be bolstered by foreign experts.

The task of the new commission is to audit the property of all individuals who held political, administrative, or financial responsibilities in the PRPB, state institutions and administrations, and public or semipublic companies since 26 October 1972. It is also empowered to audit, as part of its mission and if need be, the property of any Beninese citizen, even one living abroad, and of any person residing in Beninese territory. It can, if necessary, order an audit of the administrative and financial management of the individuals in question.

The bill that instituted the new commission also provided for guarantees and safeguards. Members of the commission, named by the cabinet, can at any time be formally relieved of their duties by the same, either

individually or collectively. Except in cases of serious transgressions unrelated to their work on the commission, members enjoy total immunity. The state protects them against all attacks or insults or any other reprehensible acts of which they could be victims. Likewise, all persons assisting the work of the commission can enjoy the same immunity, under the same conditions.

Moreover, any natural or legal person subjected to a property audit is required, if summoned, to appear before the commission, failing which he will be forced to do so by all legal means. He must also produce a complete declaration of all his property in Benin or abroad and provide any information requested on his lifestyle within a maximum of three clear days from the date of his first appearance. Any false declaration or failure to respond within the set time limit can be considered to be contempt of public authority and punished as such. This will apply to for delaying tactics as well.

When the commission's investigations find that an infraction was or may have been committed, it is also provided that the district attorney immediately order a judicial inquiry or preliminary judicial inquiry.

This should now make matters clear to one and all and rekindle the hope of the Beninese. And as the prime minister strongly emphasized when he installed the new commission, the mission assigned it "is of capital importance, because the people are impatient to recover the property of which they were dishonestly robbed by those who, in the course of carrying out their political, administrative, or financial duties, lined their pockets, either through corruption, extortion, thefts, misappropriation of public funds, breach of trust, complicity, forgery and use of forgery, fraud, influence trafficking, and other like infractions, or by skirting or refusing to obey tax laws in force."

* Challenges Facing Democratic Revival Examined

90AF0405B Paris LA POLITIQUE AFRICAINE
in French Jun 90 pp 138-142

[Article by Theophile E. Vittin: "Benin's Democratic Revival"]

[Text] Benin has experienced more unrest in the last three years than any other West African country. The ferment in the former Dahomey during the last six months has accelerated the pace of change. The page of Beninese history now being written marks the end of a painful crisis that has led to the birth of new institutions and a new political configuration, and these changes engender new prospects.

Insolvency and Political Reform

Benin's political crisis originated in the economic and financial problems that beset the Cotonou regime. These problems, caused by the world economic slump, the Nigerian recession, chicanery, and the patrimonial management of the public treasury, weakened the government politically. As a consequence, the recent unrest

unleashed a tidal wave of opposition, spearheaded by the teachers, which became radicalized, going beyond subsistence-related demands (wages, scholarships, growing pauperization, social malaise, urban mendicancy...) to include demands for political reform: multipartyism, respect for human rights, the resignation of President Kerekou, etc. Kerekou, the central personage in the political system, trying vainly to defuse public discontent, alternated between threats, repression, and grudging wage disbursements. He also ventured a timid opening (the ministerial shake-up of 4 August 1989, the amnesty of 29 August 1989, gradual release of political prisoners, various promises). In the end he was able to keep the economy going only by extraordinary injections of French aid and financial help from international donors (primarily the World Bank, IMF and EEC).

Nevertheless, in the face of chronic wage arrears, an economy and bureaucracy paralyzed by inopportune strikes, popular grumbling, the growing influence of the clandestine and exiled opposition, and the scuttling of the single trade union confederation, President Kerekou finally resolved to cut loose his ballast. The imperative of reforming the political system, in response to the decayed condition of the regime and the obsolescence of the PRPB (People's Revolution Party of Benin), the country's only legal political party, led to a startling about-face: the 7 December 1989 renunciation of Marxism-Leninism.

In thus jettisoning his principles and opening up an ossified political system, despite the resistance of some within the party, President Kerekou—who in July 1989 had been re-elected for five years—demonstrated both a certain measure of courage and a willingness to yield to the combined pressure of an unruly populace and the international donors. The realignment was accomplished by holding a National Reconciliation Conference attended by representatives of all the vital forces in the country: 488 delegates representing every occupational and confessional category, as well as all shades of political opinion (52 different varieties, including the PRPB).

Although it ran into a number of difficulties, the National Conference of the vital forces of the nation took some concrete decisions. Thanks to its adroit president, the many bargains struck, and the reciprocal concessions made, a consensus was reached to permit—for the first time in the country's political history—a nonviolent transition opening the way to peaceful and democratic alternation. Despite their disagreements, the conference participants realized the importance of avoiding an impasse or laying the foundations for possible military rule. In reality, there was no other credible, realistic solution; so President Kerekou, after some equivocation and threatening noises, agreed to implement the conference's decisions.

The concrete and promising results that came out of the debates in the plenary assembly and in committee brought new hope to a people tired of instability and financial scarcity. The results have led to an upsurge of

confidence throughout the country, thanks to the elaboration of a social blueprint that will be turned into a reality by the various reforms envisaged. The conference resolutions have brought about radical change with the establishment of transitional institutions and interim measures, pending final ratification of the new constitution, which is to be submitted to a referendum on 1 July 1990, after promulgation and amendment. That constitution provides for presidential and legislative elections to be held on 27 January 1991, which should lead to installation of the new institutions on 12 March 1991. The Constitutional Commission, under pressure from the National Conference to act quickly, has opted for full multipartyism, and the conference has already ratified that decision. This multipartyism will be paired with a semipresidential system under which the president will be elected by popular vote and can serve no more than two consecutive five-year terms. The incumbent president is allowed to be a candidate in the elections. The unicameral parliament will also be elected by direct universal suffrage, while the government will be headed by a prime minister, chosen from the parliamentary majority, who must answer to the legislature. The panoply of major institutions will be completed by a Constitutional Court and an Economic and Social Council.

Implementation of the conference's decisions has gone forward with the establishment for an 11-month period of two essential institutions: a High Council of the Republic [HCR] composed of members of the presidium that directed the work of the conference, former presidents, the presidents of the technical commissions, representatives of the country's six provinces, and other elected officials.

Legislative and executive powers are vested in the HCR, which is responsible for ensuring implementation of the decisions made by the conference. It will also popularize the constitution, receive amendments to it, and supervise the elections.

Following abrogation of the old constitution (the Fundamental Law), dissolution of the old parliament (Revolutionary National Assembly), and the resignation of the old government (National Executive Council), a new government of 15 members (independent civic leaders), composed mainly of technocrats and academics, was installed on 12 March 1990. That transition government, formed and headed by technocrat Nicephore Soglo, a former World Bank official whom the conference elected by a broad consensus vote, is to coexist with President Kerekou, whose prerogatives have been reduced.

Hopes and Challenges

The process of redemocratization now under way will help restore the somewhat sullied reputation of a country once known as "Africa's Latin Quarter." Activity is already beginning to pick up again thanks to a partial payment of back wages, re-establishment of individual liberties, and the release of political prisoners. The

qualifications and determination of the new prime minister should reassure investors and international donors, stir hopes of change in the interior, and serve to unify the country's diverse elements—all these developments to be facilitated, it is hoped, by the feeling of consensus that has emerged as this new political cycle begins.

Nevertheless, the new team led by Nicephore Soglo has an onerous legacy to overcome. It must be bold and courageous if it hopes to reinvigorate an anemic economy. Harsh action will be required to rehabilitate the insolvent parastatal and banking sectors, pay back the salary arrears and clean up public finance (notably by reducing personnel in the civil service through voluntary departures). It will have to obtain loans and aid to manage an economy that is competing against a sizable informal sector and suffering a decline in its normal trade with Nigeria and the landlocked countries.

The country's poverty, the structural rigidities, and the current sluggishness are all obstacles to successful implementation of the commitments made under the Structural Adjustment Program signed with the Bretton Woods institutions in June 1989, a program already deeply compromised by the earlier turbulence. Given the fact that the donors' new financial injections are not supposed to be used exclusively to pay government workers' salaries, and the fact that liquidity needs exceed the total disbursements donors have promised, it is difficult to see how the current government can avoid a policy of friendly overtures or fail to insist on the recovery of embezzled funds. It is thus vulnerable to the complaints about recolonization already being stirred up by the meddling of French experts and international institutions in the country's political and economic affairs. It will also be vulnerable to the dilatory and destabilizing tactics of those presumed to be responsible for the corruption and maladministration.

Moreover, the austerity policy to be carried out risks exacerbating the discontent of urban classes already hard hit by personnel cutbacks in the public sector, the layoff of 2,700 degree holders, salary reductions, declining purchasing power, etc. At the same time, the new independence of the trade unions could lead to new demands from labor. It is thus essential to reach a consensus about the economic adjustment, essential that the protagonists in the democratic renewal play by the rules. Confidence-building measures and a certain degree of transparency are also important. The performance of the current government will ultimately depend on these factors. By the same token, the results this government achieves will have crucial bearing on the actions and stability of future governments, since any unpopular decisions the latter must make will probably be blamed on a single party or coalition of parties.

Several more issues remain unresolved. There is the matter of establishing the much-heralded "new morality," the moral rectification of politics, the investigation into the wealth of former officials, the elimination of

illicit enrichment...measures that may lead to the settling of old scores, vindictiveness, heated emotions, and bitter dissension...

Other uncertainties remain, having to do with the reconversion and rehabilitation of former officials, the attitude of the army—many of whose officers have tasted the delights of power, and whose political neutrality and subordination to civilian authority the current government is committed to ensure—and reconstruction of the political landscape. One may well ask what combination of alliances it will take, in the current mosaic of political factions, to lead to stable coalitions, especially since new cleavages that go beyond traditional or previous ones are beginning to appear: generational cleavages, cleavages between exiles, former international officials, and dissidents who fought the regime or endured repression on the ground, political and ideological cleavages... The interests at stake are divergent, and their conciliation or the resolution of their contradictions—such as the attitude of President Kerekou to the evolving "cohabitation"—cannot fail to have an impact on the democratic renewal.

The transition from a monolithic to a democratic regime now going on in Benin depends on fair play, voluntarism, the sense of responsibility, and the capacity for innovation of the protagonists in the democratic renewal. The chances for the success and endurance of such an experiment depend in large part on economic recovery and the effective functioning of the institutions created or about to be established. The new constitution will be the keystone of the political system that will determine the fate of the experiment launched several months ago. The near-term political future of the country will depend on the letter and spirit of the new constitution and on the ability of the Beninese to frame laws and mechanisms capable of supporting the emergence of a stable political system and a new political culture, while avoiding excesses.

* High Council Criticized on Constitution Debate

90AF0405A Cotonou LA GAZETTE DU GOLFE
(International Edition) in French 1-15 Jul 90 pp 3, 5

[Commentary by Paul da Silva: "Debate Usurped by the HCR"]

[Text] The draft constitution prepared by the constitutional commission under the chairmanship of Professor Maurice A. Glele has given rise to controversy. Aside from the choice of a presidential system, the methods adopted by the High Council of the Republic [HCR] to popularize the draft leave many people concerned about the limitation on possible amendments. The method bears a strange resemblance to the "scorched earth" policy practiced for 17 years by the PRPB [People's Revolution Party of Benin], a policy that ended up costing it dearly when the people of Benin finally woke up...

Is it an exaggeration today to say Benin is a mirror in which black Africa is searching for its new political face? Surely not.... And that is why it is up to every Beninese to make sure that the words, and even more the intentions, of the transition authorities conform to our expectations, that those authorities distance themselves, if only to a small extent, from the unbridled ambition of certain individuals to truncate our new democracy. The path of renewal chosen by the Beninese people demands that citizens be given a clear political choice, so that conditions can be established in which people will once more be treated as real human beings whose freedom of thought and action is respected. And although the provisional leaders seem perennially optimistic about the HCR's ability to implement the institutional changes called for by the National Conference, their assurance is not shared by everyone. Because the HCR is chipping away at democracy, undermining it, by usurping the debate over the political system and charging ahead blindly, employing the same old paternalistic methods of "popularization" and mystification which the PRPB used for so long to keep Benin anesthetized...

Presidential System

Monsignor I. de Souza, president of the HCR, has spoken to the Beninese people and presented them with the draft constitution whose "popularization" is now in full swing throughout the country. More than one Beninese has had to pinch himself, listening to our brilliant prelate "launch the popularization campaign." Literally jumping out of his neutral role, he has launched himself enthusiastically into the defense of a draft constitution which, to say the least, is far from popular with a majority of the people... It is a sad spectacle, this propaganda campaign. And behind it all is a warm, soldierly smile...

"As to the question of the system: well, the National Conference decided it would be a presidential system," says the prelate in so many words. Which is another way of saying: "Stop worrying about it, there is nothing to see. At most I authorize you to consider amendments on three important points: the question of free primary education, the age restriction on presidential candidates, and the advisability of putting the HCR in the Constitutional Court. In all other respects, the Glele draft is perfect as it stands. There now, it is up to you to express your DEMOCRATIC wishes, and starting tomorrow, you will see my musketeers out in the field. Game's over..."

However, with all due respect to those who are manipulating the confusion around the monsignor for political ends, especially those members of the HCR closest to certain potential presidential candidates, a number of very fundamental questions remain, and they must be resolved. First of all there is the question whether a presidential or semipresidential system is best for our country. It is quite easy to say "the conference decided," but once the issue gives rise to controversy, political honesty demands that it be really debated. After all, it is

the people who are really sovereign, not the conference. There are fanatical supporters of a presidential system. One cannot ignore the fact that there are also impassioned devotees of a semipresidential system. And the people should not be cheated of their right to decide simply because the presidential system came along just in time to support the ambitions of a few individuals. Adoption of the presidential system on the pretext that "the conference decided," ignoring the broad masses of voiceless people who may have other views, amounts to manipulating the victory of one group over another under the convenient cover of the National Conference. And such battles, even in the domain of ideas, leave scars that will be difficult to efface, especially in Benin, which is just now awakening.

Let us assume for now that the presidential system, as outlined in the draft "Glele constitution," is actually satisfactory to the majority. Even its supporters see things in it they want to change, and thus we would like to know why the HCR must restrict the right of amendment to only three points. Are we to believe the National Conference made this decision, just as it supposedly made the decision for a presidential system? What right does anyone have to limit us to those three points? How can people who tirelessly preach to us about a "state of law" and "human rights" and "multipartyism" work so hard to tie our hands on the path to democracy? What about the rights of those who believe the Glele draft is a botched piece of work, which needs a lot of retouching? As we have said before in these columns, the draft constitution paves the way for a classic dictatorship. No one has convinced us otherwise.

We have also argued that the draft constitution establishes too many institutions for regulating the nation's political life. Their number should be reduced to no more than four or five, thus avoiding the unnecessary expense of maintaining such a multitude of institutions, and using the money instead to equip schools and clinics and provide drinking water for the people. The HCR, the Economic and Social Council, and even the High Audiovisual Authority should be eliminated. The savings in associated expenses for vehicles, houses, secretariats, allowances, and travel would be substantial enough to make an impact in essential domains like health and education.

No Post-Transition HCR

The HCR must disappear. It is a transitional structure that should end with the transition, for it is not politically decent to provide lifetime annuities to former presidents whose very incompetence was what got us into this situation in the first place. Even if it were to be called a "senate," we do not want it. It would amount to the legal establishment of a potential hornet's nest for the future president, and it would encourage its members to nourish dangerous delusions of power. It is especially unimaginable when one considers the grasping, conniving attitudes of these political dinosaurs. If they really had the capacity to provide "moral leadership in public

life," they would already have demonstrated it. It has also been argued that under the Glele draft the president has too much power, since he would appoint practically everyone except the president of the National Assembly. In a country where the range of concerns—even at the highest levels—extends only, as someone once put it, "from the stomach to the belly," the president has done all too much to turn his appointees into zealous, docile ministers to his own interests, not those of the nation. I very much doubt that a Constitutional Court whose membership is determined exclusively by the president would ever go against his wishes. They would lose their position, and since like any other Beninese functionary they can be expected to cling to their job like a flea to his favorite dog, it is much to be feared that all their decisions will reflect the president's will. The truth is that Beninese functionaries do not have much of a taste for independent thinking.

Another problem, one that in our opinion is more important for the balance of power than the question of free primary school education, is whether the assembly, the embodiment of popular sovereignty, will have its powers eviscerated. It has no real authority, and in its relations with the government, the president could even bypass it in such important areas as the national budget. What kind of democracy is that?

Does anyone in this country still want a guided or popular democracy whose establishment is left entirely in the hands of an "enlightened" and paternalistic few? Surely there cannot be many. For that very reason, the HCR should have the courage to conclude, as someone said, that "a country's constitution is too serious a matter to be left to constitutional experts," even nationalists and professors emeritus.

'PRPB-Type' Strategy

But the fact is that the HCR's operating style has shown itself over time to be brutally destabilizing; and we are certainly entitled to ask some questions when its notables espouse the old paternalistic PRPB techniques of popularization. One should not criticize them for being slow to invent new ones, but they might at least get out of ruts so deeply worn that we already know what lies behind every bend. For how many peasants in the countryside are able to understand the Glele draft, how many can comprehend its advantages and disadvantages? What really literate "popularizer" is capable of faithfully translating the text and explaining its structure and articles? Unfortunately, the duplicity long practiced by the PRPB is still a pervasive fact of life. At the local community level, the people charged with interpreting a document that ostensibly represents a rupture with the old regime are the same mayors and delegates who were elected/selected by the Marxist military dictatorship. It is true that they were elected under a chameleon's banner, and they are more than willing to change their colors. But in reality, what was needed were men who represented a real break with the past, and until we have

taken the time to make those necessary and indispensable changes, we should not rush things. The HCR has taken a considerable risk in that respect—unless its real objective is to transform our people into boy scouts, turned out sharply in their knickers, ready to obey orders from anyone.

Changing the bowl doesn't change the goldfish. And the ardor and haste with which certain members of the HCR are working to change Benin's bowl does not necessarily promise a very democratic future. "The most serious matters," according to Monsignor de Souza, "should not be rushed." And if, for whatever reasons—confused, to say the least—the presidential system is retained, we must still give the people enough time to judge and critique the proposal. This is not being done. The HCR has come out for debate, but for a truncated debate, a usurped debate. This is reflected in another sad spectacle, which on television is pompously called "dialogue." Television viewers were entitled to an authoritative survey of the world's political systems, uninterrupted by journalistic interpretation.

It is a pitiful spectacle, one which reflects the expedient methods so dear to the PRPB; it not only expresses the profound contempt that these gentlemen have for the country's journalists, but also clearly shows what they intend to do with the audiovisual media once the provisional becomes permanent. The press should realize that respect and dignity can only come through hard work: they are not dispensed by some High Audiovisual Authority.

Tomorrow, unless audiovisual journalists live up to their responsibilities and think about the fact that they studied as hard to become journalists as any magistrate studied for the bench, they will be trampled under, and their equipment confiscated for the production of authoritative documentaries. And if they resign in face of the clear threat presented by the members of the constitutional commission, they need only serve their notice and put up a blackboard in the studio.

However that may be, it would be decent of the HCR to take a little more time to complete the work entrusted to it by the National Conference. If necessary, the transition could be prolonged by six months or more. Why not? We might be able to get rid of that botched hodgepodge that is currently being popularized in such haste. Democracy's future depends on it. And if the fundamental questions about this draft constitution are not aired one way or another, the country will simply re-enact the tale of the paraplegic who jumps into the pool at Lourdes and comes out with new tires on his wheelchair. What this country needs today is not so much a flashy new president as solid, dependable, and stable institutions that can provide for a peaceful economic recovery and enable the country to reclaim the dignity it has so long been denied....

The Gambia

NPFL's Taylor Due in Banjul 16 August

AB1608060090 Paris AFP in French 1947 GMT
15 Aug 90

[Excerpt] Banjul, 15 Aug (AFP)—Charles Taylor, the president of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, NPFL, is due in Banjul, where a meeting of foreign affairs ministers of the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, mediation committee member countries will take place on 16 August, according to authoritative sources in the Gambian capital. An NPFL communique had announced on 13 August that Charles Taylor had agreed to go to Banjul at the invitation of the Gambian President Dawda Jawara and added that Mr. Taylor would hold talks with Nigerian and Ghanaian heads of state as well as with the Ugandan president who, is the current OAU chairman. In Banjul, no details have been obtained from official sources either on whom Mr. Taylor will meet or on the possible arrival of Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Ugandan leaders. [passage omitted]

Ghana

Radio Suggests Force Blocks Arms to Liberia

AB1508210890 Accra Domestic Service in English
1300 GMT 15 Aug 90

[Excerpts] The ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] peacekeeping and monitoring force, assembled in Freetown for a military intervention in the Liberian civil war, has been enlarged. The Republic of Togo has joined the original five countries to provide troops for the joint operation. Togo's move underlines the popularity and goodwill that ECOWAS enjoys in the subregion. John Nyamkuma has this write-up on the civil war and preparations for the ECOWAS intervention.

[Begin Nyamkuma recording] [passage omitted] As if to run away from censure, one of the leaders, Charles Taylor, is quoted as saying that he would court-martial his men if they raid diplomatic premises. He further said, belatedly though, that as angry as he is, he respects international law. The point made by many is that rebel forces loyal to Charles Taylor had been forcing their way into several diplomatic compounds since they entered Congotown, the site of many embassies, last week.

It is safely [word indistinct] that Charles Taylor and the others would continue to turn a blind eye to many atrocities being visited on foreign nationals in Liberia by their fighting forces. The propaganda machinery being run as part of the civil war freely put it about yesterday that Prince Johnson, one of the three leaders, had been killed by forces loyal to Charles Taylor. It later on turned out that Prince Johnson is still alive and is still leading his troops to effect his claim to leadership in Liberia.

One is tempted to believe that the hoax over Prince Johnson's murder was to make the ECOWAS force hesitate a bit before moving into Liberia. Prince Johnson controls the port area and has assured the ECOWAS troops the use of that facility for their movement. With any such delay, troops who peddled the alleged murder story might have pushed up further to enlarge the area they have already occupied.

It is strongly suggested that the ECOWAS force should first block all routes through which the fighting groups in Liberia receive their arms supplies, even before they move into Liberia. All eyes are on the ECOWAS mediation force to tell Liberians that enough is enough. [end recording]

Guinea

Army Positioned at Liberian, Ivorian Borders

AB1508221190 Paris AFP in English 2125 GMT
15 Aug 90

[Excerpt] Banjul, Aug 15 (AFP)—[passage omitted] Mr. Taylor, who has previously rejected any foreign intervention, said in the NPFL [National Patriotic Front of Liberia] communique Monday [13 Aug] that the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] and the OAU had a role to play in the settlement of the conflict.

Meanwhile, in Nzerekore, Guinea, official sources said that the Guinean Army had taken up positions along the Liberian and Ivory Coast borders following violent incursions by deserters from the Liberian Army. The armed and starving deserters attacked Guinean villages in the Macenta region, causing an unknown number of casualties and abducting several people whom they later released.

Liberia

FRG, Egyptian, Moroccan Embassies Evacuated

AB1508162690 Paris AFP in English 1553 GMT
15 Aug 90

[Text] Monrovia, Aug 15 (AFP)—The West German, Egyptian and Moroccan embassies in the Liberian capital, located on the front line of the war between rebels and government troops, were evacuated on Wednesday [15 Aug]. An 18-vehicle convoy headed by Bonn's ambassador, Jurgen Gehl, drove off through territory held by the rebel National Patriotic Front of Charles Taylor, heading north-east for the Loguatu post at the border with Ivory Coast. The convoy of about 40 people included 11 West Germans, the Egyptian ambassador, two staffers from the Moroccan mission, four Lebanese, and Liberians who worked at the West German Embassy.

The United States meanwhile, in a statement released in Lagos on Wednesday, reiterated its neutrality in the seven-month-old conflict in Liberia. "We support the idea of a cease-fire and negotiations among the parties to

the conflict so that Liberians can settle their differences peacefully and without further loss of life and destruction of property," the U.S. Embassy in the Nigerian capital said. The statement said U.S. military forces were involved to "facilitate" the evacuation of U.S. citizens and nationals of other countries caught in the war as well as to protect official U.S. property.

A recent allegation by a spokesman of President Samuel Doe's government that U.S. helicopters fired on the Executive Mansion in an effort to assassinate him is "totally without foundation," the embassy added. U.S. helicopters have neither flown near the mansion nor opened fire at any time during their flights in Liberia, the statement said.

About 350 Americans, including 46 embassy officials, are still in Liberia, the statement concluded. U.S. Marines stationed on warships off the Liberian coast have helped evacuate Americans and other foreigners from Monrovia during the past few weeks.

Taylor Refuses West African Expatriates Leaving

*AB1508183690 London BBC World Service in English
1709 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Charles Taylor has been making his hostility toward the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] more than clear. Although allowing diplomats and others to leave Liberia through the territory that he holds, he is not being so helpful to the ECOWAS nationals trying to get out. We received this dispatch from the REUTER news agency in Monrovia.

[Begin studio announcer recording] About 50 foreigners joined the West German road convoy out of Liberia's war-torn capital today, but diplomatic sources said that rebel leader Charles Taylor was refusing to let West African expatriates flee the country. About 60 Guinean citizens had hoped to join the convoy bound for Abidjan in neighboring Ivory Coast.

Diplomatic sources said that Taylor blocked the move, refusing safe passage for nationals of any West African country involved in the regional ECOWAS plan to send peacekeeping troops to Liberia. Anyone moving through rebel held territory needs a pass from Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia to cross the numerous road-blocks throughout the country.

Most of those leaving today were West German Embassy staff. Others included Moroccan diplomats and a French journalist. A REUTER's photographer following the convoy said that rebels at the checkpoint a few miles outside Monrovia forced out two Africans whom he accused of being officials in Doe's government.

Sporadic gunfire between Taylor's rebels and government troops continued today in the Congotown suburb near Monrovia's Catholic Hospital about three and half

miles from the Executive Mansion where Doe has vowed to fight to the end. [end recording]

Report of NPFL Offensive Against Airport

*AB1608063090 Paris AFP in English 1901 GMT
15 Aug 90*

[Text] Monrovia, Aug 15 (AFP)—Liberian rebels have been blocked for a week near the James Spriggs Payne Airport, four kilometers (2.5 miles) east of their objective—President Samuel Doe's Executive Mansion. The torrential rains which have been falling intermittently on Monrovia and the desperate resistance of the remaining government soldiers entrenched around the airport have dampened the ardour of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebels.

All of their attacks thus far have failed, and the combatants of NPFL leader Charles Taylor are beginning to be overtaken by fatigue. Some 100 men gathered Tuesday [14 Aug] afternoon in front of the West German Embassy, the rebel fall-back position in the semi-residential Sinkor neighborhood.

NPFL leaders had decided to launch a large-scale offensive to try to break the government forces' hold on the airport, and Edward Mineh, commander of the NPFL's first battalion, was on the scene to direct the attack. Dressed in a baseball cap and dungarees, with two grenades on his chest, a Colt revolver in his belt and a U.S.-made M-16 rifle in his hand, he harangued his troops before sending them into action.

A somber-faced 13-year-old known as Junior followed in his foot-steps. He wore a bullet-proof vest which reached down to his knees and a policeman's belt around his waist which held a bayonet. On his back, he carried an AK-47 assault rifle. But the child was unable to resist temptation when he saw an abandoned tricycle on the road and took it for a short ride along the road. His joy ride was quickly interrupted by the commander, who ordered him to get into his vehicle. Junior sullenly obeyed.

Several ammunition cases were broken open during the preparations. Some of them bore their origin in black letters: "Tripoli-Libya." A yellow truck approached, driving in reverse, with a four barrel anti-aircraft cannon mounted on its bed. "Move, move," yelled Edward Mineh.

Fifty men moved off by foot. One group moved along Kataka Highway, bordering the ocean, while another moved down a small road leading to Old Congotown road, which would take them to the airport. The other fighters milled around among their vehicles in front of the West German Embassy. "Move on," yelled Edward Mineh, waving his rifle. After milling about for an hour, the last fighters left for the front, covered by the anti-aircraft cannon.

To their great surprise, they met no resistance during their advance, moving forward two kilometers (1.2 miles) and bringing their artillery within range of the airport runway.

Five shots were fired, and the cannon left for the rear. It was followed by a group of fighters, insulted by their commanders who could not hold them back.

The operation was a failure. The rebels did not break through the government lines and the ground gained during the day was lost during their withdrawals.

Taylor on 'Dictator Club', Doe Evacuation

AB1608090090 London BBC World Service
in English 0730 GMT 16 Aug 90

[From the "Network Africa" program, Fergus Nicoll report; italicized passages are recorded]

[Excerpt] The first news is about Liberia. All eyes are on Banjul, the Gambian capital, today to see whether a peaceful settlement of the Liberian civil war can be agreed. With the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] Monitoring Force preparing itself in Sierra Leone, the force's leader, Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo, is due to meet in Banjul today with President Sir Dawda Jawara, incumbent ECOWAS chairman, and, more significantly, the Liberian rebel leader, Charles Taylor. Taylor has stated his opposition to any military intervention:

[Taylor] *It is a matter of pride, it is a matter of dignity, and I think it is an internal matter for the Liberian people to solve. This whole concept of the little regional dictatorship club—When my friend is in trouble, I come and help him because I am a dictator—I am not going to accept for our people. And the people will, as citizens of this country, resist any soldier landing on Liberian soil if he is not brought here upon my request.*

Charles Taylor. I called Network reporter Peter da Costa in Banjul, who is expected to be there for the talks:

[Da Costa] *Oh, we expect to see Dr. Abass Bundu, the executive secretary of ECOWAS, arriving in Banjul this morning, along with several foreign ministers of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee.*

[Nicoll] *Any news of General Quainoo?*

[Da Costa] *My sources tell me that Gen. Arnold Quainoo, who is Ghana's top-ranking military officer, will be in Banjul as well today.*

[Nicoll] *And I suppose the biggest question mark is: Will Charles Taylor in fact turn up? Do you have any evidence on that?*

[Da Costa] *Yes, I am informed that Charles Taylor will be here.*

Peter da Costa in Banjul. But even if he shows up, will Taylor agree to a cease-fire and the monitoring force? Elizabeth Blunt, our West Africa correspondent, assesses Taylor's options:

[Blunt] *It depends really how sure Taylor feels he is going to win. If he thinks victory is very easily within his grasp,*

then he has very little incentive to agree. He would want to stall and temporize and delay. If, on the other hand, he is getting bogged down—and his men do not seem to have advanced much in recent days—then perhaps he might agree to the cease-fire.

Elizabeth Blunt. So the table is set, awaiting the participants. In Freetown, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group known as ECOMOG is getting ready. Around 2,000 men from The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria—the biggest contingent—and Sierra Leone, have been mustered along with the small fleet of naval vessels. Togo has said they will contribute troops too. But logistics might be a problem, something acknowledged yesterday by Ghana's ambassador to Sierra Leone, A.K. Twumasi: transport, supplies, and communications. Rumors have been flying around Freetown that the United States would step in to help ECOMOG with communications. I called the U.S. State Department in Washington, and was given this statement, stressing American commitment. [passage omitted]

The situation in Monrovia meanwhile is as grim as ever. Government and rebel troops stop, hold, and kill civilians on the slightest charge. Linda Blake is a British camerawoman who has just returned from Liberia.

[Blake] *Several of the people had been arrested on suspicion of being foreign spies. Basically, these are people who had seen no reason to lie about the fact that they had a Nigerian father or a Ghanaian mother, and instantly, on admitting this, had been arrested and were bound to be executed on suspicion of being foreign spies. There was no process of investigation. Suspicion is tantamount to guilt, and execution inevitably followed arrest.*

Linda Blake, a camerawoman just returned from Liberia. Foreign nationals are still getting out when they can. Yesterday, a Spanish Air Force plane took their ambassador and the papal nuncio to safety in Europe. They had escaped from Monrovia by being airlifted out by American Marines. But if Taylor does not accept the peace-keeping force, what will happen to ECOWAS nationals trapped inside Liberia? Elizabeth Blunt:

[Blunt] *The people who have been leaving Liberia—and that is both Liberians, other West Africans, and European and North American foreigners—they have all said the same thing. They are all really afraid that it will come to violence between the peace-keeping force and Taylor's people, and then all hell will be let loose, and the people who will suffer most are the Ghanaians, the Nigerians, and particularly the Guineans, because they get it two ways. They get it through their nationality, being mixed up with the ECOWAS force, and they get it because very many of them are Mandingo, and the rebels are pursuing a sort of vendetta against the Mandingo people.*

Elizabeth Blunt. One man who shows no signs of leaving—indeed his keenness on ECOMOG indicates his belief that he may just yet survive, is President Samuel Doe. The United States has offered him an airlift out. Charles Taylor says, that he will not allow [it].

[Taylor] *I cannot permit Doe to leave this country now. And the only conflict I will have with the United States right now: They have offered to evacuate Doe. I am telling you, we are not going to permit Doe to be evacuated from this country now because it is sheer wickedness on his part to the people of this country to continue this conflict, especially when he is in an absolutely no-win situation.*

That is the voice of National Patriotic Front leader, Charles Taylor.

Mali

Amnesty Calls for Halt to Tuareg Killings

AB1608081590 Paris AFP in English 0159 GMT
16 Aug 90

[Text] London, Aug 16 (AFP)—Amnesty International on Wednesday [15 Aug] called on the Mali Government to halt the "unlawful killings" by security forces of members of the Tuareg ethnic group. Amnesty said at least 29 Tuaregs, a Berber people of the Sahara, had been publicly executed in the northeast of Mali, notably in the towns of Menaka, Gao, Kidal, Tin Essako and the Tasmema region. The victims included women and children, Amnesty said. In a communique released here, Amnesty said that among the executed were Akmed Ag Makhakha, 80, leader of the Ichadanharen Tuareg group, and Issouf Ag Dandan, a leader of the Malian People's Democratic Union. Some of the victims had been tortured and others crushed by tanks, Amnesty said.

The international human rights organization called for an independent inquiry into the "extrajudicial killings," the release of the Tuaregs arrested, and an end to the torture.

The Mali Government announced a state of emergency and imposed a curfew in districts in northeast Mali following a series of Tuareg attacks in which more than 150 are said to have died. Amnesty said 120 Tuaregs had been killed by government troops during the clashes.

(Travellers from northern Mali, arriving in the Senegalese capital of Dakar, on Wednesday said several Tuaregs had been killed by government troops during recent mop-up operations launched after a June attack by Tuaregs on army posts.

(Radio Mali said on July 25 that calm had returned to the region.

(Travellers said mop-up operations were continuing. They reported numerous clashes between government forces and armed Tuaregs, official labelled as "bandits," leaving an unknown number of dead and wounded.)

Nigeria

Chairman on Aftermath of Elections, Manifesto

AB1508165190 London BBC World Service in English
1615 GMT 14 Aug 90

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Nigeria's two political parties must now demonstrate to the electorate that they have minds of their own and are not simply creations of President Babangida's government. Up until now, the NRC [National Republic Convention] and the SDP [Social Democratic Party], as the two parties are called, have been beholden to the government. The government chose their names, their politics, while civil servants drew up their manifestos. However, last Friday [10 August] the two parties were handed over by their government guardians to the newly elected chairmen and now face the first test in local government elections in February. The SDP, which is the leftist center party, has chosen a former ambassador, Babagana Kingibe, as its chairman. Sola Odunfa went to see him and asked him whether he agreed with the manifesto that had been drawn up for the party by the government.

[Begin recording] [Kingibe] Not at all, not at all. But let me say, speaking for the SDP, that this manifesto is drafted by technocrats to the best of my knowledge who have never tested the political waters in the real world outside. But the language, the presentation, and even the extent to which they address our own perception of the real national issue are somewhat really at variance with what we would like to see in the manifesto and in any case, I do not, for one, believe that a manifesto, one just does not frame a manifesto for all [words indistinct] going into the minutest details of policies and issues in all fields of activity.

For now, government has directed that we, the new executives of the party, review their own draft and that we will do so accordingly and submit so that the sooner we get hold of the parties [words indistinct] compatible with our wishes, the better.

[Odunfa] Do you foresee fundamental changes?

[Kingibe] Well, I think that will depend on the wishes of my party. If it is the wish of the party that we should have fundamental changes, so there will be.

[Odunfa] What are your priorities for now as chairman of the SDP?

[Kingibe] Clearly, the SDP—if one can liken it to what Jesse Jackson called the rainbow coalition—it is a party that harbors various political tendencies that have come together under the roof of the SDP. Now that we have held the elections, obviously, I would like to heal the wounds of the aftermath of the elections. I would like to make sure that the past political associations to which various members belonged are buried deep, (?very) deep,

and that we now all get our hands on deck and work consciously for the SDP. That is the first that I am planning to do.

The second plan that I have is to maintain the image of the SDP, and right now, I am very glad and this is really the essence of democracy, that the nation has a (?choice). There is the SDP on the one hand, there is the NRC [National Republic Convention] on the other. Even up to this stage, they have seen the manner in which the SDP has conducted itself, in a dignified manner, in a responsible manner. I would like to believe that the people of this country will prefer to entrust the government of this country to people who fought elections on the platform of what they could visibly see to be a responsible group, and I would like to build on that image. [end recording]

Military Leaders on Governors' Retirement

*AB1508181690 Lagos Domestic Service in English
0600 GMT 15 Aug 90*

[Excerpts] The chief of General Staff, Vice Admiral August Aikhomu, and the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Sani Abacha, have shed more light on the retirement of three former governors from the Armed Forces. The two [words indistinct] at the end of a meeting of the National Council of States at Dodan Barracks. State correspondent Reginald Okwochie has the rest of the story.

[Begin Okwochie recording] The three former governors are Wing Commander Issa Mohammed, Commodore Ibe Princwell, and Colonel Mamman Daura. State House correspondents had wanted to know if their compulsory retirements from the Armed Forces was not a severe penalty. The Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha responded. He said the action was taken after detailed investigations into the conduct of the three officers while they were in office.

Lt. Gen. Abacha said that there were laid down rules and regulations for the discipline of military officers. He stated that as far as he was concerned, the punishment meted out to the three former governors was adequate.

The Chief of General Staff Vice Admiral August Aikhomu added his voice to (?that of the chief of staff). He stated that the three officers were rebuked not because they misappropriated public funds, but because there were certain expenditures they made without clearance from the General Staff Headquarters. [passage omitted]

On the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] peacekeeping forces to Liberia, Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha disclosed that Nigeria is sending a battalion, which is about 1,000 soldiers. The troops, he said, will be given support by the Navy and Air Force. Lt. Gen. Abacha said that the commander of the peacekeeping force, Gen. Arnold Quainoo of Ghana, has been making contacts [words indistinct] for the final movement of the ECOWAS joint military force. [end recording]

Sierra Leone

'Logistics' Causing Delays for ECOMOG

*AB1508184590 Paris AFP in English 1802 GMT
15 Aug 90*

[Text] Freetown, Aug 15 (AFP)—Logistics problems are delaying the intervention in the Liberian civil war of a west African force being assembled here, Ghana's ambassador said Wednesday [15 Aug]. Although Ambassador A.K. Twumasi would not reveal what was causing the trouble, transport appeared a major hang-up, not to mention the failure to secure a cease-fire.

Military sources had earlier said the force would set off Thursday or Friday, but latest developments made those assessments look very optimistic.

Nearly 2,000 men from The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone have mustered here so far in the monitoring group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). But the only sizeable vessel in the harbour here is the Ghanaian merchant ship M.V. Tano, which brought in Ghana's 800-strong contingent.

Three Nigerian transport planes have flown in 250 troops from Lagos, and three small Nigerian naval craft are also in Freetown, but they cannot carry more than a handful of troops. Nigeria badly needs a secure airfield for the intervention, but the international Robertsfield Airport outside Monrovia is in rebel hands.

The National Patriotic Front (NPFL) of rebel leader Charles Taylor, which controls nearly all of Liberia, has warned that it will fight any foreign intervention. ECOWAS has called for a cease-fire, which the NPFL is refusing until Liberian President Samuel Doe goes.

Mr. Doe, who is under siege with his last 1,500 loyalist troops in central Monrovia, has not surprisingly welcomed intervention. Dissident Liberian rebel Prince Johnson, whose forces are thought to control the port area, has also backed intervention.

NPFL claims on Tuesday to have killed Mr. Johnson caused major consternation among ECOMOG until the reports were proved wrong.

On Tuesday, military sources here said the intervention force would carry out a special aerial reconnaissance mission over Liberia by Thursday night. Ghana's President Jerry Rawlings wanted to take charge of the mission using his air force experience, the sources added.

ECOWAS To Insist Taylor Accept Cease-Fire

*AB1608075890 Accra Domestic Service in English
0700 GMT 16 Aug 90*

[Text] The Gambian president, Sir Dawda Jawara, meets the leader of the rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia, Mr. Charles Taylor, in Banjul today to discuss the operation of the ECOWAS [Economic Community

of West African States] Monitoring Group, ECOMOG. The ECOMOG commander, General Arnold Quainoo, has flown from Freetown, Sierra Leone, to Banjul for the meeting. Also expected at the talks are the ECOWAS secretary general, Dr. Abass Bundu, and foreign ministers of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee.

The leaders will make it clear to Mr. Charles Taylor that if he refuses a cease-fire, the ECOMOG, which has assembled in Sierra Leone, will still move into Liberia.

One ECOWAS official said if Taylor wants an agreement, he will have to accept a cease-fire. He said what is

certain is that the heads of state of ECOWAS have decided that the force is going to Liberia at all cost.

General Quainoo has said that he wants to secure a cease-fire in Liberia before the ECOMOG peace-keeping operation can begin.

Mr. Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia, which controls nearly all of Liberia except for the center and northern suburbs of the capital Monrovia, has so far refused a cease-fire and has opposed foreign intervention. The port of Monrovia is controlled by a dissident rebel faction led by Prince Johnson, who has said he welcomes ECOWAS intervention in the civil war.

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